

Cyprus Lessons: How to melt a frozen conflict.

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Introduction

The world is plagued by a number of frozen conflicts that hold themselves, their regions and occasionally the whole world to ransom denying their people peace while stoking the fires of geopolitical conflict. Israel and Palestine is the most well known of these frozen conflicts and Syria has the potential to become one along with the transnational Sunni/Shia split and radicalised international terrorist groups. Frozen conflicts can be ended by one side defeating the other, e.g. Sri Lanka, or by peace agreement, e.g. Northern Ireland where, significantly, the agreement reached was endorsed in a referendum supported by a programme of public diplomacy and opinion research (Irwin 2002). Similarly it should be possible to resolve the Cyprus frozen conflict but so far all efforts have failed. What has gone wrong, can the Cyprus problem be solved, and if so are there lessons to be learnt there that can benefit the rest of the world?

This paper reviews three peace polls conducted in Cyprus in 2016/17 using the Northern Ireland methods that require the negotiating parties to agree all aspects of the research agenda including the questions asked. The results of these polls are reviewed and compared with results from other conflicts using the same or similar methods. In Israel, Palestine, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka a 'peace package' would always overcome potential difficulties inherent in the various elements of an agreement not acceptable to both parties (Irwin 2012). However, this is not the case in Cyprus where the benefits of a settlement have yet to be fully demonstrated. Significantly, no one is getting killed in Cyprus rendering the status quo acceptable.

Confidence Building Measures were an important part of the Northern Ireland peace process and although the polls indicate the people of Cyprus want an extensive program of CBMs to be implemented, they have been resisted by the Greek Cypriot side as 'normalization' of the status quo. But 'normalization' can be avoided if the CBMs focus on 'symbolic' issues of peace making first rather than 'substantive' elements of a final peace agreement. Experience in Northern Ireland and polling in Cyprus, Israel and Palestine suggest that this strategy will work both there and elsewhere in the world.

Using polls to reach a peace agreement in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel and Palestine

Following the signing of the peace agreement in Northern Ireland in April 1998 the Norwegians invited me to a meeting of the Greek Turkish Forum in December 1998 in Istanbul. At that meeting, chaired by the US Special Envoy to Cyprus Richard Holbrook, I made a presentation of the public opinion and public diplomacy methods used in Northern Ireland to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot delegations and they agreed that they would also welcome an opportunity to participate in a similar programme of research and peace making. The fifth peace poll completed in the Northern Ireland series focused on an agreement package (Table 1 and see Appendix for full details). Critically this poll demonstrated that the

package negotiated would be acceptable to the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum. Although the individual elements in the package were not acceptable to one community or the other, when put together the benefits of the package to achieve peace outweighed the costs of compromises made over items like police reform and power sharing (Irwin 2002).

Table 1. Protestant and Catholic support a Northern Ireland settlement and how they would vote in a referendum with and without the support of their political party in March 1998.

Package item (Per cent Essential + Desirable + Acceptable + Tolerable)	Protestant	Catholic
A Regional Assembly	89	85
North/South bodies	60	92
Council of the Isles	83	70
Constitutional reform	93	91
A Bill of Rights	91	97
Reform of the RUC	52	91
Vote 'Yes' with political party support for the agreement	74	81
Still vote 'Yes' but without political party support for the agreement	46	53

Similarly when Shamir and Shikaki (2010) used the same approach to test and track support for a peace agreement package in Israel and Palestine between 2003 and 2006 they got similar results (Table 2 and the Appendix). However support for the 'package' was asked in a neutral way while it was asked in the context of being supported or opposed by the informant's political party in Northern Ireland as the proposals there had to be taken to a referendum.

Table 2. Support for Clinton's Permanent Settlement Framework in December/January 2004/5.

Package item (Per cent support)	Israel	Palestine
Borders and Territorial Exchange	55	63
Refugees	44	46
Jerusalem	39	44
Demilitarized Palestinian State	68	27
Security Arrangements	61	53
End of Conflict	76	69
Overall Package	64	54

Unfortunately the international community did not adopt the polling methods used so successfully in Northern Ireland in Cyprus where the peace process and negotiations lead to a failed referendum in April 2004. Subsequently an effort was made to correct this omission with the establishment of domestic NGOs to undertake polling work in support of future peace processes and negotiations most notably the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development - SeeD. Although this polling did test the various elements of a peace agreement in Cyprus, and various peace packages, this was not done in the same questionnaires/survey instruments as was done in Northern Ireland and Israel and Palestine so it is not possible to make similar comparisons here. But the Cyprus work is extensive and provides much valuable information to help negotiators guide a Cyprus peace process to a successful conclusion (Alexandros, Kaymak and Tocci 2009).

