

# Regional and Global Peace Polls as a Factor in Policy Making<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

Public opinion surveys have been used for conflict analysis since World War II and were developed as an aid for conflict resolution in support of negotiations and instrument of public diplomacy in Northern Ireland in the 1990s (Irwin, 2002). What are now referred to as ‘peace polls’ have subsequently been employed to bring the views of critical populations into peace processes in a number of conflicts around the world (Irwin 2012, 2016, Shamir and Shikaki 2010, Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci 2009). However, the application of this methodology has been done on an ad hoc basis and generally bespoke to a particular theatre of violence receiving international attention (UNDPKO, 2013). Significantly, the contemporary conflicts of greatest concern to the international community are not limited to national/state boundaries and by extension are not limited to national/state samples. These conflicts include, but are not limited to, the conflict over competing claims to seabed resources in the South China Sea, the conflict in the Ukraine and the conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a result of the Arab Spring (RUSI, 2015 and Pew, 2015 for public awareness of these conflicts). Critically, these kinds of ‘Glocal’ (Stewart, 2016) conflicts can not be adequately sampled and tracked with traditional national/state samples as they have local, national, regional, transnational and sometimes global characteristics. The costs of global samples based on national samples are too high to make them sustainable for tracking purposes and semi-global samples can miss important elements of such conflicts. Additionally both methodologies can also miss critical sub-populations engaged in violent conflict. The use of ‘Global Centric’ samples with appropriate boosters for critical sub-populations can solve these problems (Irwin, 2015a). This paper describes a polling project to develop and refine this new methodology to monitor and track conflicts with a global dimension. Specifically, with a focus on the conflicts with the most extensive global reach this project can examine the wars across the MENA region and West Asia and by extension their impact on violent conflicts involving Muslim populations around the world by addressing the following research questions:

- What are the minimum data collection requirements (sample sizes and time frame) for the effective analysis of public opinion and violent conflict in global, transnational, regional, sub-regional, national and local contexts?
- Which conflicts are purely local and/or national or have sub-regional, regional, transnational or global dimensions and to what extent and intensity and which groups are effected?
- What are the demographic profiles of groups in conflict at local, national, sub-regional, regional, transnational and global levels of analysis and by extension what is

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the potential for the expansion of these conflicts for populations sharing the same demographic characteristics?

- Which apparently unconnected conflicts share common characteristics perhaps regionally and/or transnationally?
- What is the perceived threat locally, regionally and globally of the conflicts sampled?
- What is the extent and demographic profile of the Sunni/Shia conflict?
- What ‘problems’ (requiring ‘solutions’) are perceived to be the causes of continued violent conflict, for which groups, with which demographic profiles in which conflicts, at what intensity, and what is the perceived role of state and non-state actors?
- Which communities locally, nationally, sub-regionally, regionally and globally will accept which ‘solutions’ for conflict resolution?
- What vehicles of dissemination can produce the greatest awareness of the critical parameters of global conflicts?
- What are the correlations and mismatches between fact and perception based data for both violent conflict and peace?<sup>2</sup>
- In what ways can ‘Big Data’ add insights to these analyses?<sup>3</sup>
- What research strategies and perceptions based sample designs can most effectively track and monitor global conflict on a cost effective sustainable basis?

## **Research Methods**

### **Public Perceptions, Conflict and Global Conflict Analysis Theory and Practice**

When it comes to conflict between different identity groups, perceptions by their members and leaders matter greatly in determining choices they make (Guelke 2004, Wolff 2006, Tonge 2014). Thus, public opinion polling can be an extremely useful tool to gather data which can be analysed to test hypotheses about causal factors at work in processes of escalation and de-escalation of conflicts and formulate effective policy responses. So far, public opinion research remains an under-utilised tool for conflict analysis. Significantly, the complex relationships between religion, culture, economy, society and politics are not being investigated systematically at the sub-state, state, regional and global levels of analysis. This serious gap in the academic literature dealing especially with the phenomenon of international terrorism (Blick et al. 2006, Bonney 2004, Esposito 2002) has been partially recognized by the policy community (European Commission 2005, Home Office 2004) and in some of the academic literature (Guelke 2006, Tonge 2014). Global conflict analysis is presently dominated by the existing fact-based Global Peace Index (GPI 2014) which uses UN and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2014) data to analyse the peace ‘profile’ of 162 UN member states annually while the International Crisis Group (ICG 2014) and International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS 2015) regularly report on about 60 or 70 countries subject to violent conflict. But these analyses do not systematically sample the views of local populations and their perceptions of peace, violence and the problems that they consider a threat to their security. They also lack the detailed demographics essential for the

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<sup>2</sup> The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) have agreed to make their fact based data sets available to this project to facilitate this analysis.

<sup>3</sup> DigitalGlobe have agreed to make their fact based data sets available to this project to facilitate this analysis.

social and political analysis of groups in conflict. Peace polls can do this and an instrument for general application has now been refined and tested for global deployment (Irwin and Deshmukh 2013; Irwin 2014a, 2015a).

#### **Existing and Proposed Global, Semi-Global and Sub-Global Public Opinion Polls<sup>4</sup>**

Table 1 summarises the major sample features of the two omnibus polls undertaken annually by Gallup and WIN Gallup International on a worldwide basis characterised here as ‘Semi-Global’. Two omnibus polls undertaken by Ipsos/MORI and Globescan characterised as ‘Sub-Global’ and the ‘Global’ sample proposed by the Gilani Research Foundation (Gilani, I. and Gilani, B. 2013). Significantly the high costs and length of time it takes to collect the Gallup World Poll and the limited global coverage of the commercial market research semi-global samples (here Globescan and Ipsos/MORI) render them less cost effective for tracking global events than the Global Centric sample proposed by Gilani. The WIN Gallup International End of Year poll falls somewhere between the other polls in terms of both cost and coverage but still falls short of the Global Centric model in terms of cost effectiveness, sample time and world coverage (Irwin, 2015a). Significantly ALL these polls require booster samples to monitor and track conflicts around the world, including the extensive Gallup World Poll.

Survey	Type of Sample	Number of States	Interview Methods	Global Sample %	Total Sample ‘n’	Frequency of Sample	Units of Analysis
Gallup World Poll	Semi-Global	120 (2014) <sup>5</sup>	Mixed	Up to 160 states at 99%	143,000	6 months, 1 and 2 Years	120 states
WIN Gallup International End of Year	Semi-Global	65 (2014)	Mixed	Weighted for global average <sup>6</sup>	64,000	1 Year	65 states
Globescan	Sub-Global	24 (2014) <sup>7</sup>	Mixed	65%	24,000	1 Year	24 states
Ipsos/MORI	Sub-Global	24 (2014) <sup>8</sup>	On-line	59%	17,580	As required	24 states
Gilani Research Foundation	Global	180	Mixed	99%	25,000	Less than 6 months	G20 plus 20 larger states and 35 regions

Table 1. Global, semi-global and sub-global surveys, the number of states sampled, interview method, per cent of global sample, sample size ‘n’, frequency of sample and units of analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Also see Smith (2015) for a review of the Globalization of Surveys.

<sup>5</sup> China was not included in 2014, which effectively reduced the Gallup World Poll sample by 18.9 per cent to less than 81 per cent. However when China is included the largest 120 states cover about 98 per cent of the world and 140 covers 99 per cent (Gallup 2014, Irwin 2015a).

<sup>6</sup> The largest 65 states cover about 90 per cent of the world (WIN Gallup 2014, Irwin 2015a).

<sup>7</sup> Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA (BBC 2014).

<sup>8</sup> Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United States (Ipsos/MORI 2014)

## **Data Requirements for a Global Centric Poll to Monitor and Track MENA/West Asia Conflicts with Booster Samples for Critical Populations in Regional, Transnational and World Context**

An earlier design for this methodology used a Population Proportionate to Size (PPS) sample plan in which the size of each sample was always the same fraction/per cent of the population being sampled (Gilani, I. and Gilani, B. 2013). This model was used for an earlier analysis of the sample requirements for a global conflict analysis survey using the ‘peace poll’ methods (Irwin 2015a). However, when this paper was presented at the WAPOR annual conference in Buenos Aires it was widely thought that a more efficient sampling plan could be achieved by reducing the size of samples for very large states, such as China and India, while increasing the sample sizes for relevant populations/states that were smaller, and then weighting the results accordingly. This has been done in Appendix I (in the Request for Proposal RfP attached as an Appendix) to produce a non-PPS sample where table 1 lists the samples achieved for each region, table 2 lists all the states in these regions with their tier/sample size classification and correction weights and table 3 rank orders the states by size with their estimated margin of error. The key features of this sample and its associated fieldwork include the collection of a 25,000 (n) Global Centric sample using a variety of sampling methods (internet, phone and face-to-face) as may be most appropriate in terms of cost effectiveness and accuracy. The collection of approximately 8,000 booster samples to document the critical populations required for conflict analysis, locally, regionally and globally. These are listed in Appendix II (in the RfP attached) to reflect the demographic profile of both the states in conflict and the parties/groups to conflict. They are a subset of all the conflicts listed in the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) database and reviewed more extensively in Irwin (2015a). The fieldwork for the completion of the Global Centric sample, its evaluation and the collection of the booster samples will not exceed six months in total.<sup>9</sup>

## **Products, analysis and outcomes**

### **Sample Produced**

The Global sample of 25,000 proposed here will be able to generate comparable results for the world as a whole (n=25,000), 3 zones of the world (n>5,000), 10 regions (n>1,000), 15 sub-regions (n>500) plus 2 countries at n=1000 (China and India), 23 at n=500, 16 at n=300, 2 at n=200, 36 at n>100, and 103 at n<100 for a total of 182 sampled states.<sup>10</sup> This sample will provide for detailed demographic analysis of all the research questions at the most appropriate level of world, zone, region, sub-region and/or large state plus correlations and factor analysis of all states globally with fact based data sets generated by the Institute for Economics and Peace and by DigitalGlobe when face-to-face interviews include GPS coordinates. However smaller states and sub-populations require boosters which, for this project, include all states and sub-populations affected by the MENA and West Asia wars regionally and globally detailed in Appendix II. Significantly, for example, the boosters for Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Somalia raise ‘n’ to 1000 with boosters for critical sub-populations in a further 20 states (Table 4 in Appendix I).

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<sup>9</sup> ORB International have provided a quote for this project to demonstrate both its economic and practical viability.

<sup>10</sup> In addition to having maximum sample sizes for states it may also be useful to consider minimum sizes of perhaps 50 to facilitate more accurate data collection and running fact based correlations.

### **Conflict Analysis**

There is a long tradition in IR theory using a levels-of-analysis approach (e.g., Waltz 1959, Singer 1961). Models for the analysis of intra-state conflict, too, have more recently drawn on this approach (Brown 1996, Brubaker 1996, Wolff 2001), and identified a range of actors and structures relevant to explain causes, consequences and settlements of such conflicts (e.g., Adamson 2005, Collier and Hoeffler 2001, Cordell and Wolff 2009, Crawford and Kuperman 2005, Kemp 2004, Abuza 2003, Frost et al. 2003, Smith 2005, Wolff 2006). Drawing on these various approaches, it will be possible to generate an analytical model to identify relevant actors and structures and their impact on the onset, duration, and termination of conflict at the sub-state, state, regional and global levels of analysis. Using a standard set of questions (Appendix III) that employs the scales and methods developed in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Middle East and Asia, a number of analysis can be completed that include: problems specific to the conflict being examined; problems common to most conflicts in comparative perspective; intensity of conflict and the role of state and non-state actors in conflict and peace making (questions 1 to 3). Critically the reports of respondent's perceptions will be analysed by all relevant demographic variables including the group affiliations of those subject to or involved in violent actions. As the same instrument will be used globally it will be possible to map both the reach of each conflict and its perceived impact comparatively with demographic breakdowns at the higher levels of analysis - national, regional, transnational and global.

