

Pilot Study for a ‘People’s Peace Process’ in Syria

Colin Irwin

Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, UK.

E: colin.irwin@liverpool.ac.uk

W: www.peacepolls.org

To be presented at the WAPOR Regional Conference, 7-9 March 2015, Doha, Qatar

All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.
Edmund Burk (1729-1797)

Introduction

Public opinion surveys have been used for conflict analysis since World War II and were developed as an aid for conflict resolution in support of negotiations and as an instrument of public diplomacy in Northern Ireland in the 1990s (Irwin 2002). What are now referred to as ‘peace polls’ have subsequently been employed to bring the views of critical populations into peace processes in a number of conflicts around the world including the Balkans, Middle East and Asia (Irwin 2012, Shamir and Shikaki 2010, Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci 2009). However, the application of this methodology was only done on an *ad hoc* basis with no effort made to do this systematically as an essential instrument of learning in all peace processes. This issue was well understood by the UN with critical reports (UN 2009 and UN 2011) leading to an in depth review of best practice for the inclusion of local voices in all UN peacekeeping operations (DPKO/NUPI 2013) in which ‘peace polls’ were identified as an important tool for effective negotiations (UN 2013).

Accordingly, as a consultant to that review, I expected the UN to undertake a program of such research in preparation for the Geneva I negotiations in June 2012 and if that opportunity had been missed then again for the Geneva II negotiations in January 2014. I was therefore quite surprised, when invited to give a three-day workshop on peace polls for the Syrian Opposition and various NGOs operating out of Turkey, to discover that no such program of public opinion research on the parameters of a peace agreement for Syria had been completed (SOC/LACU, 2014).¹ Fortunately I subsequently received an offer from a well established UN accredited NGO *No Peace Without Justice* (NPWJ) to undertake a pilot peace poll in the Opposition held areas of Syria with their partner NGO *The Day After* (TDA). These NGOs had their offices in Istanbul and Gaziantep, which is close to the Turkish-Syrian border.

¹ Over 40 participants attended the workshop, which I gave with Dr. Samir R. Abu Rumman of Gulf Opinions. He also made many useful suggestions on an early draft of the questionnaire and assisted TDA with the management of their SPSS files.

Methodology and Samples

Sample Pilot 1

With a focus on the judicial aspects of transitional justice a questionnaire was developed through a week of interviews with a variety of stakeholders in Gaziantep between April 24th and May 1st 2014. These interviews included Syrian members of the legal profession, representatives of the Syrian Opposition and a number of NGOs working in Syria based out of Gaziantep.² Relevant topics covered included 'Problems', 'Conflict and Responsibility', 'Justice', 'Violations of Human Rights', and 'Demographics'. Using this research instrument 1,500 interviews were then collected across those parts of Syria under the control of the Syrian Opposition and in refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan between 15 May 2014 and 5 August 2014.

This sample (Table 1), when compared with available data for the pre-war demographics of Syria is clearly not representative of the population as a whole and the results for each question using this sample should be understood in this context. However, in spite of this obvious difficulty some significant trends can be identified from this sample by comparing various critical demographic groups to produce 'indicative samples' as opposed to 'representative samples'. In addition to the Syria sample (Opposition controlled areas only) comparisons can also be made between the various regions/Governorates, the refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan, gender (male and female), age groups (18 to 65+), levels of education (illiterate to university post graduate) and critical religious and ethnic groups (Sunni, Kurd and Christian). The structure of the sample by these demographics are summarised in Table 2.

Sample Pilot 2

Although opinions about the war varied significantly between the different groups sampled in the first pilot completed in the summer of 2014 there clearly existed a common desire for institutional reform from all the communities sampled (Sunni, Kurd and Christian). This result begged the question concerning the opinions of the Alawite community. How was their view of the war different to the dominant Sunni view and in what respects do they also want reform of Syrian institutions. With this point in mind a pilot sample of 50 Alawites was collected from the Regime held areas of Latakia and Tartus between October 10 and October 25 using the same questionnaire (Table 1B and 2B).

But the Syrian conflict then took another turn for the worse when ISIS forces attacked the dominantly Kurdish town of Kobani close to the border with Turkey. With thousands of Kurdish refugees now filling the Turkish camps we took the view that having sampled this same Kurdish community before the ISIS attack it would now be important to sample the same Kurdish community again as refugees in Turkey post the ISIS attack. This was also done in the second pilot sample collected between October 10 and October 22 (Table 1B and 2B).