At the meeting of the Greek Turkish Forum held in Istanbul in 1998 there was much discussion about Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and I agreed with the Greek and

Turkish Cypriots at that meeting that the first peace poll to be run in Cyprus should focus on these CBMs. We all felt they would receive a very positive response from the people of Cyprus. That opportunity was missed but SeeD tested a wide range of CBMs and some of them, most notably ‘The reduction of bureaucratic formalities at crossing points’, were implemented (Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci 2008, ‘Cyprus2015’ 2011). Unfortunately most of the CBMs tested were not implemented and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities grew further apart making a peace agreement and referendum more difficult to achieve, particularly amongst the younger generation who had grown up with the status quo of a divided island in two distinct segregated communities. Arguably, with all the benefits of hindsight, the international community and UN had gone too far in their efforts to keep the peace at any cost.

Regional imperatives and the need for renewed Cyprus negotiations

Following the discovery of gas in the Israeli section of the Eastern Mediterranean in 2009 a 2010 US Geological Survey report estimated that there were 122 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil off the coasts of Israel, the Gaza Strip, Cyprus, Syria and Lebanon (USGS 2010). Additionally by taking these gas reserves to Cyprus and then to Turkey and Europe the region and Europe would benefit both economically and strategically from the cooperative development of these resources. In this context the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and the UN formally restarted negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus on the 11th of February 2014 with the signing of a Joint Declaration. Importantly this agreement included the implementation of CBMs and establishment of good will between the two sides in clause 7 as follows:

‘The sides will seek to create a positive atmosphere to ensure the talks succeed. They commit to avoiding blame games or other negative public comments on the negotiations. They also commit to efforts to implement confidence building measures that will provide a dynamic impetus to the prospect for a united Cyprus.’

UN Cyprus Talks (2014)

Clearly those responsible for the Cyprus peace process, the UN, and the two sides knew what had to be done to achieve a successful peace agreement (Lordos and Sozen 2014) but unfortunately this clause was not worth the paper it was written on. It was only an aspiration not a condition for negotiations in good faith. No systematic program of CBMs was agreed and when negotiations started to feel the strain of a final push to reach an agreement in October 2016 I was invited to work with the two sides in the hope that a settlement of the Cyprus Problem could be reached (Irwin 2017a and b). At that time all those involved in the negotiations were quite optimistic and I coordinated a poll with the two sides in December 2016 that measured support for an agreement the leaders might reach without specifying the details as had been done in Northern Ireland. At the same time we also identified those members of the public best placed to work on a referendum campaign if an agreement was achieved at negotiations held in Geneva in January 2017.

That poll indicated a leaning towards a ‘yes’ vote on the Greek Cypriot (GC) side at 28 per cent ‘yes’, 26 per cent ‘no’ and 46 per cent ‘undecided’ (Table 3) with similar results for the Turkish Cypriot (TC) side at 40 per cent ‘yes’, 36 per cent ‘no’ and 24 per cent ‘undecided’ (Table 4). Significantly the ‘undecided’ vote on Cyprus was very high when compared with

the results of similar polls in Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine. In these countries the pressures of on-going conflict incline the populations to make a decision one way or the other but when there is no on-going conflict and the potential risks of a change in the status quo could result in more difficulties not less then the result is a very significant 'undecided' vote. They are yet to be convinced of the benefits of a settlement and this in turn rests on the public's conviction that the two leaders can make any agreement they might reach, work. So a lot is riding on the public's perception of the leadership and their ability to be seen as peacemakers.

Table 3. If we assume a scenario where the 2 leaders agree on a solution and a referendum is held, how would you be likely to vote, would you vote YES or would you vote NO?

GC - All	Dec 16 SEED ¹	Dec 16 Percent Pre Switzerland ²	Feb 17 Percent Post Switzerland ³	Feb 17 Percent Post Switzerland ³	March 17 Percent
Yes	15+23	28	25	28	26
No	32+12	26	29	30	29
Not decided/ it depends/DK/NA	18	46	45	42	45

Table 4. If we assume a scenario where the 2 leaders agree on a solution and a referendum is held, how would you be likely to vote, would you vote YES or would you vote NO?