### **Conflict Demographics**

The critical demographic parameters are gender, age, ethnicity, religious denomination, language, education, marital status, household, employment, income, urban/rural, type of habitat, size of town and region. All these variables are covered in the World Values Survey and other regional barometers in considerable detail so using a sub-set of these demographic questions is the way forward. Most importantly, by using the World Values Survey demographic questions it will be possible to check the accuracy of the Global Centric sample against the results of this research as all these results are in the public domain. However, the World Values Survey demographic questions are as long or possibly even longer than the whole of the questionnaire proposed here in Appendix III. With this point in mind a subset and/or reduced versions of the World Values Survey demographic questions should be used with care taken to make sure the units and categories are the same so that comparisons can still be made. Additionally, there are a few items that may need some special attention and these should be reviewed at the cognitive testing stage of the questionnaire. For example the coding for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 'employment' in 'militant' or 'paramilitary' as well as military organisations. Finally it will be necessary to include a political affiliation/preference question specific to each country. This is done in the World Values Survey with a 'who would you vote for/never vote for?' question. But given the importance of various 'militant' and 'paramilitary' groups in this survey it will be necessary to add or substitute a question along the lines of 'which group most strongly represents your views?' and 'does not represent your views at all?' followed by a country specific list that includes political parties, national groups of 'militants' and internationally banned transnational organisations that are on the major international organisation 'terrorist' lists.

### **Conflict Solutions and Remedies**

In consultation with parties to these conflicts (where possible) and representatives of the international community a brief series of possible ‘Solutions’ will be drawn up for inclusion in question 4. Significantly experience suggests that while local populations or states involved in such conflicts may consider various expert ‘Solutions’ negatively the wider international population/community may consider such expert ‘Solutions’ positively. Conversely some local populations may be willing to accept various expert ‘Solutions’ that some states/political elites, with conflicting interests, may find unacceptable. Other ‘Solutions’ may be acceptable to all. As the sample sizes are relatively small when compared with the traditional world polls it would be possible to run these Global samples as required. In this way the conflicts could be tracked with greater effect and, with a view to conflict prevention, management and resolution, it would be possible to test additional remedies in a timely manner using traditional peace poll methods where stakeholders are invited to propose and test remedies of their choosing.

### **Disciplines**

In addition to the primary discipline of peace studies within the broader discipline of political science and international studies, which would include conflict/war studies, diplomacy and international relations (specifically public diplomacy) and security studies. There is also an overlap with politics, international relations and development within development studies (fragile states for example). Significantly this project can bridge the gap between fact-based studies of conflict and perceptions-based studies of conflict. Until now perceptions based studies are mostly carried out on a state by state basis while fact-based studies are well established on a global basis through the work of the Institute for Economics and Peace. But these fact-based studies lack detail at the local level when it is needed and, critically, lack demographics designed for a detailed analysis of parties in conflict. This project will generate a data set that addresses these omissions and will create an opportunity to combine these two methods of fact and perceptions analysis at a global level including DigitalGlobe data for the GPS interviews in conflict zones.

### **General Dissemination**

ALL the results, analysis, reports and data sets can be published and made available on a dedicated portal for download, review and secondary analysis by any interested third party. The objective is to create the widest possible discourse on and about the views of local people’s caught up in and subject to violent conflict. By sampling and reporting on conflict globally two additional objectives can be met. Firstly no particular state will be the focus of selective political attention and secondly the opinion-based data can be added to various fact-based UN, EIU, GPI/IEP, DigitalGlobe and Pew Research (see Pew 2014) data for additional analysis and interpretation. For example when the IEP analysed their Global Peace Index (GPI) and Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) together the only strong correlation found was with police corruption (Irwin 2014a). This very narrow result is expected to fundamentally change when minority/group demographics are added in from the data collected here.

## **Impact**

### **New Methodology and Omnibus Service for Global Polls**

The development of a cost effective methodology for the collection of global public opinion will make such data significantly more available for the analysis of a wider range of problems that are increasingly global in character. The Global Centric sample methodology used here is new and will provide the researchers and polling organisations involved with this project invaluable experience in the practical management, collection and analysis of these kinds of data sets. The knowledge transfer value of this project/experience is considerable leading to the development of new markets and services through the deployment of this methodology globally.

Specifically the best way to make sure third parties effectively use the knowledge generated from this project is to get third parties actively involved in the project as partners. For example, as the Worldwide Independent Network of the Gallup International Association (WIN/GIA), comprised of 75 companies that cover 95 per cent of the global market. They presently run an annual international omnibus service that allows clients to include questions in their End of Year (EoY) poll that covers 68 countries (WIN Gallup International, 2014) and through this service third parties can be offered an opportunity to include their questions in the Global Centric sample generated by this project that covers 182 countries. This could be done as an add-on omnibus service through WIN/GIA and/or the World Association of Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) and their regional associations.

Importantly the Global Centric sample used for this project covers all of the states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OSCE), Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) countries. In this way a cost effective vehicle can be provided for the inclusion of timely international comparative surveys on development topics against which systematic conflict data can be made available for comparative analysis. In this context this project directly addresses thematic priorities such as the ESRC's 'Global Challenges Research Fund' of 'Shocks, security, risks and resilience' but there is no reason why third parties can not develop and run research questions to address other priorities of: building effective institutions in conflict-affected and fragile states; migration, mobility and development; and dynamics of inequality, innovation and inclusive economic growth as well as ODA and FCV (Fragility, Conflict and Violence) states in general (ESRC, 2016).

### **Integration with 'Big Data'**

DigitalGlobe is a leading provider of commercial high-resolution and advanced geospatial data are able to manage the explosion of location data from open source environments with the quantitative polling/surveys produced by this project. All the face-to-face interviews collected in conflict environments can have GPS coordinates which will allow DigitalGlobe to integrate these observations with all their other data sets to generate and visualize a spectrum of 'big data' analysis across the MENA and West Asia region. All data in the public domain can be analysed with this partner in this way.

The Institute for Economics and peace can be consulted at each stage of the project to make sure the perceptions based data generated from this project are compatible with and complement the fact based data that they use for global conflict and peace analysis. By

providing local data to complement their global data and by also including critical demographics it will be possible to explore the ‘local’ verses ‘global’ dynamics of these ‘glocal’ conflicts. This can be done for the key MENA and West Asia states presently involved in various forms of conflict to help identify remedies with the potential for the greatest impact. In this way the application of this methodology to problems in the analysis of conflicts with global dimensions will generate new data on the relationships between local, national, regional, transnational and global aspects of these conflicts to better identify the potential levers of conflict resolution.

### **Institutional and Academic Partners**

Critically these data, top line results, analytical findings and recommendations can be made available to all parties with an interest in the mitigation and resolution of such conflicts. This can be done through a proactive programme of dissemination using all available channels of media communications, publication and consultation to ensure that both stakeholders and users can benefit fully from conceptual and instrumental impact and capacity building based on the quality and scholarly integrity of the underpinning research. These beneficiaries can be categorised into three main groups of stakeholders and users as follows:

- The peoples caught up in violent conflicts, local and regional authorities in states, state governments and regional and global IGOs with responsibilities for conflict resolution. For example regional IGOs would include the EU, African Union etc. and globally the UN departments of Political Affairs, Peace-building, UNDPKO, UNDP etc. World Bank and ICRC.
- National and international NGOs engaged in conflict resolution, human rights advocacy, humanitarian aid and development. National NGOs in conflict states are numerous and varied. Internationally a few relevant NGOs would include: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, No Peace Without Justice, Minority Rights Group International, International Crisis Group, Transparency International, Oxfam, etc.
- Students, academics and research institutions engaged in peace and conflict studies, religious and ethnic conflict, fragile states, development, security and public opinion/market research. This would include all universities, their relevant departments and institutions as well as relevant government think tanks (for example: Chatham House, RUSI in the UK, PRIO in Norway).

Additionally, as well as making all the results available to these various IGOs, NGOs and research institutes all of these organisations can be invited to be active partners in the project by sending them a brief concerning the methodology and research instruments and inviting them to include additional questions on an omnibus basis. In this way any interested IGO, NGO or research institute will be able to become an active partner with the costs of that participation covered by the relatively small cost of running their additional question(s). This can be done on a cost only basis for research that is shared with other participants in the project but it can also be done on a commercial basis for agencies that wish to keep the results of their research in house. In this way it is hoped to develop a service for this methodology as a sustainable commercial product for both the academic research community and other research agencies.



## **Communications**

The management of communications should be shared between the implementing research team, their institutions, research partners and primary polling contractor with input from the communications specialists in these institutions, organisations and companies. These specialists would be a necessary part of the management team. Significantly the Institute for Economics and Peace is one of the most successful NGOs in getting their message out placing the Global Peace Index and their other products at the top of global media attention for peace research. This project should take full advantage of their expertise in this regard as project partners (Institute of Economics and Peace - Consulting Services, available at: <http://economicsandpeace.org/consulting/>)

## **Discussion – Can public opinion research make a difference?**

All politicians in free and democratic societies know they can't ignore public opinion. Through good leadership they can help to shape public opinion, but when election day comes they must be on the same page as their voters. Knowing this, why are the views of Muslims around the world, most notably and recently in Syria, not given the full attention they deserve? Arguably, such omissions have helped to fuel civil wars and mass migrations of refugees across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Syria became a magnet for international Jihadists inspired by the Islamic State. The ISIS "franchise" expanded globally, while the Super Powers took sides with regional allies over the future fate of the Assad regime.

But the prospects for making peace in Syria were actually quite good, at least as far as the people of Syria were concerned (Irwin, 2015c). All sides had suffered terribly and they wanted an end to war. For example, with regards to the most serious abuses of human rights, it might have been assumed that only the Sunni—who rebelled against President Assad's rule—were the victims of the regime's excesses, but this was not the case. In a poll I ran on justice issues, Alawites also reported being subject to arbitrary arrest, torture and killing by the state military and security services. However, the Sunni were able to report their human rights abuses to their government agencies, NGOs and IGOs in opposition-held areas. Similarly, the Kurds reported abuses to the various Kurdish political parties that represented them in Syria. But the Alawites had no one they could report abuses to in government held areas. Significantly then, the Alawites placed the notorious and much feared Air Force Intelligence agency—established by Assad's pilot father, who was President before him—at the top of their list of institutions to be disbanded. The Sunni and Kurds, in common cause, did the same (Irwin, 2014b).

Polls conducted by ORB International in Syria and IIACSS in Iraq (Irwin, 2015c; Marcus, 2015) also confirm the people's desire for peace in the region. Three in four (75%) said it was "very/somewhat likely that Iraqis can put their differences aside and live side by side again" and 65% in Syria agreed with the same statement. With regards to ISIS, only 5% in Iraq said they were having a positive influence, rising to 22% in Syria at that time. However, while the numbers supporting ISIS were still in the minority, 81% in Syria and 85% in Iraq believed ISIS was a foreign/American-made group. Indeed, both UK, (Shehadi, 2014) and US intelligence analysts (Associated Press, 2015) attribute the rise of ISIS to the disbandment

of the Iraqi army, without pay, and disgruntled generals who sought revenge against the US and its allies following their invasion.

Similarly, polls run ten years ago in the UK suggested that Western foreign policy in the Middle East played a significant role in the disaffection and radicalisation of Muslims responsible for the 7/7 London bombings (Irwin, 2006, 2012). These grievances have remained unaddressed, only to be aggravated further by democratic deficits manifest in the Arab Spring and Sunni/Shia splits across the MENA region. All of these events, unfolding in the tragedy that is Syria, prompted King Abdullah of Jordan (2015) to tell the UN General Assembly that we are now in a third world war and in his most recent speech on this issue at the Arab Islamic-American Summit in Riyadh (Abdullah, 2017), he elaborated on this theme with four specific areas of concern that could be addressed as both ‘Problems’ and ‘Solutions’ in the research instrument described here.

- ‘First and foremost, is the grave challenge of terrorism and extremism. Only a holistic approach can address the complex layers of the threat, from its evil ideas to its attack on prosperity and security... this demands coordinated and global action at every level.’
- ‘A second and equally vital challenge is a just and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian cause.... No injustice has spread more bitter fruit than the absence of a Palestinian state. This is the core issue for our region, and it has driven radicalism and instability beyond our region and into the Muslim world.’
- ‘Third, safeguarding Jerusalem must be a priority. The Holy City is a strategic linchpin, vital to relationships among the three monotheistic faiths.’
- ‘A fourth critical task is to sharpen public focus on the values that will protect and enrich humanity’s future: mutual respect, compassion, and acceptance. In the Muslim world, the voice of traditional, moderate Islam has been stronger in recent years. We need to continue to build on that.’