² With a view to making comparisons with other research that used different methodologies we ran some questions from the Transitional Justice questionnaire developed by the Centre For Civil Society And Democracy In Syria and we are grateful for their cooperation in this.

Problems

Pilot 1

To put the person being interviewed at ease and to identify any problem that may be particular to their circumstances and region the first question invited them to give an open-ended answer for the problem that was affected them most (Question 1.1). For the Syrian sample as a whole the most serious problem was the regime followed by the war and shelling but for the Kurds the most serious problem was the war with the regime second and 'terrorism from both sides' third (Table 3). As the Syrian sample is mostly Sunni we can see that the Sunni may want to still continue the war to topple the regime (fourth item on their list) while the Kurds may not share this objective as their top priority, as they appear to blame all sides for the conflict.

Pilot 2

Both the Alawites and the Kurd refugees place the war at the top of their list of problems. Only the Sunni in the first pilot placed the Regime first. After that the Alawite identify ISIS and various other Islamist groups as their most serious problem while the Kurd refugees continue to blame both sides along with ISIS (Table 3B1 and 3B2)

Pilot 1

Following the open-ended problem question the informant was asked to say how significant a list of standard conflict problems were (Question 1.2). When these general problems associated with most conflicts are placed in their rank order for the Syria Opposition sample (Table 4) a profile is achieved that is common to many conflicts still engaged in violence with 'So many killed and displaced by violence' as the top problem followed by the actions of the military and political failure. However when this result is compared with the result for the Kurds (Table 5) we can see that their situation is very different with their top priorities being the economy and political failure and with 'So many killed and displaced by violence' down at the 17th position. Given the dominance of the Sunni sample in the Syria Opposition sample as a whole the differences between the Sunni and Syria Opposition sample are not particularly significant (Table 6). However, as we look through the regions sampled differences in the intensity of the conflict and various ethnic/religious elements in those regions also has an impact on the conflict profile of each region. Kurds for example place 'Lack of language and cultural rights' fourth on their list of problems requiring attention (Table 5) while it is down at 24th on the Syria Opposition sample and at 25th on the Sunni sample (Table 6). Clearly addressing these kinds of issues will be important for long term stability and good community relations in a future Syria. 'So many killed and displaced by violence' is the first or second problem in all the regions except for Al-Hasakah where it is down at 16th (Table 8). But the Al-Hasakah sample is made up of Kurds and Christians (Table 2) so their circumstances in their region is very different to the other regions sampled. Although the violence has now stopped for those in the Turkish and Jordanian refugee camps 'So many killed and displaced by violence' remains their number one problem (Table 10). Additionally each region has its own particular problems, for example 'Lack of food and clean water' comes in at the 5th position in Deir Ezzor, 6th in the Damascus countryside, 9th in Idlib, 16th in the Jordanian camp, 18th in the Turkish camp, 21st in Hama, 23rd in Aleppo and 24th in Hassakah (Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10) and each problem can be analysed and understood in this way.

Between the open-ended question and the list of conflict problems very few respondents added an additional 'other' problem. The only significant additional problem identified as 'other' was 'arming' and 'benefits' from other countries.³

Pilot 2

The top item on the Alawite list of problems, 'The military actions of foreign forces' comes in very last at 25th on the Kurd Refugee problems list (Table 10B). Such extremes of opinion are unusual. Clearly international intervention is seen by the Alawites as the source of their difficulties, particularly various radical Islamists (Table 3B1), while the Kurd refugees see foreign forces in Kobani (presumably the Peshmerga with US support) as an asset not a problem. Similarly 'The actions of the army' are second on the Sunni list (Table 6) but last on the Alawite list at 25th. For the Sunni the Regime's army are a 'very significant' source of their difficulties but for the Alawites the army are, for the most part, their saviour although 20 per cent of this small sample still thought they were a 'very significant' problem.

Critically 'So many killed and displaced by violence' which came in first on the Sunni list (Table 6) is also a 'very significant' problem for the Alawites at 3rd on their list (Table 10B) with 'No effective negotiations to end the conflict' 4th and 'Corrupt Government' 5th (6th on the Sunni list). So although the problem in terms of those responsible for the war is very different for Alawites and Sunni the effects of the war are felt by both sides and the need for negotiations that will deal with the problems of corruption or justice and reconciliation that are 1st on the Kurd refugee list (Table 10B) and 6th on the Alawite list are common themes for all the communities sampled.

³ As it produced very few results this option was not run in the second pilot.