TC - All	Dec 16 SEED ¹	Dec 16 Percent Pre Switzerland ²	Dec 16 Percent Pre Switzerland ²	Feb 17 Percent Post Switzerland	March 17 Percent
Yes	23+21	40	44	46	49
No	17+16	36	34	37	39
Not decided/ it depends/DK/NA	24	24	22	17	12

So when the January 2017 negotiations in Geneva failed confidence in the leaders and the peace process faltered and in our next poll conducted in February 2017 the vote shifted to 28 per cent 'yes' and 30 per cent 'no' on the GC side while support for an agreement on the TC side strengthened to 46 per cent 'yes' and 37 per cent 'no'. In the failed referendum of April 2004 the TC community had voted 'yes' while the GC community had voted 'no' when the GC leadership rejected the proposals put forward by the UN. The GC community were losing confidence in the process and it started to look as if history might be repeating itself. In this second poll we also tested a number of critical issues in the negotiations but I was not able to persuade the two sides to test a 'package' as had been done in Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine as they did not want to reveal the parameters of their negotiating hand through the means of a public opinion poll.

¹ SeeD 'Yes' as 'Yes' + 'leaning to Yes' and 'No' as 'No' + 'leaning to No'

² Sample collected before break down of negotiations.

³ Includes sample collected after break down of negotiations.

⁴ SeeD 'Yes' as 'Yes' + 'leaning Yes' and 'No' as 'No' + 'leaning No'

⁵ Complete sample with no filter for those who said 'Yes' or 'No' they will or will not vote.

⁶ Sample with filter for those who said 'Yes' they will vote.

Significantly, at this time, the GC leadership did not move to block a parliamentary vote to celebrate the 1950 Greek Cypriot referendum to unite Cyprus with Greece. It was this event that precipitated their conflict with the Turkish Cypriots and subsequent invasion by Turkey. Understandably the TC leadership were very annoyed with their GC partners in negotiations, and they in turn compounded the political error of the GCs by walking out of the negotiations until the matter was resolved to their satisfaction with a reversal of the GC position. As it happened we were able to run a natural experiment on these unfortunate developments as half our GC sample was collected before the political ‘bust up’ and half of the sample after. Accordingly support for a settlement became more polarised (Table 3).

The Cyprus peace process was now on ‘life support’ and I agreed with my interlocutors with the two sides that we should try and restore confidence in the process by identifying CBMs that could be quickly and effectively deployed. Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci (2008) had noted that CBMs that required negotiation tended to get ‘bogged down’ and accordingly advocated the deployment of CBMs that could be initiated by each side without the necessary cooperation of the other side. The CBMs that required negotiation also had to involve the UN which tended to be very bureaucratic and although initially the UN welcomed a new initiative on CBMs they ‘thought better of it’ on reflection given past experience. But something had to be done so, in addition to testing CBMs that had been monitored in the past we added as many CBMs as we could that would not involve negotiations and the UN.

Table 5. The importance of CBMs (Irwin 2017b)

Do you expect the two sides to implement many of these CBMs?			
	Yes	No	D.K.
GC	27%	63%	10%
TC	28%	71%	1%

Would you like to see many of these CBMs implemented by the two sides?			
	Yes	No	D.K.
GC	83%	15%	2%
TC	86%	14%	-

If the two sides implement these CBMs do you think that will improve the chances of reaching a final agreement on the future of Cyprus?			
	Yes	No	D.K.
GC	69%	26%	5%
TC	65%	34%	1%

Timing is everything in peace polling and we had an opportunity to have the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides, Presidents Anistasiades and Akinci respectively, to jointly attend the Easter services at the Greek Church presently under the control of the Turkish Cypriots in the ancient walled city of Famagusta. Quite rightly in our view, Quintin Oliver of Stratagem, who I had worked with on the Northern Ireland peace process, had made recommendations to the two sides for the leaders to be seen working together in an effort to restore public confidence in both them and the peace process (Oliver 2017). So this CBM at a significant public event, along with another 36 CBMs were tested in April with a view to publishing the results before the Easter holiday. Firstly, however, we asked the Cypriot people their views of CBMs. As happens with all peace processes in frozen conflicts both GCs and TCs did not think the two sides would implement them, 63 and 71 per cent ‘no’, but they did want them, 83 and 86 per cent ‘yes’, and they believed they would help the peace

process at 69 and 65 per cent ‘yes’ (Table 5). We wanted to demonstrate that the sceptics and cynics who dismissed CBMs as unimportant or irrelevant were quite wrong in their judgement. So far so good.