Our world is clearly changing rapidly, and politics are no longer just local. Although we do not yet enjoy many benefits of democratic institutions above the state level, regional and global public opinion do help to shape the conflicts of the world. But it is not being used to its potential to find effective solutions. There are a few notable exceptions: Transparency International (2016) for example, does a very good job of monitoring public opinion and corruption in more than 100 countries, with a view to bringing the corrupt to public account. In addition, WIN Gallup International<sup>11</sup> samples world public opinion on a selection of critical issues of global concern on an annual basis. As an example, in 2015 WIN Gallup International’s chosen topic was serious breaches of international law and the imposition of UN sanctions (WIN Gallup, 2015a). A majority of the world’s citizens support sanctions as an appropriate action to be taken against member states that break their UN commitments. Not surprisingly, states under threat - such as South Korea and Ukraine South - most strongly support the sanctions that back their position (WIN Gallup, 2015a). On the other hand, the people of Palestine do not support sanctions, as such methods have not worked for them in their search for Israeli compliance with UN resolutions (WIN Gallup, 2015b).

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<sup>11</sup> See Win Gallup International, End of Year Survey’s available at: [http://www.wingia.com/en/survey/end\\_of\\_year\\_survey/](http://www.wingia.com/en/survey/end_of_year_survey/)

Clearly the successes and failures of all international and human rights law can be monitored in this way, globally, transnationally, regionally, and in states. It is especially important to monitor progress for minorities, as discrimination can all too easily lead to disaffection and violence. Monitoring such progress could now be done with a perceptions based peace index<sup>12</sup> Fact-based peace indexes<sup>13</sup> are able to track the intensity of conflicts, state-by-state, post fact and post mortem. The results are a chilling reminder of the failure of our international institutions established to prevent violent conflict. However, perceptions based indexes can track much more than this. They can tailor their demographics and focus their questions to explore any issue in any population. In other words, they can measure what people being affected by conflict actually think and the world should listen. Only by exposing the fears that people share, and their genuine hopes for peace—objectively, honestly, from all sides—can we begin to have the dialogue needed to prevent the tragedies unfolding before us. Public opinion as truth telling can do this and help to make the world a more just and safer place for all its citizens.

But we live in a world where such truths can be very inconvenient. Like the interest groups that wish to deny the facts of global warming interest groups exist that do not want to expose the objective realities of contemporary conflicts that have gone global. For example in 2015, at an event organised at the Royal United Services Institute to address the problem of violent extremism across borders the CEO of the Quilliam Foundation pointed out that it was a very great pity that they did not have a baseline study available of Muslim attitudes in the UK from 10 years ago on or about the time of the 7/7 London bombings (RUSI 2015). I pointed out that I had such a study and offered to both the Quilliam Foundation and head of the Prevent programme at the Home Office, who was also at that meeting, to update the questionnaire and run it again to track changes in UK Muslim attitudes over the past 10 years. In public opinion research terms this is a ‘gift’ a ‘no brainer’ but my offer was not accepted. Undoubtedly such a study would have exposed the inconvenient truth that the UK’s domestic Prevent policies and the foreign policies of the UK and her allies were not having the desired effect of improving the prospects for better domestic security from Muslim extremists in the UK.

Similarly proposals to undertake the programs of research described here to create an equivalent baseline study for the world have been met with the same institutional resistance. As long as the critical examination of the missed opportunities for peace making is an inconvenient truth for those who manage and mismanage our security and affairs of state the global polling industry will not be able to realise its full potential as a force for social good and creative political insight that we all know it can be. We need a paradigm shift and the proposal detailed here can do just that.

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<sup>12</sup> For review see Peacepolls at: <http://www.peacepolls.org/cgi-bin/generic?instanceID=30>

<sup>13</sup> See Institute for Economics and Peace at: <http://economicsandpeace.org>

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## APPENDIX - REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL AND TENDER

Dr Colin Irwin, Department of Politics, The University of Liverpool (*The Institution*)  
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Is requesting a proposal (RFP) and tender from eligible companies, or consortium of companies under the direction of a lead company, for the following service:

**Provision of a Global-Centric sample of public opinion on issues related to global violent conflicts with booster samples of critical minority populations.**

Closing date for receipt of RFP and tender: June 2016.

### GENERAL INFORMATION

Public opinion surveys have been used for conflict analysis since World War II and were developed as an aid for conflict resolution in support of negotiations and instrument of public diplomacy in Northern Ireland in the 1990s (Irwin, 2002). What are now referred to as ‘peace polls’ have subsequently been employed to bring the views of critical populations into peace processes in a number of conflicts around the world (Irwin, 2012). However, the application of this methodology has been done on an *ad hoc* basis and generally bespoke to a particular theatre of violence receiving international attention.

In their review of UN peacekeeping operations around the World the Senior Advisory Group (UN, 2011) noted that the views of local people were not systematically being sought to help resolve conflicts and they strongly recommended that this omission should be rectified. Accordingly the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) policies were reviewed to address this issue, which included the application of ‘pace polls’ (DPKO/NUPI 2013; DPKO, 2013). To this end, by mainstreaming ‘peace polls’ through their global application the views of local people can be made a normal part of every day conflict discourse and comparative analysis in conditions of both violent conflict and states of peace.

Significantly, the contemporary conflicts of greatest concern to the international community are not limited to national/state boundaries and by extension are not limited to national/state samples. These conflicts include, but are not limited to, the conflict over competing claims to seabed resources in the South China Sea, the conflict in the Ukraine and the conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a result of the Arab Spring (RUSI, 2015 and Pew, 2015 for public awareness of these conflicts).

Critically, these kinds of conflicts can not be adequately sampled and tracked with traditional national/state samples as they have local, national, regional, transnational and sometimes global characteristics. The costs of global samples based on national samples are too high to make them sustainable for tracking purposes and semi-global samples can miss important elements of such conflicts. Additionally both methodologies can also miss critical sub-populations engaged in violent conflict. The use of Global-Centric samples with appropriate boosters for critical sub-populations can solve these problems (Irwin, 2015). This polling project is being undertaken to develop and refine this new methodology to monitor and track conflicts with a global dimension.

## SAMPLE

Examining all the major conflicts in the world in global context is beyond the scope of this project. Rather it is designed to develop new methodologies that can accomplish this task. With this point in mind this project will focus on the conflicts which presently have the most extensive global reach, namely the wars across the MENA region and West Asia and by extension their impact on violent conflicts involving Muslim populations around the world. This will be done using the Gilani Research Foundation Global-Centric sample described in Appendix I with booster samples for critical populations as may be required.

It should be noted that an earlier design for this methodology used a Population Proportionate to Size (PPS) sample plan in which the size of each sample was always the same fraction/percent of the population being sampled (Gilani, I. and Gilani, B. 2013). This model was used for an earlier analysis of the sample requirements for a 'world peace poll' (Irwin 2015). However, when this paper was presented at the WAPOR annual conference in Buenos Aires it was widely thought that a more efficient sampling plan could be achieved by reducing the size of samples for very large states, such as China and India, while increasing the sample sizes for relevant populations/states that were smaller, and then weighting the results accordingly. This has been done in Appendix I to produce a non-PPS sample where table 1 lists the samples achieved for each region, table 2 lists all the states in these regions with their tier/sample size classification and correction weights and table 3 rank orders the states by size with their estimated margin of error.

The key features of this sample and its associated fieldwork can be summarised as follows:

1. The collection of a 25,000 (n) Global-Centric sample as described in Table 3. The fieldwork for the collection of this sample should be kept to a workable minimum number of weeks/months (probably more than 1 month but not exceeding 3 to 4 months) using a variety of sampling methods (internet, phone and face-to-face) as may be most appropriate in terms of cost effectiveness and accuracy.
2. The collection of approximately 8,000 (n) booster samples to document the critical populations required for conflict analysis, locally, regionally and globally. These are listed in Appendix II to reflect the demographic profile of both the states in conflict and the parties/groups to conflict. They are a subset of all the conflicts listed in the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) database and reviewed more extensively in Irwin (2015), *Constructing a 'World Peace Poll' in an age of Global Conflict*. The booster samples are prioritised to include all those listed with conflicts of 'High', 'Medium' or 'Low' intensity, with conflicts that are 'Archived' of less priority (IISS 2015). The size of the booster samples suggested here in Table 4 range from a maximum state sample size of 1000 for the most intense state conflicts down to a low of 100 to 150 for some of the local insurgent groups. The size of these samples is debatable and can be adjusted following the collection of the base Global-Centric sample of 25,000.
3. With the addition of the 8,000 booster samples the field work for the completion of the Global-Centric sample, its evaluation and the collection of the booster samples should also be kept to a total workable minimum number of months (probably more than 2 months but less than 6 months). However, it is understood that some 'Hard-to-Reach Populations' in conflict zones can sometimes be very difficult to sample requiring exceptional methodologies and/or exclusions with appropriate explanations and documentation.

## QUESTIONNAIRE

Using a standard set of questions (Appendix III) that employs the scales and methods developed in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Middle East and Asia, a number of analysis can be completed that include: problems specific to the conflict being examined; problems common to most conflicts in comparative perspective; intensity of conflict and the role of state and non-state actors in conflict and peace making (questions 1 to 3). Critically the reports of respondent's perceptions will be analysed by all relevant demographic variables including the group affiliations of those subject to or involved in violent actions. This can also be done at various levels including national, regional, transnational and global which in turn will require a standard sub-set of demographic questions which need to be decided in the context of the sampling requirements.

The critical parameters are gender, age, ethnicity, religious denomination, language, education, marital status, household, employment, income, urban/rural, type of habitat, size of town and region. All these variables are covered in the World Values Survey and other regional barometers in considerable detail so using a sub-set of these demographic questions is the way forward. Critically, and most importantly, by using the World Values Survey demographic questions it will be possible to check the accuracy of the Global sample against the results of this research as all these results are in the public domain.

However, the World Values Survey demographic questions are as long or possibly even longer than the whole of the questionnaire proposed here in Appendix III. With this point in mind a subset and/or reduced versions of the World Values Survey demographic questions should be used with care taken to make sure the units and categories are the same so that comparisons can still be made.

Additionally, there are a few items that may need some special attention and these should be reviewed at the cognitive testing stage of the questionnaire. For example the coding for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 'employment' in 'militant' or 'paramilitary' as well as military organisations. Finally it will be necessary to include a political affiliation/preference question specific to each country. This is done in the World Values Survey with a 'who would you vote for/never vote for?' question. But given the importance of various 'militant' and 'paramilitary' groups in this survey it will be necessary to add or substitute a question along the lines of 'which group most strongly represents your views?' and 'does not represent your views at all?' followed by a country specific list that includes political parties, national groups of 'militants' and internationally banned transnational organisations that are on the major international organisation 'terrorist' lists.

In consultation with parties to these conflicts (where possible) and representatives of the international community a brief series of possible 'Solutions' will be drawn up for inclusion in question 4. Significantly experience suggests that while local populations or states involved in such conflicts may consider various expert 'Solutions' negatively the wider international population/community may consider such expert 'Solutions' positively. Conversely some local populations may be willing to accept various expert 'Solutions' that some states/political elites, with conflicting interests, may find unacceptable.

## **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

It should be stressed that this approach to conflict sampling and analysis is not a substitute for detailed country/state samples and analysis but rather a vehicle for the sampling and analysis of conflicts in their wider context where conflicts are both local and global – ‘Glocal’. With its emphasis on the MENA and West Asia conflicts in regional and global context the data collected here will be used with other data sets to address the following research questions:

1. What are the minimum data collection requirements (sample sizes and time frame) for the effective analysis of public opinion and violent conflict in global, transnational, regional, sub-regional, national and local contexts?
2. Which conflicts are purely local and/or national or have sub-regional, regional, transnational or global dimensions and to what extent and intensity and which groups are effected?
3. What are the demographic profiles of groups in conflict at local, national, sub-regional, regional, transnational and global levels of analysis and by extension what is the potential for the expansion of these conflicts for populations sharing the same demographic characteristics?
4. Which apparently unconnected conflicts share common characteristics perhaps regionally and/or transnationally?
5. What is the perceived threat locally, regionally and globally of the conflicts sampled?
6. What is the extent and demographic profile of the Sunni/Shia conflict?
7. What ‘problems’ (requiring ‘solutions’) are perceived to be the causes of continued violent conflict, for which groups, with which demographic profiles in which conflicts, at what intensity, and what is the perceived role of state and non-state actors?
8. Which communities locally, nationally, sub-regionally, regionally and globally will accept which ‘solutions’ for conflict resolution?
9. What vehicles of dissemination can produce the greatest awareness of the critical parameters of global conflicts?
10. What are the correlations and mismatches between fact and perception based data for both violent conflict and peace.
11. What research strategies and perceptions based sample designs can most effectively track and monitor global conflict on a cost effective sustainable basis?

## DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES

The consultant will:

1. Pilot the questionnaire to further ensure its robustness as an analytical tool for comparative peace and violent conflict analysis.
2. Provide a vehicle for including the questions in established national surveys on a global basis through an appropriate consortium of polling contractors as may be required.
3. Translate and linguistically adapt the questions in national and local languages in order to take into account cultural differences and to ensure comparable results.
4. Manage the fieldwork and ensure quality control at every stage of the survey implementation.
5. Following fieldwork code and compile results into the agreed electronic format.
6. Provide access to the full data set and top line analysis through a dedicated portal in a timely fashion.

## MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS

In order to qualify, the consultant intending to bid must **certify** the following capabilities and provide supporting documentation in English:

1. The consultant(s) must have experience with surveys carried out on a global basis.
2. The consultant(s) should command the necessary logistical capacity to guarantee the coverage necessary for the collection of a Global-Centric sample as detailed in Appendix 1.
3. The consultant(s) must have experience and expertise to identify and sample key demographic groups (geographic, linguistic, ethnic, racial and religious) who are engaged in or are the victims of violent conflict nationally and/or transnationally.
4. The consultant(s) must document the soundness of the methodology used (including sample and questionnaire design, interview methods) and be able to ensure consistency in its implementation with the exception of critical 'Hard-to-Reach Populations', which may require exceptional methods, documentation and qualifications/omissions in some circumstances.
5. The consultant(s) must also be aware of and be able to take advantage of new methodologies (mobile, inter-net) as and when they are available and appropriate to use in order to increase country coverage with greater time and cost efficiencies.
6. The consultant(s) must have experience of translation and linguistic adaptation of complex survey questions in national and local languages of each of the countries where it operates.
7. The consultant(s) must have the capacity and experience to manage databases of complex surveys.

## **SCHEDULE AND BUDGET**

The consultant(s) must provide schedules and budgets as follows:

1. For translation, pre-test and pilot with delivered data set, analysis and recommendations for global implementation of the questionnaire using the Global-Centric sample with boosters.
2. Global implementation of the questionnaire with a delivered data set for the Global-Centric sample including booster samples.
3. Top line analysis and full portal access to all data and results.

## **PROCEDURE FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSAL**

Responses to this RFP and tender are to be submitted in English by the submission date of [to be decided].

*The Institute* reserves the right to require compliance with additional conditions as and when issuing the final solicitation document.

*The Institute* reserves the right to change the requirements at any time during the RFP and/or solicitation process.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact Dr Colin Irwin by email or phone.

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## **Appendix I**

### **The Size And Structure of The Sampling Plan For A World Peace Poll**

Conducted through the Global-Centric Method developed by the Gilani Research Foundation

#### **Introduction**

A more detailed account of the Global-Centric Method for global polls is available elsewhere and can be requested as needed (gilani@gallup.com.pk). Furthermore, a comparative evolution of global polling is provided in a paper prepared at the University of Chicago (Smith 2015), which cites, among other notable developments, the work on the Global-Centric Method. The purpose of this Appendix is to explain the key logic for the proposed sampling plan of approximately 25,000 interviews. The achieved sample will then be boosted to meet the specific requirements of the research agenda, which in this case is global conflict in the context of religion and geopolitics.

#### **Size And Structure Of The Core Sample (N=25,000)**

##### **Size**

The core sample of 25,000 interviews ensures that all Countries in the Tier # 1 Group (G20 plus another few with large populations) achieve a sample of at least 500 (1000 for China and India). It further ensures that another 16 countries achieve a sample of at least 300 interviews. These are Tier # 2 Countries. The considerations to be included in this and the remaining two tiers are the same as for Tier # 1. Which country falls in which tier is however debatable and can be negotiated among a group of experts. The relevant booster adjustments for both states and subpopulations for this project are given in Table 4, Appendix II.

##### **Geographical Structure Or Distribution Of The Sample**

Following the Global-Centric Sampling approach, a total sample of 25,000 was first allocated across the global population by taking countries as the basic unit and Population Proportionate to Size (PPS) as the allocation method. This is provided in Table 2. Some countries were over-sampled and others under-sampled in view of the Research Design and the varying degrees of error margins required of countries in each one of four tiers of countries as explained above. In other words the ideal PPS Sample was re-weighted to suit the Project Research Design. Accordingly the sample thus achieved has been labelled the **Proposed Sample (non-PPS)**.

##### **Weighting To Match The Population Of The Universe**

Since probability surveys should reflect the probabilities of any part in the universe of the surveyed population, a sample, which is disproportionate in character, requires to be weighted to match the distribution of the universe. The universe in this case is the global population. Consequently it is proposed that the achieved (disproportionate) sample be weighted to correspond with the census distribution of all countries in the global population.



The **Weighting Scheme** is provided in Table 2 of this Appendix with weightings for the major regions and selection of sub-regions in Table 1.

### **Explanation On The Size, Structure And Timing Of The Booster Sample (N=8,000)**

Considering that Global Peace has a special interest in analysing opinions in Conflict Zones, it is interested in achieving statistically reliable estimates for populations living in Conflict Zones. However conflict zones can be sub-national, national or trans-national. In fact, empirical data from previous studies show that conflict zones are more likely to be **sub-national** and **trans-national** in character. Consequently the sampling approach adopted in this proposal is to determine **conflict zone sample sizes** on the basis of the known demographics of the parties to the conflicts and the experience of experts familiar with public opinion survey work with those populations. These boosters are summarised in Table 4 with the rationale for these samples provided in Table 5, Appendix II. However, it should be noted that these samples can also be informed and adjusted from the findings of the core Proposed Sample Global Peace Poll (ex-post) rather than only on the basis of prior theoretical judgments about the structure of the conflict zone population (ex-ante) and that the booster samples should be adjusted accordingly.

As in the case of the Size and Structure of the **Core Sample** (n=25,000) size and structure of the Booster Sample (n=8,000) is also debatable and can be negotiated by a Group of Experts to meet the needs of specific research requirements.

### **Summary**

This Appendix explains the logic behind the four points identified in this Appendix: the **Size, Structure, Weights** of the Core Sample and the reason for the **Booster Sample**. The Key Tables are provided below.

**Table 1**

**REGIONAL SUMMARY OF PROPOSED GLOBAL SAMPLE (non-PPS)**

*(To be re-weighted as in Table 2)*

S.#		Population 2012*	Target Sample	Population Share %	Share in sample %	Weights
1	<b>NORTH AMERICA Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	348,794,531	1,000	4.9%	4.0%	1.238
2	<b>LATIN AMERICA Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	607,435,916	3,447	8.6%	13.8%	0.626
	<b>South America</b>	402,255,842	1,815	5.7%	7.3%	0.787
	<b>Central America</b>	165,086,917	1,130	2.3%	4.5%	0.519
	<b>Caribbean</b>	40,093,157	502	0.6%	2.0%	0.284
3	<b>Europe+ Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	544,685,401	5,452	7.7%	21.8%	0.355
	<b>Northwestern Europe</b>	260,303,753	2,218	3.7%	8.9%	0.417
	<b>Scandinavian Europe</b>	25,860,394	619	0.4%	2.5%	0.148
	<b>Southern Europe</b>	130,490,169	1,211	1.9%	4.8%	0.383
	<b>Eastern Europe</b>	128,031,085	1,404	1.8%	5.6%	0.324
4	<b>RUSSIAN - CIS Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	206,071,181	1,185	2.9%	4.7%	0.617
5	<b>Africa Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	858,946,145	2,960	12.2%	11.8%	1.030
	<b>East Africa</b>	236,004,406	643	3.3%	2.6%	1.303
	<b>West Africa</b>	318,500,013	736	4.5%	2.9%	1.537
	<b>Central Africa</b>	132,391,397	569	1.9%	2.3%	0.826
	<b>South Africa</b>	172,050,329	1,012	2.4%	4.0%	0.604
6	<b>MENA (Middle East-North Africa) Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	370,374,529	2,562	5.3%	10.2%	0.513
	<b>North Africa</b>	221,420,624	670	3.1%	2.7%	1.173
	<b>Fertile Crescent-Levant</b>	77,675,152	869	1.1%	3.5%	0.317
	<b>GCC+</b>	71,278,753	1,023	1.0%	4.1%	0.247
7	<b>TURKO-PERSIAN Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	254,881,944	1,595	3.6%	6.4%	0.567
8	<b>SAARC Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	1,672,222,171	2199	23.7%	8.8%	2.700
	<b>India</b>	1,236,686,732	1,000	17.6%	4.0%	4.391
	<b>Pakistan</b>	179,160,111	500	2.5%	2.0%	1.272
	<b>Bangladesh</b>	154,695,368	500	2.2%	2.0%	1.099
	<b>Bhutan</b>	741,822	1	0.0%	0.0%	2.634
	<b>Burma (Myanmar)</b>	52,797,319	103	0.7%	0.4%	1.820
	<b>Maldives</b>	338,442	1	0.0%	0.0%	1.202
	<b>Nepal</b>	27,474,377	54	0.4%	0.2%	1.807
	<b>Sri Lanka</b>	20,328,000	40	0.3%	0.2%	1.805
9	<b>ASEAN+ (East Asia) Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	555,606,494	1,445	7.9%	5.8%	1.365
10	<b>NORTH ASIA (CJK+) Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	1,586,799,631	2,495	22.5%	10.0%	2.258
11	<b>AUSTRALASIA PACIFIC (A-P) Region</b> <i>(Country-wise details available in the Master Table)</i>	40,556,957	680	0.5%	2.7%	0.202
		<b>7,046,374,900</b>	<b>25,020</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.000</b>

**Table 2**  
**MASTER TABLE TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSED SAMPLE AND WEIGHTING**  
**SCHEME**

S.#	Region	Sub-Region	Country Tier Group #	Countries	Population 2012*	Proposed Sample (non-PPS)	Share of Country Population in global population %	Share of Proposed Sample in global sample %	Correction Weights for proposed sample	Share of Weighted Sample in global sample %
1	North America	<i>United States</i>	1	<b>United States</b>	313,914,040	500	4.5	2.0%	<b>2.229</b>	4.5%
2	North America	<i>Canada</i>	1	<b>Canada</b>	34,880,491	500	0.5	2.0%	<b>0.248</b>	0.5%
3	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	1	<b>Argentina</b>	41,086,927	500	0.6	2.0%	<b>0.292</b>	0.6%
4	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	4	<b>Bolivia</b>	10,496,285	32	0.1	0.1%	<b>1.165</b>	0.1%
5	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	1	<b>Brazil</b>	198,656,019	500	2.8	2.0%	<b>1.411</b>	2.8%
6	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	3	<b>Chile</b>	17,464,814	200	0.2	0.8%	<b>0.310</b>	0.2%
7	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	2	<b>Colombia</b>	47,704,427	300	0.7	1.2%	<b>0.565</b>	0.7%
8	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	4	<b>Ecuador</b>	15,492,264	48	0.2	0.2%	<b>1.146</b>	0.2%
9	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	4	<b>Guyana</b>	795,369	2	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.412</b>	0.0%
10	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	4	<b>Paraguay</b>	6,687,361	21	0.1	0.1%	<b>1.131</b>	0.1%
11	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	3	<b>Peru</b>	29,987,800	100	0.4	0.4%	<b>1.065</b>	0.4%
12	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	4	<b>Suriname</b>	534,541	2	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.949</b>	0.0%
13	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	4	<b>Uruguay</b>	3,395,253	10	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.206</b>	0.0%
14	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	3	<b>Venezuela</b>	29,954,782	100	0.4	0.4%	<b>1.064</b>	0.4%
15	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	4	<b>Belize</b>	324,060	4	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.288</b>	0.0%
16	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	4	<b>Costa Rica</b>	4,805,295	54	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.316</b>	0.1%
17	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	4	<b>El Salvador</b>	6,297,394	71	0.1	0.3%	<b>0.315</b>	0.1%
18	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	2	<b>Guatemala</b>	15,082,831	300	0.2	1.2%	<b>0.179</b>	0.2%
19	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	4	<b>Honduras</b>	7,935,846	90	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.313</b>	0.1%
20	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	1	<b>Mexico</b>	120,847,477	500	1.7	2.0%	<b>0.858</b>	1.7%
21	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	4	<b>Nicaragua</b>	5,991,733	68	0.1	0.3%	<b>0.313</b>	0.1%
22	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	4	<b>Panama</b>	3,802,281	43	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.314</b>	0.1%
23	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	4	<b>Bahamas</b>	371,960	5	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.264</b>	0.0%
24	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	4	<b>Barbados</b>	283,221	4	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.251</b>	0.0%
25	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	3	<b>Cuba</b>	11,270,957	141	0.2	0.6%	<b>0.284</b>	0.2%
26	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	3	<b>Dominican</b>	10,276,621	128	0.1	0.5%	<b>0.285</b>	0.1%