Conflict and Responsibility

Pilot 1

The results of both the open-ended question 2.1 (Table 11) and closed question 2.2 (Table 12 and 13) clearly indicate that ‘The Regime’ is considered to be most responsible for starting the civil war in Syrian Opposition held areas. However the Kurds also place some responsibility with ‘The Opposition’ while everyone (Sunni, Kurd and Christian) also place considerable responsibility with ‘The Regional Forces’ and ‘The International Forces’ (Table 13). Significantly the Opposition is not without blame. Even in the Sunni dominated Syria Opposition sample only 39.7 per cent say they are ‘Not Responsible At All’ (Table 12). The top ‘other’ responses to this question were ‘Countries supporting the Syrian Regime’ (n=34) followed by ‘Radical groups’ (n=8).

Pilot 2

The results for the Kurdish refugees is very similar to the previous results for question 2.1 and 2.2 with them still laying blame for starting the war with the Regime and, to a lesser extent, ‘The Opposition’ (Table 13B). However the Alawites place most of the blame on the Opposition at 68 per cent ‘very responsible’, then Regional Forces at 60 per cent, the Regime at 40 per cent and finally International Forces at 34 per cent. So there appears to be plenty of blame going around to everyone from everyone with the notable exception of the Kurd refugees now not blaming the International Forces at all (down from 35.6 per cent ‘very responsible’ to 0 per cent).

Pilot 1

With regards to those responsible for keeping the conflict going (Question 2.3) ‘The Regime’ continue to be given most of the responsibility (Table 14 and 15) but there is an increase in the degree of responsibility placed on the Opposition by both the Sunni at 7.7 to 15.2 per cent ‘very responsible’ and Kurds at 23.7 to 44.1 per cent ‘very responsible’ (Table 13 and 15). The top ‘other’ groups considered most responsible for keeping the conflict going are now identified as ‘Radical groups’ (Table 17).

When the results for question 2.3 are broken down by region (Table 15) regional similarities and differences become apparent. Everyone continues to blame ‘The Regime’, ‘Regional’ and ‘International’ forces but in Hassakah where the sample is comprised of Kurds and Christians 54.1 per cent consider the ‘Opposition’ to be ‘Very Responsible’ for keeping the conflict going. However, in the refugee camps opinions are far less equivocal with only 1.9 per cent (Jordan) and 4.2 per cent (Turkey) saying the Opposition are ‘Very Responsible’.

Similarly when the results for this question are broken down by age, gender and education blame for the continued conflict still solidly seems to lay with ‘The Regime’ at 94.4 per cent for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole (Table 16). With regards to age the over 65s appear to place more responsibility on the ‘Opposition’ at 41.7 per cent ‘Very Responsible’. But the sample is small although none of them are Kurds or Christians (Table 2). Gender does not make a great deal of difference to these results but education does with 7.3 per cent of those who are illiterate holding ‘The Opposition’ ‘Very Responsible’ rising to 9.0 per cent for those with an Elementary education, 14.7 per cent for those with Secondary education, 23.8 per cent for university graduates and 40.0 per cent for those with higher degrees.

Pilot 2

The pattern is very similar again for the Kurd refugees with regards to those responsible for keeping the conflict going (Question 2.3) with most blame going to The Regime, some to the Opposition and Regional Forces and none to the International Forces who are resisting ISIS in their home town of Kobani (Table 16B). Conversely the Alawites blame the Opposition most of all followed by the Regional and International Forces, but 36 per cent of this pilot Alawite sample still thought The Regime were also 'very responsible' (Table 16B). Again plenty of blame going around.

Pilot 1

The pattern of results for those considered most responsible for human rights abuses remains much the same at 98.1 per cent 'Very Responsible' for 'The Regime' (Question 2.4 and Table 18) with some responsibility resting also with the Opposition as only 29.5 per cent say they are 'Not Responsible At All'. Again the Kurds place more responsibility on the Opposition then do the Sunni and the data here suggests that the Christians place most responsibility on the Opposition although they may be including groups like ISIS in their response (Table 19). 'Radical groups' are also at the top of the list for 'others' in this category (Table 20).

Pilot 2

Similarly the Kurd refugees blame the Regime for most of the human rights abuses (Question 2.4, Table 19B) while the Alawites place most blame on the Opposition (90 per cent 'very responsible'), although, again 46 per cent of this pilot sample also thought The Regime were 'very responsible'.