Critically if CBMs were to help the negotiations and peace process then they needed to have maximum positive effect at minimum political cost at just the right time – during negotiations, after an agreement is reached but before a referendum or after a referendum as part of a new plan of government. Deciding which CBMs to implement when is a political decision for the two sides. Tables 6 and 7 list the ‘top ten’ for the GC and TC communities with opening the Greek Church in Famagusta for Easter services only being opposed by 8 per cent of GCs and 19 per cent of TCs as ‘unacceptable’. It was very ‘doable’ but the sides did not take up this initiative with the results of the poll and publication delayed until the opportunity had passed. Significantly symbolic CBMs that touched on questions of national identity, culture and religion were as important or sometimes more important than more practical CBMs associated with commerce and economic development. This was particularly true for the Greek Cypriot community and many of these symbolic CBMs could be implemented unilaterally with minimum involvement of the UN.

Table 6. Top Ten (Essential + Desirable) CBMs for GCs with results for TCs (Irwin 2017b)

GC Top Ten CBMs		Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	D.K.
1. Turn off the lights of the Turkish Cypriot flag to show TC support for the negotiations	GC	68%	13%	11%	2%	5%	1%
	TC	4%	5%	6%	10%	74%	1%
2. Ensure a common time zone across the whole of Cyprus.	GC	57%	14%	18%	4%	6%	2%
	TC	37%	36%	19%	3%	4%	1%
3. Allow owners of property in Varosha to visit their properties.	GC	47%	22%	21%	3%	7%	1%
	TC	22%	29%	27%	10%	11%	1%
4. Return Icons to their rightful owners.	GC	53%	15%	19%	2%	9%	2%
	TC	19%	29%	28%	13%	9%	1%
5. Allow the Greek Church in Famagusta to be opened for Easter services.	GC	44%	23%	22%	3%	8%	1%
	TC	10%	24%	33%	13%	19%	2%
6. For example allow the vacated Archbishopric in Kyrenia to be restored and made available for religious festivals.	GC	43%	21%	24%	6%	7%	1%
	TC	12%	20%	31%	16%	20%	1%
7. Arrange meetings between North and South fire brigades to agree joint procedures for dealing with catastrophic fires.	GC	48%	14%	23%	5%	9%	1%
	TC	49%	28%	17%	3%	2%	1%
8. Make vacated military installations on religious and public property available to their owners.	GC	40%	21%	26%	3%	6%	5%
	TC	13%	20%	26%	13%	27%	1%
9. Coordinate and finance the repair and maintenance of cemeteries and graves in the North and South.	GC	37%	23%	26%	3%	10%	2%
	TC	46%	32%	17%	4%	1%	1%
10. Being able to use your mobile phones on both sides of the island without limitation on where you are.	GC	43%	12%	23%	5%	12%	6%
	TC	31%	44%	19%	3%	3%	1%

Table 7. Top Ten (Essential + Desirable) CBMs for TCs with results for GCs (Irwin 2017b)

TC Top Ten CBMs		Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	D.K.
1. Coordinate and finance the repair and maintenance of cemeteries and graves in the North and South.	TC	46%	32%	17%	4%	1%	1%
	GC	37%	23%	26%	3%	10%	2%
2. Arrange meetings between North and South fire brigades to agree joint procedures for dealing with catastrophic fires.	TC	49%	28%	17%	3%	2%	1%
	GC	48%	14%	23%	5%	9%	1%
3. Facilitate the purchase of car insurance to cover both sides of the island at the same rates.	TC	47%	29%	18%	3%	2%	1%
	GC	29%	15%	25%	8%	20%	3%
4. Being able to use your mobile phones on both sides of the island without limitation on where you are.	TC	31%	44%	19%	3%	3%	1%
	GC	43%	12%	23%	5%	12%	6%
5. Ensure a common time zone across the whole of Cyprus	TC	37%	36%	19%	3%	4%	1%
	GC	57%	14%	18%	4%	6%	2%
6. Remove the requirement for the Enosis plebiscite to be commemorated in GC schools.	TC	44%	21%	17%	9%	9%	1%
	GC	15%	8%	15%	6%	47%	9%
7. Allow all persons born or not born in Northern Cyprus with a right to vote in a referendum have access to the South.	TC	36%	29%	19%	6%	7%	2%
	GC	16%	10%	15%	7%	46%	6%
8. Complete and open the new crossing in Famagusta at Dherynia without any further delay.	TC	32%	32%	20%	7%	9%	-
	GC	27%	17%	25%	9%	20%	3%
9. Complete the North/South electricity interconnector without further delay.	TC	26%	37%	25%	5%	-	-
	GC	21%	14%	22%	9%	29%	4%
10. Promote North/South trade by extending the scope of Green Line regulations	TC	25%	37%	30%	3%	4%	1%
	GC	17%	12%	20%	7%	39%	4%