				<b>Republic</b>						
27	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	3	<b>Haiti</b>	10,173,775	127	0.1	0.5%	<b>0.284</b>	0.1%
28	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	4	<b>Jamaica</b>	2,712,100	34	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.283</b>	0.0%
29	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	4	<b>Puerto Rico</b>	3,667,084	46	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.283</b>	0.1%
30	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	4	<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	1,337,439	17	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.279</b>	0.0%
31	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	3	<b>Austria</b>	8,462,446	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.300</b>	0.1%
32	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	3	<b>Belgium</b>	11,142,157	113	0.2	0.5%	<b>0.350</b>	0.2%
33	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	1	<b>France</b>	65,696,689	500	0.9	2.0%	<b>0.467</b>	0.9%
34	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	1	<b>Germany</b>	81,889,839	500	1.2	2.0%	<b>0.582</b>	1.2%
35	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	3	<b>Ireland</b>	4,588,798	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.163</b>	0.1%
36	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	4	<b>Luxembourg</b>	531,441	5	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.377</b>	0.0%
37	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	2	<b>Netherlands</b>	16,767,705	300	0.2	1.2%	<b>0.198</b>	0.2%
38	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	3	<b>Switzerland</b>	7,997,152	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.284</b>	0.1%
39	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	1	<b>United Kingdom</b>	63,227,526	500	0.9	2.0%	<b>0.449</b>	0.9%
40	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	4	<b>Cyprus</b>	1,128,994	8	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.501</b>	0.0%
41	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	3	<b>Denmark</b>	5,590,478	108	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.184</b>	0.1%
42	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	3	<b>Finland</b>	5,414,293	105	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.183</b>	0.1%
43	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	3	<b>Greece</b>	11,280,167	100	0.2	0.4%	<b>0.401</b>	0.2%
44	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	4	<b>Iceland</b>	320,137	6	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.189</b>	0.0%
45	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	1	<b>Italy</b>	60,917,978	500	0.9	2.0%	<b>0.433</b>	0.9%
46	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	4	<b>Malta</b>	418,366	3	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.495</b>	0.0%
47	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	3	<b>Norway</b>	5,018,869	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.178</b>	0.1%
48	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	3	<b>Portugal</b>	10,526,703	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.374</b>	0.1%
49	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	1	<b>Spain</b>	46,217,961	500	0.7	2.0%	<b>0.328</b>	0.7%
50	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	2	<b>Sweden</b>	9,516,617	300	0.1	1.2%	<b>0.113</b>	0.1%
51	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Albania</b>	3,162,083	29	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.387</b>	0.0%
52	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	3,833,916	36	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.378</b>	0.1%
53	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	3	<b>Bulgaria</b>	7,304,632	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.259</b>	0.1%
54	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Croatia</b>	4,267,000	40	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.379</b>	0.1%
55	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Czech Republic</b>	10,514,810	82	0.1	0.3%	<b>0.455</b>	0.1%
56	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Estonia</b>	1,339,396	9	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.528</b>	0.0%
57	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Hungary</b>	9,943,755	77	0.1	0.3%	<b>0.459</b>	0.1%
58	Europe +	<i>Eastern</i>	4	<b>Kosovo</b>	1,806,366	17	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.377</b>	0.0%

		<i>Europe</i>								
59	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Latvia</b>	2,025,473	14	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.514</b>	0.0%
60	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Lithuania</b>	2,985,509	21	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.505</b>	0.0%
61	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Macedonia</b>	2,105,575	20	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.374</b>	0.0%
62	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Moldova</b>	3,559,541	25	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.506</b>	0.1%
63	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Montenegro</b>	621,081	6	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.368</b>	0.0%
64	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	1	<b>Poland</b>	38,542,737	500	0.5	2.0%	<b>0.274</b>	0.5%
65	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	2	<b>Romania</b>	21,326,905	300	0.3	1.2%	<b>0.252</b>	0.3%
66	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Serbia</b>	7,223,887	67	0.1	0.3%	<b>0.383</b>	0.1%
67	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Slovakia Republic</b>	5,410,267	42	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.457</b>	0.1%
68	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	4	<b>Slovenia</b>	2,058,152	19	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.385</b>	0.0%
69	Russian - CIS	<i>Russian Federation</i>	1	<b>Russian Federation</b>	143,533,000	500	2.0	2.0%	<b>1.019</b>	2.0%
70	Russian - CIS	<i>Armenia</i>	4	<b>Armenia</b>	2,969,081	20	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.527</b>	0.0%
71	Russian - CIS	<i>Belarus</i>	4	<b>Belarus</b>	9,464,000	65	0.1	0.3%	<b>0.517</b>	0.1%
72	Russian - CIS	<i>Georgia</i>	3	<b>Georgia</b>	4,511,800	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.160</b>	0.1%
73	Russian - CIS	<i>Ukraine</i>	1	<b>Ukraine</b>	45,593,300	500	0.6	2.0%	<b>0.324</b>	0.6%
74	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	4	<b>Eritrea</b>	6,130,922	14	0.1	0.1%	<b>1.555</b>	0.1%
75	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	2	<b>Ethiopia</b>	91,728,849	300	1.3	1.2%	<b>1.086</b>	1.3%
76	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	3	<b>Kenya</b>	43,178,141	100	0.6	0.4%	<b>1.533</b>	0.6%
77	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	4	<b>South Sudan</b>	10,837,527	23	0.2	0.1%	<b>1.673</b>	0.2%
78	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	3	<b>Tanzania</b>	47,783,107	106	0.7	0.4%	<b>1.601</b>	0.7%
79	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	3	<b>Uganda</b>	36,345,860	100	0.5	0.4%	<b>1.291</b>	0.5%
80	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Benin</b>	10,050,702	16	0.1	0.1%	<b>2.230</b>	0.1%
81	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Burkina Faso</b>	16,460,141	26	0.2	0.1%	<b>2.248</b>	0.2%
82	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Cape Verde</b>	494,401	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.755</b>	0.0%
83	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Gambia</b>	1,791,225	3	0.0	0.0%	<b>2.120</b>	0.0%
84	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Ghana</b>	25,366,462	40	0.4	0.2%	<b>2.252</b>	0.4%
85	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Guinea</b>	11,451,273	18	0.2	0.1%	<b>2.259</b>	0.2%
86	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	1,663,558	3	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.969</b>	0.0%
87	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Ivory Coast - Cote d Ivoire</b>	19,839,750	31	0.3	0.1%	<b>2.272</b>	0.3%
88	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Liberia</b>	4,190,435	7	0.1	0.0%	<b>2.126</b>	0.1%
89	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Mali</b>	14,853,572	23	0.2	0.1%	<b>2.293</b>	0.2%
90	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Niger</b>	17,157,042	27	0.2	0.1%	<b>2.256</b>	0.2%
91	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	1	<b>Nigeria</b>	168,833,776	500	2.4	2.0%	<b>1.199</b>	2.4%
92	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Senegal</b>	13,726,021	22	0.2	0.1%	<b>2.215</b>	0.2%
93	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Sierra Leone</b>	5,978,727	9	0.1	0.0%	<b>2.359</b>	0.1%
94	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	4	<b>Togo</b>	6,642,928	10	0.1	0.0%	<b>2.359</b>	0.1%
95	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Burundi</b>	9,849,569	37	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.945</b>	0.1%
96	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	3	<b>Cameroon</b>	21,699,631	100	0.3	0.4%	<b>0.770</b>	0.3%
97	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Central African Republic</b>	4,525,209	17	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.945</b>	0.1%
98	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Chad</b>	12,448,175	47	0.2	0.2%	<b>0.940</b>	0.2%
99	Africa	<i>Central</i>	2	<b>Congo</b>	65,705,093	300	0.9	1.2%	<b>0.778</b>	0.9%

		<i>Africa</i>								
100	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Congo (Zaire)</b>	4,337,051	16	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.962</b>	0.1%
101	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	736,296	3	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.871</b>	0.0%
102	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Gabon</b>	1,632,572	6	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.966</b>	0.0%
103	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	4	<b>Rwanda</b>	11,457,801	43	0.2	0.2%	<b>0.946</b>	0.2%
104	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	3	<b>Angola</b>	20,820,525	100	0.3	0.4%	<b>0.739</b>	0.3%
105	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Botswana</b>	2,003,910	8	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.889</b>	0.0%
106	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Lesotho</b>	2,051,545	8	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.911</b>	0.0%
107	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Madagascar</b>	22,293,914	92	0.3	0.4%	<b>0.860</b>	0.3%
108	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Malawi</b>	15,906,483	66	0.2	0.3%	<b>0.856</b>	0.2%
109	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Mauritius</b>	1,291,456	5	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.917</b>	0.0%
110	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	3	<b>Mozambique</b>	25,203,395	104	0.4	0.4%	<b>0.860</b>	0.4%
111	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Namibia</b>	2,259,393	9	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.891</b>	0.0%
112	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	1	<b>South Africa</b>	51,189,307	500	0.7	2.0%	<b>0.364</b>	0.7%
113	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Swaziland</b>	1,230,985	5	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.874</b>	0.0%
114	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Zambia</b>	14,075,099	58	0.2	0.2%	<b>0.862</b>	0.2%
115	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	4	<b>Zimbabwe</b>	13,724,317	57	0.2	0.2%	<b>0.855</b>	0.2%
116	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	3	<b>Algeria</b>	38,481,705	100	0.5	0.4%	<b>1.366</b>	0.5%
117	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	4	<b>Comoros</b>	717,503	2	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.274</b>	0.0%
118	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	4	<b>Djibouti</b>	859,652	2	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.526</b>	0.0%
119	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	2	<b>Egypt</b>	80,721,874	300	1.1	1.2%	<b>0.955</b>	1.1%
120	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	4	<b>Libya</b>	6,154,623	13	0.1	0.1%	<b>1.681</b>	0.1%
121	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	4	<b>Mauritania</b>	3,796,141	8	0.1	0.0%	<b>1.685</b>	0.1%
122	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	3	<b>Morocco</b>	32,521,143	100	0.5	0.4%	<b>1.155</b>	0.5%
123	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	4	<b>Somalia</b>	10,195,134	22	0.1	0.1%	<b>1.645</b>	0.1%
124	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	3	<b>Sudan</b>	37,195,349	100	0.5	0.4%	<b>1.321</b>	0.5%
125	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	4	<b>Tunisia</b>	10,777,500	23	0.2	0.1%	<b>1.664</b>	0.2%
126	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	2	<b>Iraq</b>	32,578,209	300	0.5	1.2%	<b>0.386</b>	0.5%
127	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	3	<b>Israel</b>	7,907,900	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.281</b>	0.1%
128	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	4	<b>Jordan</b>	6,318,000	41	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.547</b>	0.1%
129	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	4	<b>Lebanon</b>	4,424,888	28	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.561</b>	0.1%
130	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	3	<b>Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza)</b>	4,046,901	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.144</b>	0.1%
131	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	2	<b>Syria</b>	22,399,254	300	0.3	1.2%	<b>0.265</b>	0.3%
132	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	4	<b>Bahrain</b>	1,317,827	15	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.312</b>	0.0%
133	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	4	<b>Kuwait</b>	3,250,496	38	0.0	0.2%	<b>0.304</b>	0.0%
134	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	4	<b>Oman</b>	3,314,001	39	0.0	0.2%	<b>0.302</b>	0.0%
135	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	4	<b>Qatar</b>	2,050,514	24	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.303</b>	0.0%
136	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	1	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	28,287,855	500	0.4	2.0%	<b>0.201</b>	0.4%
137	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	3	<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	9,205,651	107	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.305</b>	0.1%
138	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	2	<b>Yemen</b>	23,852,409	300	0.3	1.2%	<b>0.282</b>	0.3%
139	Turko- Persian	<i>Persian</i>	3	<b>Afghanistan</b>	29,824,536	100	0.4	0.4%	<b>1.059</b>	0.4%
140	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	3	<b>Azerbaijan</b>	9,297,507	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.330</b>	0.1%