Pilot 1

Finally, with regards to 'International forces' and their responsibility Iran seems to receive most of the responsibility followed by Russia and Lebanon then China and the USA in the Syria Opposition sample (Question 2.5 and Table 21).

Pilot 2

In this section, when it comes to identifying the regional and international forces/states responsible for the Syrian conflict the Alawites tend to place most blame on the Gulf States particularly Qatar (Table 21B1). On the other hand the Kurd refugees seem to follow the general Sunni trend of blaming Iran and Russia (Table 21B2) although both the Alawites and Kurd refugees are now placing some blame on Turkey no doubt for opposing Assad on the one hand and not intervening militarily to help the Kurds on the other hand.

Justice

Pilot 1

Everyone in the Syria Opposition sample seems to want justice as a means to reforming the state with the only significant reservations being some groups or minorities opposed to the 'Promotion of reconciliation' and an 'Islamic Government' (Question 3.1 and Table 22). Human rights are the top priority for the Kurds followed by 'Fair trials of most responsible persons' while this is the first priority for the Sunni sample followed by 'Avoid impunity' (Table 23).

However, when these priorities are viewed across the regions sampled it is clearly the case that variations in these priorities are not limited to ethnic and religious groups alone. For example 'Democracy', which has not produced all the hoped for reforms after the 'Arab Spring' is 2nd in Hama (Table 24), 4th in the Jordanian Camp (Table 27), 7th in Aleppo (Table 24), 8th in Hassakah (Table 25), 11th in Deir Ezzor (Table 26) and the Turkish Camp (Table 27), 12th in Idlib (Table 25) and 13th in Damascus countryside (Table 26). Conversely 'Islamic Government' as the way forward is 2nd in Damascus countryside and 14th in Hama. Although the Hama sample is small (n=27) the trend across the regions is clear. There is an inverse relationship between 'Democracy' on the one hand and a desire for an 'Islamic Government' on the other hand, which can not be explained by ethnic and religious affiliations alone.

Pilot 2

Most significantly the Alawite sample place 'Democracy' and 'Promote human rights' at the very top of their list at 100 per cent 'very important' followed by 'Fair trials of most responsible persons' second at 98 per cent while placing 'Islamic Government' at the very bottom of their list at '0' per cent 'very important' (Table 27B). So when it comes to reform the Alawites appear to be 'on the same page' as those Sunni who reject an Islamic Government. The results for the Kurd refugees has not changed much with 'Promote human rights' 1st and Democracy 7th in Table 23 and 2nd and 6th in Table 27B. However 'Avoid impunity' now scores a 'zero', which suggests a different understanding of this term in the second pilot.

Pilot 1

With regards to the delivery of justice everyone wants reform and all that is required to deliver reform (Question 3.2 and Table 28). 'Traditional courts' have very little support and 'Apologies' do not seem adequate. The Kurds place 'Restitution' above 'Reform' (Table 29) while Sunnis place 'Reform' above 'Restitution' although they may have lost more during the course of the war.

Pilot 2

Again the results for the Kurd refugees are not significantly different for Question 3.2. However, the results for the Alawites are. They place 'National tribunals' at the top of their priorities for the delivery of justice with 'Hybrid courts' and 'Permanent international tribunals' at the bottom (Table 23). However, they also want 'Reintegration of banned individuals' 2nd, 'Restitution' 3rd, 'Reform of government institutions' 4th and significantly 'Monitor justice solutions' 5th at 92 per cent 'very significant'. So although the Alawites want Syrian institutions they want reformed institutions that they can have confidence in.

Pilot 1

Table 30 (Question 3.3) identifies what respondents in the all Syria Opposition sample consider to be the most appropriate forms of restitution for various crimes and

associated losses while Table 31 (Question 3.4) suggests which persons should be considered most responsible for such crimes in terms of punishment. Where property and the ability to work is concerned financial compensation seems to be more important than 'Justice through Prosecution' while such justice is more important when the loss involves a family member, false imprisonment or torture. Similarly ordering such crimes ranging from genocide to killing civilians seems to warrant the harshest possible punishment while looting, for example, could be met through the normal course of the law or even a reduced punishment in the context of a confession.

Pilot 2

The Alawite results for Question 3.4 follow much the same pattern as the results for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole suggesting that the response to this question is driven as much by Middle Eastern Arab/Syrian culture as anything else (Table 31B). However, the Alawites do place more emphasis on 'Trial and punishment by law' than they do on 'Kill without trial' and reduced punishment or amnesty.