In spite of this failure to restart the negotiations on the initiative of the two sides using CBMs the UN and International Community eventually persuaded the leaderships to start negotiations again and a final round was held in Crans-Montana, Switzerland on the 28th of June only to collapse again on the 7th of July 2017. Although the Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades said he was negotiating in good faith and had not decided to postpone making an agreement and risking a referendum before Presidential elections in January and February 2018 the negotiations had broken down on his insistence for 'zero [Turkish] troops and zero [Turkish] guarantees' from day one of any new agreement. This was not a 'negotiating position', it was a 'not negotiating position'. But assuming Anastasiades made a correct political calculation regarding his electoral prospects, and he did, he would still be in a Catch 22 situation. Having won the Presidential elections he still has to restore confidence in the Cyprus peace process and experience in Northern Ireland, the opinion of his own electorate in Cyprus, and polling in Israel and Palestine all point to the implementation of CBMs as being the way forward for him.

CBMs and getting to 'Yes' in a referendum

In Northern Ireland CBMs were introduced into that society over a period of decades. Importantly this included the strongest legal measures available to prevent discrimination, a human rights commission 'with teeth' to recommend remedial action as required and most significantly the introduction of power sharing arrangements in towns and cities including the provincial capital Belfast. Additionally, as a prelude to negotiations and an Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire the British State said categorically that they had "no selfish strategic or economic interest" in Northern Ireland and the future status of the province rested with the people of Northern Ireland alone (Brooke 1990). Public apologies of the harm one side had done to the other were also made to convince the respective publics that no one would go back to 'the bad old days' of exclusion from public life, discrimination and violence.

The introduction of 'substantial' CBMs, such as power sharing in provincial towns and cities, was in the hands of the local people and British authorities in Northern Ireland. However, in Cyprus, given the unilateral declaration of independence by the northern part of the island under Turkish Cypriot control, substantial CBMs can only be implemented through mutual agreement. But such agreements have the potential to contribute to the 'normalization' of the status quo and, in time, the de facto establishment of northern Cyprus as a province of Turkey. As a consequence successfully negotiating these kinds of CBMs is very difficult but 'symbolic' CBMs do not carry these same dangers with them. Indeed, carefully chosen statements, apologies and activities involving common interests in religious, artistic, educational, heritage matters and forward planning for a united island can achieve the desired effect without compromising constitutional principles. Additionally such activities should be seen to be leader led whenever possible to establish confidence in them as their endorsement of a final peace agreement will be essential to its passage in a referendum. Packages tested in both Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka (see Appendix) also required leadership/party support to pass a referendum and the UN are quite right to emphasise this point, but those leaders, in turn, for all the reasons given here require CBMs.

In 2017 the Palestine Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) were running their joint Palestine-Israel Pulse with the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research (TSCPR). In February they published results of a December poll, that in addition to tracking support for a settlement package, also measured the effect various incentives had on switching 'no' voters to 'yes' voters (PSR 2017a). This was necessary, as support for the package had now fallen to 48 per cent of Israelis and 42 per cent of Palestinians. But when the incentive of having the peace agreement supported by Arab states across the region was added in 30 per cent of Palestinian 'no' voters and 28 per cent of Israel 'no' voters switched to 'yes' raising support for the package to 58 per cent in Israel and 57 per cent in Palestine (Tables 8 and 9). So I sent a copy of these findings to the two sides in Cyprus along with a copy of the poll that tested a package in Northern Ireland before the signing of that peace agreement and offered to conduct a similar poll in Cyprus. As already noted the offer was not accepted. Since then the PCPSR and TSCPR published the results of a repeat poll in August 2017 with the same package but new 'shopping list' of incentives (PSR 2017b). These are also included in Tables 8 and 9.