141	Turko- Persian	<i>Persian</i>	2	<b>Iran</b>	76,424,443	300	1.1	1.2%	<b>0.905</b>	1.1%
142	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	3	<b>Kazakhstan</b>	16,797,459	113	0.2	0.5%	<b>0.528</b>	0.2%
143	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	4	<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	5,582,100	37	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.536</b>	0.1%
144	Turko- Persian	<i>Persian</i>	3	<b>Tajikistan</b>	8,008,990	110	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.259</b>	0.1%
145	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	1	<b>Turkey</b>	73,997,128	500	1.1	2.0%	<b>0.525</b>	1.1%
146	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	4	<b>Turkmenistan</b>	5,172,931	35	0.1	0.1%	<b>0.525</b>	0.1%
147	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	2	<b>Uzbekistan</b>	29,776,850	300	0.4	1.2%	<b>0.352</b>	0.4%
148	SAARC	<i>India</i>	1	<b>India</b>	1,236,686,732	1000	17.6	4.0%	<b>4.391</b>	17.6%
149	SAARC	<i>Pakistan</i>	1	<b>Pakistan</b>	179,160,111	500	2.5	2.0%	<b>1.272</b>	2.5%
150	SAARC	<i>Bangladesh</i>	1	<b>Bangladesh</b>	154,695,368	500	2.2	2.0%	<b>1.099</b>	2.2%
151	SAARC	<i>Bhutan</i>	4	<b>Bhutan</b>	741,822	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>2.634</b>	0.0%
152	SAARC	<i>Burma (Myanmar)</i>	3	<b>Burma (Myanmar)</b>	52,797,319	103	0.7	0.4%	<b>1.820</b>	0.7%
153	SAARC	<i>Maldives</i>	4	<b>Maldives</b>	338,442	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.202</b>	0.0%
154	SAARC	<i>Nepal</i>	4	<b>Nepal</b>	27,474,377	54	0.4	0.2%	<b>1.807</b>	0.4%
155	SAARC	<i>Sri Lanka</i>	4	<b>Sri Lanka</b>	20,328,000	40	0.3	0.2%	<b>1.804</b>	0.3%
156	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Indonesia</i>	1	<b>Indonesia</b>	246,864,191	500	3.5	2.0%	<b>1.753</b>	3.5%
157	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Brunei</i>	4	<b>Brunei</b>	412,238	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.464</b>	0.0%
158	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Cambodia</i>	4	<b>Cambodia</b>	14,864,646	24	0.2	0.1%	<b>2.199</b>	0.2%
159	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Laos</i>	4	<b>Laos</b>	6,645,827	11	0.1	0.0%	<b>2.145</b>	0.1%
160	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Malaysia</i>	3	<b>Malaysia</b>	29,239,927	100	0.4	0.4%	<b>1.038</b>	0.4%
161	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Philippines</i>	2	<b>Philippines</b>	96,706,764	300	1.4	1.2%	<b>1.145</b>	1.4%
162	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Singapore</i>	4	<b>Singapore</b>	5,312,400	9	0.1	0.0%	<b>2.096</b>	0.1%
163	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Thailand</i>	3	<b>Thailand</b>	66,785,001	200	0.9	0.8%	<b>1.186</b>	0.9%
164	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Vietnam</i>	2	<b>Vietnam</b>	88,775,500	300	1.3	1.2%	<b>1.051</b>	1.3%
165	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>China</i>	1	<b>China</b>	1,350,695,000	1000	19.2	4.0%	<b>4.796</b>	19.2%
166	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Japan</i>	1	<b>Japan</b>	127,561,489	500	1.8	2.0%	<b>0.906</b>	1.8%
167	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>South Korea</i>	1	<b>South Korea</b>	50,004,000	500	0.7	2.0%	<b>0.355</b>	0.7%
168	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Hong Kong</i>	4	<b>Hong Kong</b>	7,154,600	52	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.489</b>	0.1%
169	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Macao, China</i>	4	<b>Macao, China</b>	556,783	4	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.494</b>	0.0%
170	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Mongolia</i>	4	<b>Mongolia</b>	2,796,484	20	0.0	0.1%	<b>0.496</b>	0.0%
171	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Korea</i>	3	<b>Korea, Dem. Rep(North)</b>	24,763,188	119	0.4	0.5%	<b>0.739</b>	0.4%
172	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Taiwan</i>	2	<b>Taiwan*</b>	23,268,087	300	0.3	1.2%	<b>0.275</b>	0.3%
173	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>American Samoa</b>	55,128	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
174	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	1	<b>Australia</b>	22,683,600	500	0.3	2.0%	<b>0.161</b>	0.3%
175	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Fiji</b>	874,742	6	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.518</b>	0.0%
176	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>French Polynesia</b>	273,814	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.972</b>	0.0%
177	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Guam</b>	162,810	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
178	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Kiribati</b>	100,786	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
179	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Marshall Islands</b>	52,555	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
180	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Micronesia, Fed. Sts.</b>	103,395	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
181	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>New Caledonia</b>	258,121	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.917</b>	0.0%
182	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	3	<b>New Zealand</b>	4,433,100	100	0.1	0.4%	<b>0.157</b>	0.1%
183	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Northern Mariana Islands</b>	53,305	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
184	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Palau</b>	20,754	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
185	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	7,167,010	52	0.1	0.2%	<b>0.489</b>	0.1%
186	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Samoa</b>	188,889	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.671</b>	0.0%
187	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Solomon</b>	549,598	4	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.488</b>	0.0%

				Islands						
188	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Timor-Leste</b>	1,210,233	9	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.477</b>	0.0%
189	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Tonga</b>	104,941	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
190	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Tuvalu</b>	9,860	0	0.0	0.0%	<b>1.251</b>	0.0%
191	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	4	<b>Vanuatu</b>	247,262	1	0.0	0.0%	<b>0.878</b>	0.0%
	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Others</i>	4		2,007,054	3	0.0	0.0%	<b>2.376</b>	0.0%
<b>Total</b>					<b>7,046,374,900</b>	<b>25,020</b>	100.0	100.0	<b>1.000</b>	100.0

Legend: Country Tiers (see details in Methods Note)

**Table 3**  
**RANK ORDERING BY SAMPLE SIZE**  
**And estimated Error Margins**

S.#	Region	Sub-Region	Countries	Population 2012*	Proposed Sample (non-PPS)	Estimated Error Margin (%) Also Refer to error margin table below Table 3
148	SAARC	<i>India</i>	<b>India</b>	1,236,686,732	1000	± 2 - 4
165	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>China</i>	<b>China</b>	1,350,695,000	1000	± 2 - 4
1	North America	<i>United States</i>	<b>United States</b>	313,914,040	500	± 4 - 5
2	North America	<i>Canada</i>	<b>Canada</b>	34,880,491	500	± 4 - 5
3	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Argentina</b>	41,086,927	500	± 4 - 5
5	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Brazil</b>	198,656,019	500	± 4 - 5
20	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Mexico</b>	120,847,477	500	± 4 - 5
33	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>France</b>	65,696,689	500	± 4 - 5
34	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Germany</b>	81,889,839	500	± 4 - 5
39	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>United Kingdom</b>	63,227,526	500	± 4 - 5
45	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<b>Italy</b>	60,917,978	500	± 4 - 5
49	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<b>Spain</b>	46,217,961	500	± 4 - 5
64	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Poland</b>	38,542,737	500	± 4 - 5
69	Russian - CIS	<i>Russian Federation</i>	<b>Russian Federation</b>	143,533,000	500	± 4 - 5
73	Russian - CIS	<i>Ukraine</i>	<b>Ukraine</b>	45,593,300	500	± 4 - 5
91	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Nigeria</b>	168,833,776	500	± 4 - 5
112	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>South Africa</b>	51,189,307	500	± 4 - 5
136	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	28,287,855	500	± 4 - 5
145	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	<b>Turkey</b>	73,997,128	500	± 4 - 5
149	Saarc	<i>Pakistan</i>	<b>Pakistan</b>	179,160,111	500	± 4 - 5
150	Saarc	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<b>Bangladesh</b>	154,695,368	500	± 4 - 5
156	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Indonesia</i>	<b>Indonesia</b>	246,864,191	500	± 4 - 5
166	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Japan</i>	<b>Japan</b>	127,561,489	500	± 4 - 5
167	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>South Korea</i>	<b>South Korea</b>	50,004,000	500	± 4 - 5
174	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Australia</b>	22,683,600	500	± 4 - 5
7	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Colombia</b>	47,704,427	300	± 4 - 6
18	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Guatemala</b>	15,082,831	300	± 4 - 6
37	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Netherlands</b>	16,767,705	300	± 4 - 6
50	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	<b>Sweden</b>	9,516,617	300	± 4 - 6
65	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Romania</b>	21,326,905	300	± 4 - 6
75	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	<b>Ethiopia</b>	91,728,849	300	± 4 - 6
99	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Congo</b>	65,705,093	300	± 4 - 6
119	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Egypt</b>	80,721,874	300	± 4 - 6
126	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-</i>	<b>Iraq</b>	32,578,209	300	± 4 - 6



		<i>Levant</i>				
131	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	<b>Syria</b>	22,399,254	300	± 4 - 6
138	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Gcc+</i>	<b>Yemen</b>	23,852,409	300	± 4 - 6
141	Turko- Persian	<i>Persian</i>	<b>Iran</b>	76,424,443	300	± 4 - 6
147	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	<b>Uzbekistan</b>	29,776,850	300	± 4 - 6
161	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Philippines</i>	<b>Philippines</b>	96,706,764	300	± 4 - 6
164	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Vietnam</i>	<b>Vietnam</b>	88,775,500	300	± 4 - 6
172	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Taiwan</i>	<b>Taiwan*</b>	23,268,087	300	± 4 - 6
6	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Chile</b>	17,464,814	200	± 5 - 9
163	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Thailand</i>	<b>Thailand</b>	66,785,001	200	± 5 - 9
25	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Cuba</b>	11,270,957	141	± 5 - 9
26	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Dominican Republic</b>	10,276,621	128	± 5 - 9
27	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Haiti</b>	10,173,775	127	± 5 - 9
171	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Korea</i>	<b>Korea, Dem. Rep (North)</b>	24,763,188	119	± 5 - 9
32	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Belgium</b>	11,142,157	113	± 5 - 9
142	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	<b>Kazakhstan</b>	16,797,459	113	± 5 - 9
144	Turko- Persian	<i>Persian</i>	<b>Tajikistan</b>	8,008,990	110	± 5 - 9
41	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	<b>Denmark</b>	5,590,478	108	± 5 - 9
137	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	9,205,651	107	± 5 - 9
78	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	<b>Tanzania</b>	47,783,107	106	± 5 - 9
42	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	<b>Finland</b>	5,414,293	105	± 5 - 9
110	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Mozambique</b>	25,203,395	104	± 5 - 9
152	Saarc	<i>Burma (Myanmar)</i>	<b>Burma (Myanmar)</b>	52,797,319	103	± 5 - 9
11	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Peru</b>	29,987,800	100	± 7 - 11
14	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Venezuela</b>	29,954,782	100	± 7 - 11
31	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Austria</b>	8,462,446	100	± 7 - 11
35	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Ireland</b>	4,588,798	100	± 7 - 11
38	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Switzerland</b>	7,997,152	100	± 7 - 11
43	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<b>Greece</b>	11,280,167	100	± 7 - 11
47	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	<b>Norway</b>	5,018,869	100	± 7 - 11
48	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<b>Portugal</b>	10,526,703	100	± 7 - 11
53	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Bulgaria</b>	7,304,632	100	± 7 - 11
72	Russian - CIS	<i>Georgia</i>	<b>Georgia</b>	4,511,800	100	± 7 - 11
76	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	<b>Kenya</b>	43,178,141	100	± 7 - 11
79	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	<b>Uganda</b>	36,345,860	100	± 7 - 11
96	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Cameroon</b>	21,699,631	100	± 7 - 11
104	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Angola</b>	20,820,525	100	± 7 - 11
116	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Algeria</b>	38,481,705	100	± 7 - 11
122	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Morocco</b>	32,521,143	100	± 7 - 11
124	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Sudan</b>	37,195,349	100	± 7 - 11
127	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	<b>Israel</b>	7,907,900	100	± 7 - 11
130	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	<b>Palestinian Territories (West Bank And Gaza)</b>	4,046,901	100	± 7 - 11
139	Turko- Persian	<i>Persian</i>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	29,824,536	100	± 7 - 11
140	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	<b>Azerbaijan</b>	9,297,507	100	± 7 - 11
160	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Malaysia</i>	<b>Malaysia</b>	29,239,927	100	± 7 - 11
182	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>New Zealand</b>	4,433,100	100	± 7 - 11