Pilot 1

With regards to documenting what is happening in Syria (Question 4.1 and Table 32) there is no significant difference between the views of Sunnis and Kurds from the samples that we have (Table 33). Crimes, disappeared persons, prisoners and the loss of life should all be carefully documented. The relevant documentation centres used are listed in Tables 34 and 35 (Question 4.2) with the respondents knowledge of relevant NGOs in Tables 36 and 37 (Question 4.3). All of which may be very important for documentation as the most commonly used services are presently provided by civil society and international organisations with the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and International Red Cross and Red Crescent most prominent.

Pilot 2

Similarly Alawites also place an emphasis on the need to document crimes, loss of life, disappeared persons and prisoners. (Table 33B). However, the documentation centres used are quite different for both the Alawites (Table 34B1) and Kurd refugees (Table 34B2). The Alawites appear not to be documenting any of these abuses at all while the Kurd refugees are using their own political institutions principally the Azadi Kurdish Party in Syria (Table 35B) although they are familiar with the various NGOs undertaking such documentation (Table 36B2) while the Alawites knowledge of the relevant NGOs is comparatively poor (Table 36B1).

Pilot 1

Finally, with regards to practical post conflict justice solutions Question 4.4 asks the informant to indicate which legal system they would prefer for Syria. Significantly there were very few 'Can't Says' (Table 38). The Sunni's first choice was 'Sharia law and courts' at 35.8 per cent 'most acceptable' followed by 'Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power' at 33.2 per cent 'most acceptable' (Table 39). But Kurds (Table 40) and Christians (Table 41) in our sample seem to prefer 'Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors'. This option is not strongly opposed by the Sunni, only 17.6 per cent said it was 'not acceptable at all', so Syrian law and courts operating to the best international standards may be the way forward.

But the results for this question are also affected by region, age, education and gender. For example, in common with the Sunni sample those interviewed in Aleppo prefer 'Sharia law and courts' at 37.2 per cent 'most acceptable' but they are more generally

opposed to UN and International involvement that might exclude executions (Table 42). A similar pattern is found in Idlib at 58.8 per cent ‘most acceptable’ for ‘Sharia courts and law’ (Table 44) rising to 69.9 per cent in the Damascus countryside sample (Table 47). Clearly the respondents in these communities take a more conservative approach to matters of law while in the Der Ezzor sample, which was completed before ISIS were there in force, there is a clear indication that these respondents would prefer UN or International involvement of some kind at only 33.3 per cent ‘most acceptable’ for ‘Sharia law and courts’ and 45.8 per cent ‘most acceptable’ for ‘Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors’ (Table 46). Similarly in Hassakh 85.1 per cent prefer this option with 73.2 per cent ‘a little’ or ‘not acceptable at all’ regarding Sharia law and courts (Table 45). Those living in the two refugee camps in Jordan and Turkey, although they now live on opposite sides of Syria seem to prefer the status quo of the pre 1948 system but they are not strongly opposed to international standards (Table 48 and 49). Education also has an impact on these issues with those who are illiterate preferring the status quo or Sharia law and courts (Table 50) with a shift to International standards (15.5 to 31.7 per cent ‘most acceptable’) for those with a university education (Table 51). The young also seem to prefer Sharia law and courts (Table 52) as do men (Table 54) while those who are older prefer the status quo (Table 53) and women prefer International standards (Table 55).

What can we conclude from all of this? Perhaps the following:

- In general the Sunni population in this sample prefer the option of Sharia law and courts
- This preference is increased in some regions such as Idlib and Damascus countryside
- As well as amongst younger men.
- Women and the better educated prefer international standards of some kind
- As do Kurdish and Christian minorities who are more generally opposed to Sharia law and courts.
- Given the male bias of the sample (Table 2) it seems very likely that a representative sample would prefer International standards.

This pattern of regional, ethnic, religious, age, education and gender differences seems to be a common characteristic of many of the responses to this questionnaire which may in turn reflect a more general pattern of radical, conservative and progressive ‘right’ and ‘left’ political thinking and disposition.

Pilot 2

The results for this question for both the Alawites and Kurd refugees are quite unambiguous. The Kurd refugees would prefer ‘Combined Syrian and International courts using Syrian and International judges’ at 86.5 per cent ‘Most Acceptable’ followed by ‘Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors’ at 75 per cent ‘Most Acceptable’ (Table 55B2). This option is also the preferred Alawite option at 34 per cent ‘Most Acceptable’ and 64 per cent ‘Acceptable’. Additionally both Alawites and Kurds reject ‘Sharia law and courts’ at 94 per cent and 83.3 per cent ‘Not acceptable at all’ respectively.