Table 8. Per cent of Israeli ‘no’ voters who switched to ‘yes’ for symbolic or substantive CBMs or incentives offered in December 2016 and June/July 2017 (PSR 2017a and b)

Symbolic or substantive CBM or incentive	%
Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries following the 1948 War will be compensated for the lost assets left behind (2016)	40
Palestinians agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement to hatred against Jews (2017)	35
Palestinians acknowledge the historic and religious links between Jews and historic Palestine (2016)	34
Recognition of Jewish holy sites in Judea and Samaria with Jewish rights to access and security guarantees (2017)	33
Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (2016)	32
Agreement is part of a larger peace with all Arab states (2016)	30
Allow Israeli air force full access to Palestinian airspace (2017)	30
Prime Minister Netanyahu declared his support for the package (2017)	29
Joint Israeli-Palestinian economic ventures (2017)	25
Free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state (2016)	24
Israelis are guaranteed free access to holy sites in Jerusalem and other places (2016)	23
Settlers allowed to stay, to keep Israeli citizenship and their safety guaranteed by the Palestinian state (2016)	21
Holy sites to be placed under the custody of a multi-national committee from Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US (2016)	10

Table 9. Per cent of Palestinian ‘no’ voters who switched to ‘yes’ for symbolic or substantive CBMs or incentives offered in December 2016 and June/July 2017. (PSR 2017a and b)

Symbolic or substantive CBM or incentive	%
The release of all Palestinian prisoners (2017)	56
Palestinian labourers can freely work in Israel after the establishment of the Palestinian state (2016)	44
Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine (2016)	44
Refugees are compensated and provided with homes and land in Palestinian state (2016)	42
Free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured (2016)	40
Peace agreement is based on a long term hudna between the two sides (2016)	34
Marwan Barghouti declares his support for the package (2017)	34
Israelis agree to change school textbooks to remove incitement to hatred against Palestinians (2017)	32
Israel apologizes for the suffering it has inflicted on the Palestinian refugees (2017)	32
Israel agrees to accept the Arab peace initiative and all Arab countries support peace treaty (2016)	28
Joint Palestinian-Israeli economic ventures (2017)	27
Holy sites to be placed under the custody of a multi-national committee from Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US (2016)	19

In the spring and summer of 2017 while everyone in Cyprus was doing everything they could to bring the two sides to the negotiations at the end of June I drafted some questions that had the potential to strengthen the peace process with some CBMs based on the Northern Ireland experience. But the sides did not want to run them or anything like them. They continued to want to ‘keep their cards close to their chest’ prior to negotiations in Switzerland and as I did not know the content of the potential Cyprus package I was not in a position to test these or other incentives against the package as had been done in Israel and Palestine. But this situation has now changed.

Conclusion and Recommendation

In Crans-Montana the two sides came very close to an agreement indeed as noted by the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide. On 18 July 2017 after briefing the Security Council he said:

“But I think we have to admit that there was a collective failure of stitching together a deal in Crans-Montana despite of the fact that towards the end of the conference we saw more and more of the pieces of the puzzle actually coming on the table. That came late, but it came, but we were not able to stitch it together to a total deal, because we had this perennial problem of the chicken and egg: What comes first, what comes second? And all sides in many ways continued to reserve their final gives until they saw the cards of the other side. The Secretary-General and the rest of us were trying very actively throughout the ten days of the conference and particularly in his presence on 30 June and then again on 6 July to overcome this by saying that in our view there is a package available where six separate, important and crucial issues are all settled and only when they are all settled we can say that we have a deal. We thought that would be possible, but realized that it wasn't.”

(Eide 2017)

The major elements of that agreement are now in the public domain so it would now be possible to test the various CBMs already tested and any other CBMs and incentives thought to be helpful against that package and demonstrate exactly what combination would produce a yes vote in a referendum on both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides. Ideally the two sides should do this but if they will not then civil society can by developing a Cyprus equivalent of the Geneva Accord (2003) and testing that. It would also be possible to test a few 'substitutions' for different elements in the package. This was also done in Northern Ireland (for example see Appendix) to demonstrate the robustness of the major package elements and to identify any critical weaknesses that could be improved on substantially, or in presentational terms in order to avoid 'unpicking' delicate compromises reached. With a core package to work from the prospects of producing a positive result in Cyprus are now very, very, good indeed.