107	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Madagascar</b>	22,293,914	92	± 7 - 11
19	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Honduras</b>	7,935,846	90	± 7 - 11
55	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Czech Republic</b>	10,514,810	82	± 7 - 11
57	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Hungary</b>	9,943,755	77	± 7 - 11
17	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>El Salvador</b>	6,297,394	71	± 7 - 11
21	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Nicaragua</b>	5,991,733	68	± 7 - 11
66	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Serbia</b>	7,223,887	67	± 7 - 11
108	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Malawi</b>	15,906,483	66	± 7 - 11
71	Russian - CIS	<i>Belarus</i>	<b>Belarus</b>	9,464,000	65	± 7 - 11
114	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Zambia</b>	14,075,099	58	± 7 - 11
115	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Zimbabwe</b>	13,724,317	57	± 7 - 11
16	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Costa Rica</b>	4,805,295	54	± 7 - 11
154	Saarc	<i>Nepal</i>	<b>Nepal</b>	27,474,377	54	± 7 - 11
168	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Hong Kong</i>	<b>Hong Kong</b>	7,154,600	52	± 7 - 11
185	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	7,167,010	52	± 7 - 11
8	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Ecuador</b>	15,492,264	48	± 7 - 11
98	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Chad</b>	12,448,175	47	± 7 - 11
29	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Puerto Rico</b>	3,667,084	46	± 7 - 11
22	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Panama</b>	3,802,281	43	± 7 - 11
103	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Rwanda</b>	11,457,801	43	± 7 - 11
67	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Slovakia Republic</b>	5,410,267	42	± 7 - 11
128	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	<b>Jordan</b>	6,318,000	41	± 7 - 11
54	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Croatia</b>	4,267,000	40	± 7 - 11
84	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Ghana</b>	25,366,462	40	± 7 - 11
155	SAARC	<i>Sri Lanka</i>	<b>Sri Lanka</b>	20,328,000	40	± 7 - 11
134	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	<b>Oman</b>	3,314,001	39	± 7 - 11
133	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>GCC+</i>	<b>Kuwait</b>	3,250,496	38	± 7 - 11
95	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Burundi</b>	9,849,569	37	± 7 - 11
143	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	5,582,100	37	± 7 - 11
52	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Bosnia And Herzegovina</b>	3,833,916	36	± 7 - 11
146	Turko- Persian	<i>Turko</i>	<b>Turkmenistan</b>	5,172,931	35	± 7 - 11
28	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Jamaica</b>	2,712,100	34	± 7 - 11
4	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Bolivia</b>	10,496,285	32	± 7 - 11
87	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Ivory Coast - Cote D Ivoire</b>	19,839,750	31	± 7 - 11
51	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Albania</b>	3,162,083	29	± 7 - 11
129	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Fertile Crescent-Levant</i>	<b>Lebanon</b>	4,424,888	28	± 7 - 11
90	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Niger</b>	17,157,042	27	± 7 - 11
81	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Burkina Faso</b>	16,460,141	26	± 7 - 11
62	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Moldova</b>	3,559,541	25	± 7 - 11
135	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Gcc+</i>	<b>Qatar</b>	2,050,514	24	± 7 - 11
158	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Cambodia</i>	<b>Cambodia</b>	14,864,646	24	± 7 - 11
77	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	<b>South Sudan</b>	10,837,527	23	± 7 - 11
89	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Mali</b>	14,853,572	23	± 7 - 11
125	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Tunisia</b>	10,777,500	23	± 7 - 11
92	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Senegal</b>	13,726,021	22	± 7 - 11
123	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Somalia</b>	10,195,134	22	± 7 - 11
10	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Paraguay</b>	6,687,361	21	± 7 - 11
60	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Lithuania</b>	2,985,509	21	± 7 - 11
61	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Macedonia</b>	2,105,575	20	± 7 - 11
70	Russian - Cis	<i>Armenia</i>	<b>Armenia</b>	2,969,081	20	± 7 - 11
170	North Asia (Cjk+)	<i>Mongolia</i>	<b>Mongolia</b>	2,796,484	20	± 7 - 11
68	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Slovenia</b>	2,058,152	19	± 7 - 11
85	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Guinea</b>	11,451,273	18	± 7 - 11
30	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Trinidad And Tobago</b>	1,337,439	17	± 7 - 11

58	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Kosovo</b>	1,806,366	17	± 7 - 11
97	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Central African Republic</b>	4,525,209	17	± 7 - 11
80	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Benin</b>	10,050,702	16	± 7 - 11
100	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Congo (Zaire)</b>	4,337,051	16	± 7 - 11
132	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>Gcc+</i>	<b>Bahrain</b>	1,317,827	15	± 7 - 11
59	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Latvia</b>	2,025,473	14	± 7 - 11
74	Africa	<i>East Africa</i>	<b>Eritrea</b>	6,130,922	14	± 7 - 11
120	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Libya</b>	6,154,623	13	± 7 - 11
159	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Laos</i>	<b>Laos</b>	6,645,827	11	± 7 - 11
13	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Uruguay</b>	3,395,253	10	± 7 - 11
94	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Togo</b>	6,642,928	10	± 7 - 11
56	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Estonia</b>	1,339,396	9	± 7 - 11
93	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Sierra Leone</b>	5,978,727	9	± 7 - 11
111	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Namibia</b>	2,259,393	9	± 7 - 11
162	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Singapore</i>	<b>Singapore</b>	5,312,400	9	± 7 - 11
188	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Timor-Leste</b>	1,210,233	9	± 7 - 11
40	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<b>Cyprus</b>	1,128,994	8	± 7 - 11
105	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Botswana</b>	2,003,910	8	± 7 - 11
106	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Lesotho</b>	2,051,545	8	± 7 - 11
121	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Mauritania</b>	3,796,141	8	± 7 - 11
88	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Liberia</b>	4,190,435	7	± 7 - 11
44	Europe +	<i>Scandinavian Europe</i>	<b>Iceland</b>	320,137	6	± 7 - 11
63	Europe +	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<b>Montenegro</b>	621,081	6	± 7 - 11
102	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Gabon</b>	1,632,572	6	± 7 - 11
175	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Fiji</b>	874,742	6	± 7 - 11
23	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Bahamas</b>	371,960	5	± 7 - 11
36	Europe +	<i>Northwestern Europe</i>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	531,441	5	± 7 - 11
109	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Mauritius</b>	1,291,456	5	± 7 - 11
113	Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	<b>Swaziland</b>	1,230,985	5	± 7 - 11
15	Latin America	<i>Central America</i>	<b>Belize</b>	324,060	4	± 7 - 11
24	Latin America	<i>Caribbean</i>	<b>Barbados</b>	283,221	4	± 7 - 11
169	North Asia (CJK+)	<i>Macao, China</i>	<b>Macao, China</b>	556,783	4	± 7 - 11
187	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Solomon Islands</b>	549,598	4	± 7 - 11
46	Europe +	<i>Southern Europe</i>	<b>Malta</b>	418,366	3	± 7 - 11
83	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Gambia</b>	1,791,225	3	± 7 - 11
86	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	1,663,558	3	± 7 - 11
101	Africa	<i>Central Africa</i>	<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	736,296	3	± 7 - 11
	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Others</i>		2,007,054	3	± 7 - 11
9	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Guyana</b>	795,369	2	± 7 - 11
12	Latin America	<i>South America</i>	<b>Suriname</b>	534,541	2	± 7 - 11
117	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Comoros</b>	717,503	2	± 7 - 11
118	Mena (Middle East - North Africa)	<i>North Africa</i>	<b>Djibouti</b>	859,652	2	± 7 - 11
82	Africa	<i>West Africa</i>	<b>Cape Verde</b>	494,401	1	± 7 - 11
151	SAARC	<i>Bhutan</i>	<b>Bhutan</b>	741,822	1	± 7 - 11
153	SAARC	<i>Maldives</i>	<b>Maldives</b>	338,442	1	± 7 - 11
157	Asean+ (East Asia)	<i>Brunei</i>	<b>Brunei</b>	412,238	1	± 7 - 11
176	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>French Polynesia</b>	273,814	1	± 7 - 11
181	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>New Caledonia</b>	258,121	1	± 7 - 11
186	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Samoa</b>	188,889	1	± 7 - 11
191	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Vanuatu</b>	247,262	1	± 7 - 11
177	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Guam</b>	162,810	0	± 7 - 11
189	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Tonga</b>	104,941	0	± 7 - 11
180	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Micronesia, Fed. Sts.</b>	103,395	0	± 7 - 11
178	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Kiribati</b>	100,786	0	± 7 - 11
173	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>American</b>	55,128	0	± 7 - 11

			<b>Samoa</b>			
183	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Northern Mariana Islands</b>	53,305	0	± 7 - 11
179	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Marshall Islands</b>	52,555	0	± 7 - 11
184	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Palau</b>	20,754	0	± 7 - 11
190	Australasia Pacific (A-P)	<i>Australasia</i>	<b>Tuvalu</b>	9,860	0	± 7 - 11
<b>Total</b>				<b>7,046,374,900</b>	<b>25,020</b>	

<b>ERROR MARGIN TABLE</b>	
<b>Recommended Allowance for SAMPLING ERROR</b>	
<b>Sampling Size</b>	<b>Error Margin at 95% Confidence Level</b>
n= 0-100	±7 - 11%
n=101-200	±5 - 9%
n=201-400	±4 - 6%
n=401-600	±4 - 5%
n=601-750	±3 - 4%
n=751-1000	±2 - 4%
n=1001-1500	±2 - 3%
n=1501-3000	±2 - 3%

**Source: George Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Scholarly Research 1978**

**Table 4**  
**Summary of Booster Samples required for conflicts reviewed in Appendix II**

<b>State</b>	<b>Base</b>	<b>Booster</b>	<b>Total</b>
China	1000	n=300 in Xinjiang	1300
Philippines	300	n=150 Muslims ARMM and Zamboanga	450
Thailand	200	n=150 Muslims in Southern Thailand	350
Turkey	500	n=100 Kurds	600
Egypt	300	n=100 in Sinai	400
Iran	300	n=100 additional Kurds and Sunni	400
Iraq	300	n=700 boost	1000
Israel	100	n=200 (100 of which are Arab Israelis)	200
Palestine	100	n=200	200
Lebanon	28	n=400 (100 each of Christian, Shia, Sunni and Druze)	428
Libya	13	n=300 (100 west, 100 east and 100 south)_	313
Syria	300	n=700 boost	1000
Yemen	300	n=700 boost	1000
Azerbaijan	100	n=150 Nagorno Karabakh	250
Russia	500	n=150 North Caucuses	650
Tajikistan	110	n=100	210
Afghanistan	100	n=900	1000
Bangladesh	500		500
India	1000	n=300 in north east	1300
Pakistan	500	n=500 boost	1000
Ethiopia	300		300
Kenya	100	n=100 Muslims	200
Mali	23	n=300 (150 Toureg and 150 non-Toureg)	323
Nigeria	500	n=500 boost	1000
Somalia	22	n=978 (split between the three countries)	1000
Sudan	100	n=150 in Darfur (split between local and Arab pop)	250
<b>Total</b>	<b>7596</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>15624</b>
		<b>Oversample =Total-Base</b>	<b>8028</b>

## Appendix II – Booster Samples

**Table 5. States, regions, state populations, required booster samples, type and intensity of conflicts listed in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) database for conflicts that have connections with local and/or international Muslim communities.<sup>14</sup>**

State Sample (Non-PPS) + Booster = Total	Region	State Pop Non-PPS Sample	Booster Samples	Conflict Type and Intensity
China (1000+300=1300)	E Asia Australasia	1,368,440,000 (n=1000)	Uyghur and Han in Xinjiang <sup>15</sup> (n=300)	Intra-State Medium
Philippines (300+150=450)	E Asia Australasia	101,063,700 (n=300)	Moro in ARMM <sup>16</sup> and Zamboanga <sup>17</sup> (n=150)	Insurgency Intra-State Low
Southeast Asian Islamist Terrorism	E Asia Australasia	439,595,883 (1,100)	Covered in Philippines (150) and Thailand (150) <sup>18</sup>	Intra-State Low
Southern Thailand (200+150=350)	E Asia Australasia	64,871,000 (n=200)	Southern Thailand (n=150) <sup>19</sup>	Intra-State Medium
Turkey (500+100=600)	Europe	77,695,904 (n=500)	Kurds <sup>20</sup> (n=100)	Insurgency Intra-State Medium
Egypt (300+100=400)	MENA	88,083,900 (n=300)	Sinai <sup>21</sup> (n=100)	Insurgency Medium
Iran (300+100=400)	MENA	78,148,000 (n=300)	Kurds and Sunni <sup>22</sup> (n=100)	Intra-State Archived
Iraq (300+700)	MENA	36,004,552 (n=300)	Kurds and Sunni <sup>23</sup> (n=700)	Insurgency High
Israel (100+100=200)	MENA	8,296,200 (n=100)	Israel <sup>24</sup> (n=100)	Intra-State Medium

<sup>14</sup> For a list of all the IISS data base conflicts see Table 11 in Irwin (2015).