Unfortunately the same can not be said in Israel and Palestine. The decision by the US President to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was rejected by 128 UN member states in a General Assembly vote with only 9 states supporting the change of status while 35 states abstained (UN 2017). Additionally a multi-national poll run by Gallup International (2017) on this issue noted a majority disapproval of this decision in Europe rising to 84 per cent in Islamic countries and 94 per cent in the Arab World. This measure has not *built* confidence in the peace process but rather has *diminished* confidence. It is a 'CDM' not a CBM. Regrettably this decision, and the failure to reach a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, has a negative effect on the region adding to the incentives that encourage terrorist groups affiliated with radical Muslim organisations transnationally (Abdullah II 2017, 2015; Gallup International 2017). On one of my trips to Ramallah I was taken to Yasser Arafat's tomb and it was pointed out to me that his tomb pointed to Jerusalem and that he would be reburied there when East Jerusalem was the capital of Palestine. This is a CBM much of the world in conflict is waiting for. Hopefully Cyprus, by good example, can show the way.

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Appendix

Packages tested for Northern Ireland (Irwin 2002), Sri Lanka (Irwin 2012) and Israel and Palestine (The Palestine-Israeli Pulse, June-July 2017 – PSR 2017b)

A Comprehensive Settlement For Northern Ireland tested in March 1998

- A REGIONAL ASSEMBLY made up from elected members who share responsibilities in proportion to their representation and employing a voting system, with other checks and balances, to ensure the fair participation of the whole community in government and the prevention of abuse of power.
- NORTH/SOUTH BODIES strictly controlled by the elected politicians who establish them to deal with a wide range of issues using various functions and powers appropriate to the areas of government policy being managed.
- Replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement and establish a ‘COUNCIL OF THE ISLES’ to create a new relationship between London, Dublin, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast appropriate to the needs of the region as a part of Europe.
- CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM that embraces the principle of consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland to keep or change its status, guaranteed rights of British and/or Irish citizenship, and any other balanced changes required to implement the various agreements made at the Stormont Talks.
- A BILL OF RIGHTS that deals specifically with the political, social and cultural problems that have aggravated the conflict and a Human Rights Commission with responsibilities and powers to educate, monitor standards and bring cases to court.
- REFORM THE RUC to create community policing units as part of a two tier service restructured with a view to recruiting more Catholics and improving community relations under the authority of a new Department of Justice in a Regional Assembly.

Protestant and Catholic support for the different parts of a comprehensive settlement

Per cent	Religion	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
A REGIONAL ASSEMBLY	Protestant	19	16	40	14	11
	Catholic	13	16	36	20	15
NORTH/SOUTH BODIES	Protestant	3	10	19	28	40
	Catholic	33	26	23	10	8
COUNCIL OF THE ISLES	Protestant	4	20	38	21	17
	Catholic	6	12	30	22	30
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM	Protestant	36	18	27	12	7
	Catholic	20	25	33	13	9
A BILL OF RIGHTS	Protestant	12	23	36	20	9
	Catholic	48	23	20	6	3
REFORM THE RUC	Protestant	3	8	19	22	48
	Catholic	40	21	21	9	9

Support for a comprehensive settlement with party approval

Per cent	All of NI	Protestant	Catholic	DUP	PUP+UDP	UUP	Alliance	SDLP	Sinn Fein
Yes	77	74	81	50	68	83	96	95	61
No	23	26	19	50	32	17	4	5	39

Support for a comprehensive settlement with party opposition

Per cent	All of NI	Protestant	Catholic	DUP	PUP+UDP	UUP	Alliance	SDLP	Sinn Fein
Yes	50	46	53	24	24	50	87	70	22
No	50	54	47	76	76	50	13	30	78

- NORTH/SOUTH BODIES strictly controlled by the elected politicians who establish them to deal with a wide range of issues using various functions and powers appropriate to the areas of government policy being managed.

Support for proposed North/South bodies and a Council of Ministers

Per cent	Religion	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
NORTH/SOUTH BODIES	Protestant	3	10	19	28	40
	Catholic	33	26	23	10	8
A 'Council of Ministers' appointed from the Executive of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Irish Dail	Protestant	3	6	16	23	52
	Catholic	14	24	39	13	10
A 'Council of Ministers' directly elected by proportional representation North and South	Protestant	3	7	19	23	48
	Catholic	21	25	38	9	7

Protestant and Catholic views on responsibility for North/South bodies

Per cent	Religion	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
The Northern Ireland Assembly	Protestant	19	17	33	12	19
	Catholic	4	10	28	20	38
The Irish Dail	Protestant	1	0	6	9	84
	Catholic	3	6	25	25	41
Both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Dail	Protestant	3	5	16	28	48
	Catholic	13	25	44	12	6
The 'Council of Ministers'	Protestant	1	5	27	25	42
	Catholic	3	19	49	17	12
The North/South body with permission	Protestant	0	5	24	22	49
	Catholic	5	29	43	13	10
The North/South body at all times	Protestant	3	6	16	19	56
	Catholic	6	23	37	19	15
Civil Servants from the North and South	Protestant	0	3	12	35	50
	Catholic	2	8	32	28	30

The Sri Lanka All Party Representative Committee (APRC) proposals tested in March 2009

1. *The Structure of the State* – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state.
2. *The Powers of the Centre and Provinces* – These powers will be clearly defined in two separate lists. One for the Centre and one for the Provinces.
3. *The Parliament* – Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators.
4. *Amending the Constitution* – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.
5. *The Powers of the President* – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent's term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives.
6. *The Powers of Local Authorities* – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
7. *Language Rights* – The Tamil and Sinhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Sinhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Sinhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education.
8. *Religious Rights* – Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.
9. *Fundamental Rights* – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
10. *Electoral System* – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
11. *The Judiciary* – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
12. *Public Service* – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
13. *Safeguards against secession* – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to secede from the State.
14. *Law and Order* – There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.

Sinhala response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Sinhala per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	25	42	14	3	8	8
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	19	40	16	3	11	11
3. The Parliament	19	33	18	4	12	15
4. Amending the Constitution	22	40	14	5	6	13
5. The Powers of the President	23	37	13	5	15	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	13	36	18	9	15	10
7. Language Rights	47	35	8	3	5	2
8. Religious Rights	64	25	5	2	2	1
9. Fundamental Rights	60	31	7	1	0	2
10. Electoral System	21	34	15	7	8	15
11. The Judiciary	37	39	14	2	3	6
12. Public Service	24	36	21	4	5	11
13. Safeguards against secession	43	33	10	3	4	7
14. Law and Order	39	32	10	2	9	7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	20	38	22	7	4	10

Tamil response to the APRC proposals (March 2010)

Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	37	29	17	5	7	5
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	44	29	13	4	4	5
3. The Parliament	46	27	14	2	4	8
4. Amending the Constitution	41	25	19	2	5	8
5. The Powers of the President	51	19	14	3	5	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	37	34	17	4	2	6
7. Language Rights	75	11	11	2	1	1
8. Religious Rights	22	11	7	8	50	2
9. Fundamental Rights	66	21	10	1	1	2
10. Electoral System	34	22	26	5	3	10
11. The Judiciary	57	27	7	2	0	7
12. Public Service	38	39	17	1	1	6
13. Safeguards against secession	28	24	18	7	15	9
14. Law and Order	41	32	14	5	5	4
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	42	24	17	5	3	8

The Palestine-Israeli Pulse, settlement package tested in June-July 2017

1. (In Israel) Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side.

(In Palestine) Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side.

2. The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry).

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides.

4. The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years.

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements.

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel.

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.

10. And now after we went over the main proposed terms of the two-state solution of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement (demilitarization of the Palestinian state, equal territorial exchange, the family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel, and the end of the conflict, please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general as one combined package?

Israeli and Palestinian support for nine-point agreement package in June/July 2017

Package item (Per cent support)	Israel	Palestine
1. Mutual recognition	66	49
2. Demilitarized Palestinian State	23	60
3. Multilateral security force in Palestine	40	50
4. Palestinian sovereignty and Israel security	33	39
5. Settlement blocs	34	40
6. Territorial exchange	31	41
7. East and West Jerusalem as capitals	29	22
8. Old City of Jerusalem religious sites	28	27
9. Palestinian refugees	55	29
10. Package as a whole	43	41

Israel and Palestinian support for six-point agreement package in December/January 2004/5
(Shamir and Shikaki 2010)

Package item (Per cent support)	Israel	Palestine
Borders and Territorial Exchange	55	63
Refugees	44	46
Jerusalem	39	44
Demilitarized Palestinian State	68	27
Security Arrangements	61	53
End of Conflict	76	69
Overall Package	64	54