<sup>15</sup> The Muslim Uyghur (43%) and Han (41%) population in Xinjiang.

<sup>16</sup> The Mindanao population is 21,989,174 and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) population is 3,256,140.

<sup>17</sup> The Mindanao population is 21,989,174 and the population of the Zamboanga Peninsula is 3,407,353.

<sup>18</sup> This regional conflict will not require a regional booster in a Global Centric sample that combines Indonesia (n=500), Malaysia (n=100), the Philippines (n=300) and Thailand (n=200).

<sup>19</sup> The population of these Provinces are: Yala 474,558, Narathiwat 718,724, Pattani 641,187, Sonkhula 1,329,635 for a total of 3,164,104.

<sup>20</sup> The Kurds in Turkey represent about 20 per cent of the population and are politically represented by the PKK.

<sup>21</sup> An oversample in Sinai to cover the predominantly Bedouin insurgency.

<sup>22</sup> The Kurds and Sunni represent about 10 per cent of the Iranian population and should be sampled as part of a regional analysis.

<sup>23</sup> The Sunni represent about 35 per cent of the Iraqi population of which about half are Kurds.

<sup>24</sup> As the populations of Israel (about 8.3M of which 20 per cent are 'Arab') and Palestine (about 4.5M) are small they will both require booster samples.

Palestine (100+100=200)	MENA	4,550,368 (n=100)	Palestine <sup>25</sup> (n=100)	Intra-State Medium
Lebanon (28+[4x100]=428)	MENA	4,104,000 (n=28)	Christian, Shia, Sunni and Druze <sup>26</sup> (n=100x4)	Inter-State Low
Libya 13+[3x100]=313	MENA	6,317,000 (n=13)	Ethnic Groups <sup>27</sup> (3x100) East-West-South	Intra-State Medium
Syria 300+700=1000	MENA	23,076,730 (n=300)	Sunni, Alawites and Kurds <sup>28</sup> (n=700)	Intra-State High
Yemen 300+700=700	MENA	25,956,000 (n=300)	Shia and Sunni <sup>29</sup> (n=700)	Insurgency Intra-State High
Azerbaijan 100+150=250	Russia & Eurasia	9,593,000 (n=100)	Azerbaijan, Armenia and NKR <sup>30</sup> (n=150)	Inter-State Low
Russia 500+150=650	Russia & Eurasia	146,270,033 (n=500)	North Caucasus <sup>31</sup> (n=150)	Intra-State Medium
Tajikistan 110+100=210	Russia & Eurasia	8,354,000 (n=110)	Tajikistan <sup>32</sup> (n=100)	Intra-State Archived
Afghanistan 100+900=1000	South Asia	26,556,800 (n=100)	Pashtun and 'Others' <sup>33</sup> (n=900)	Insurgency Inter-State High
Bangladesh 500	South Asia	157,902,000 (n=500)	(None) <sup>34</sup>	Intra-State Archived
India 1000+300=1300	South Asia	1,267,500,000 (n=1000)	Assam - Hindu, Muslim and Bodos <sup>35</sup> Nagaland, <sup>36</sup> Manipur and the Northeast (n=300)	Intra-State Low

<sup>25</sup> As the populations of Israel (about 8.3M of which 20 per cent are 'Arab') and Palestine (about 4.5M) are small they will both require booster samples.

<sup>26</sup> As the population of Lebanon is only 4M boosters will be required for each of its Christian, Shia, Sunni and Druze communities.

<sup>27</sup> Libya is very roughly split into two along ethnic and political lines with a population made up of 5 major tribal groups: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Sirte, Fezzan, and Kufra. 95% speak Arabic and almost all are Sunni Muslim so they may not require a booster sample.

<sup>28</sup> The Syrian Sunni will get covered in the national sample of Syria but boosters will be required for the Alawites and Kurds.

<sup>29</sup> This conflict follows ethnic and religious divisions along a Sunni/Shia split.

<sup>30</sup> Nagoro-Karabakh (population 138,000), and Armenia (3M) will require boosters but possibly not for Azerbaijan (9.5M).

<sup>31</sup> This Federal District is comprised of: Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkar, Karachay-Cherkess, North Ossetia, Stavropol Krai and Chechen Republic (total population 9.5M).

<sup>32</sup> With a population of 8.3M Tajikistan may require a booster sample with an ethnic break down that can also be analysed with its neighbor states.

<sup>33</sup> Divisions in Afghanistan are largely ethnic and will require an analysis of Pashtun opinion (approximately 42 per cent) in contrast to 'other' groups which can also be looked at across the region.

<sup>34</sup> A political demographic of Bangladesh should be able to identify Islamist elements.

<sup>35</sup> As part of the India sample a booster may be required for Assam to differentiate between the Hindu, Muslim and Bodo populations.

<sup>36</sup> Nagaland can also be combined with the adjacent Indian States of Manipur for analysis of tribal and other ethnic groups as well as with Tripura and Assam all of which are in NE India.

India-Pakistan	South Asia	1,267,500,000 189,086,000 (n=1000+1000)	IaK and PaK <sup>37</sup>	Inter-State Medium
Pakistan 500+500=1000	South Asia	189,086,000 (n=500)	Balochistan, <sup>38</sup> KPK and Northwest <sup>39</sup> and Pakistan Sectarianism <sup>40</sup> (n=500)	Insurgency Intra-State Medium to High
Ethiopia 300	Sub-Sahara Africa	90,076,012 (n=300)	Ethiopia <sup>41</sup>	Insurgency Low
Kenya 100+100=200	Sub-Sahara Africa	46,749,000 (n=100)	Kenya <sup>42</sup> (n=100 Muslim minority)	Intra-State Archived
Mali 23+150+150=323	Sub-Sahara Africa	16,259,000 (n=23)	The Sahel <sup>43</sup> (n=150 Tuareg and n=150 non-Tuareg)	Intra-State Medium
Nigeria 500+500=1000	Sub-Sahara Africa	183,523,000 (n=500)	Nigeria and North East <sup>44</sup> (n=500)	Intra-State High
Somalia North, Central and South 22+978=1000	Sub-Sahara Africa	11,123,000 (n=22)	North, Central and Southern Somalia <sup>45</sup> (n=978)	Intra-State High
Sudan 100+150=250	Sub-Sahara Africa	38,435,252 (n=100)	Sudan, Darfur, Arab-Nomad and Non-Arab <sup>46</sup> (n=150)	Intra-State Medium
International Terrorism 25,000+8,000=33,000	Worldwide	7,218,875,758 (n=25,000)	Trans-State <sup>47</sup> (n=8,000)	Trans-State Low

<sup>37</sup> Booster samples will be needed for both India administered Kashmir (IaK) and Pakistan administered Kashmir (PaK) but PaK are all Muslim while IaK are Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist.

<sup>38</sup> With a population of 8M the separatist movement in Balochistan may require a booster sample.

<sup>39</sup> With a population of 28M Northwest Pakistan may require a booster sample.

<sup>40</sup> General sectarian violence across Pakistan will not require a special booster sample.

<sup>41</sup> The religious breakdown in Ethiopia is 62.8% Christian (43.5% Ethiopian Orthodox and 19.3% other Christian denominations) and 33.9% Muslim while the major ethnic groups are the Oromo at 34.5% and Amhara at 26.9% all of which would be represented in a Ethiopian sample with a total population of 90M.

<sup>42</sup> Recent conflicts in the East of the country involve the Muslim community (11%), which would require a booster sample.

<sup>43</sup> Booster samples will be required for the Tuareg in Northern Mali or the Sahel.

<sup>44</sup> Boko Haram in the North East States of Brono (4,588,668), Adamawa (3,737,223) and Yabe (2,757,000) for a total population of 11,082,891 will require a booster sample.

<sup>45</sup> With a total population of 11M the political regions of North, Central and Southern Somalia will require separate booster samples.

<sup>46</sup> In addition to a Sudan sample (population 38M) Darfur will require booster samples for the Arab-Nomad and Non-Arab communities in Darfur.

<sup>47</sup> Trans-State groups will not require booster samples as these will be covered in the global sample.

## Appendix III – Questionnaire

(Piloted in 2013 and Revised in 2014)<sup>48</sup>

### 1. Problems Questions

1.1 We are conducting a survey of all the countries in the world to better understand the causes of violent conflict and how to resolve them. But every place is different so first of all can you please tell me what you think is the most serious problem that has to be dealt with in your country?

Write in.....

1.2 Now with regards to violent conflict in general I will read you a list of problems that have to be dealt with in different parts of the world. For each problem can you please tell me if it is 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance At All' in your country?

Problems	Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance At All
1	Poor economy and unemployment				
2	Low standards of education				
3	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply				
4	Lack of food and clean water				
5	Corrupt Government				
6	Corruption and criminality in general				
7	Lack of free press and media				
8	Media that incites hatred				
9	Elections not free and fair				
10	Lack of democratic accountability				
11	Discrimination and sectarianism				
12	Prejudice and personal safety				
13	Lack of language and cultural rights				
14	UN resolutions and human rights violations				
15	Poor political leadership				
16	No political solution to end conflict				
17	No effective negotiations to end conflict				
18	So many killed and displaced by violence				
19	No justice and reconciliation				
20	The actions of the police				
21	The actions of the army				
22	The actions of terrorists and militants				
23	The actions of rebels and freedom fighters				
24	The military actions of foreign forces				
25	The government's foreign military engagements				

<sup>48</sup> For reviews of the development of this instrument see Irwin and Deshmukh (2013) and Irwin (2014).



## 2. Conflict Intensity Questions

2.1 How would you rate the condition of peace and conflict in your country as of today? Please rate on a 1 to 10 scale where '1' means 'Fully Peaceful' and '10' means 'Extreme Conflict' in your country?

[1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10]

2.2 Is there or has there recently been a violent conflict in your country?  
YES or NO

(If NO go to next question [3] if YES go to question [2.3] below)

2.3 And do you think the situation regarding violent conflict in your country is getting 'worse', or is the situation getting 'better', or perhaps you think there is 'no change'?

[Much Worse - Worse - No Change - Better - Much Better]

2.4 And as a result of the violent conflict please indicate if you or any member of your family has been the victim of:

Violent riots/protests... Yes/No

Violent attack... Yes/No

Damage and/or loss of property... Yes/No

Physical harm... Yes/No

Arrest... Yes/No

Imprisonment... Yes/No

Torture... Yes/No

Death... Yes/No

2.5 And how were relations between the parties to the violent conflict in the past?

[Always very good - Good - Neither good nor bad (or none) - Bad - Always very bad]

## 3. Other Countries Questions

Which country does the most for world peace?

Write in.....

Which country is the greatest threat to world peace?

Write in.....

Which country is your countries strongest ally?

Write in.....

Which country is the greatest threat to peace in your country?

Write in.....

And finally which non-state organisation (militant, paramilitary or terrorist) is the greatest threat to peace in your country?

Write in.....

#### 4. Solutions

4.1 Here is a list of steps that could be taken by the international community in an effort to reduce the levels of violent conflict around the world. Please indicate which options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’, or completely ‘Unacceptable’ under any circumstances.

Solutions		Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
1	Solution option					
2	Solution option					
3	Solution option					
4	Etc.					
5	Etc.					
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25	Always ask the local people caught up in a violent conflict what they believe needs to be done to stop the violent conflict.					

4.2 And finally do you have another solution you would like to add to end violent conflict?

Write in.....

#### Demographics

Edited selection from the World Values Survey plus domestic/transnational political associations.