Violations of Human Rights

Pilot 1

Most Sunni appear to have experienced or know a relative who has experienced a human rights violation in the Sunni sample. About half the Kurds and possibly half the Christians have experience of similar violations (Question 5.1 and Table 56). For the Sunni most of these violations were committed by the Regime (Question 5.2 and Table 57) or their agencies (Table 58). The same is true for the Kurds but they appear to suffer more through the actions of the armed brigades in Hassakah while those now living in the Jordanian and Turkish refugee camps are not affected by the armed brigades at all (Table 57). The types of violation and their relative frequencies are given in Tables 59 and 60 (Question 5.3).

Pilot 2

The Alawites appear to be victims of human rights abuses along with the rest of the Syrian population (Table 56B) at 22 per cent with 'no' abuse while the Kurd refugees negative response to this question has gone down to only 1.9 per cent 'no' (Table 56B) from 37.3 per cent 'no' before the ISIS attacks (Table 56). For both the Alawites and Kurds most of the responsibility for these violations rested with the 'Armed Brigades' although a significant percentage of Alawites (20 per cent) also identified the Regime forces as violators (Table 57B). More specifically the Alawites identified the offending groups as the Al-Nusra Front first followed by their own security services second (Table 58B1) while the Kurd refugees identified ISIS alone (Table 58B2). The type of violation and their relative frequencies are given in Table 59B with the Kurd refugees now suffering as much as the wider Sunni population (Table 59).

Pilot 1

With regard to which human rights should be investigated the Sunni seem to prefer 'Investigating violations that occurred during the Syrian Revolution since March 2011 until now' while the Kurds seem to favour 'Investigating violations that have occurred before March 2011' (Question 5.4 and Table 61). Those responsible for the agencies that committed the violations would appear to be the most important to prosecute (Question 5.5 and Table 62 to 67)⁴ and everyone in the Syria Opposition sample (Sunni, Kurd, Christian) appears to think that all violators should be treated the same (Question 5.6 and Table 68).

Pilot 2

The Alawites prefer to have investigations of human rights violations committed after March 2011 (Table 61B) as do the majority of Sunni (Table 61). However the Kurd refugees who previously wanted the focus of such investigations to focus on events before March 2011 are now shifting to post March 2011 up from 22 per cent to 57.7 per cent (Table 61 and 61B). The Kurd refugees continue to identify those responsible for the agencies that committed the violations as most important to prosecute (Table 67B1) while, significantly, the Alawites place more responsibility on the lower ranks (Table 67B1) although, like everyone else, they also think all human rights violators should be prosecuted (Table 68B).

⁴ For this question the informant was asked to rank order the 8 options on offer. However in the pilot this question was asked in a different way in Aleppo and Hama so these results have been left out, as has the result for the Syria sample as a whole that included the Aleppo and Hama samples.

Pilot 1

With regard to the organisations that these violators would have been a part of the Al-Bath party and various state security services come in for the strongest need for reform (Question 5.7 and Table 69) in the Syria Opposition sample. The Sunni appear to be split on the need to replace all government staff while a majority of Kurds and Christians seem to think that they can keep their posts if they have not committed a human rights violation (Question 5.8 and Table 70).

Pilot 2

Not surprisingly the Alawites place greatest emphasis on the disbandment of the 'Free Syrian Army' at 80 per cent of those sampled, but, again, significantly a majority of the Alawites sampled also want the 'Air Force Intelligence' and 'Special Forces' disbanded and most of the other institutions of government reformed in one way or another (Table 69B). However, the Alawites also think that government officials who have not committed any human rights abuses should retain their positions (Table 70B).

Pilot 1

Although there appears to be general acceptance for the work of Truth Committees in all the communities (Sunni, Kurd, Christian) in the Syria Opposition sample (Question 5.9 and Table 71) a majority of Sunni and Kurds do not support amnesty while the Christians (from this very small sample) appear to support amnesty (Question 5.10 and Table 72). There is no significant difference regarding amnesty for men and women while the regional, education and age variations on this issue are mixed and difficult to interpret at this time (Table 72). The Sunni, and possibly also the Christians, appear to support public hearings for victims, but the Kurds appear to be split on this issue (Question 5.11 and Table 73). Finally, nearly everyone in the Syria Opposition sample appears to support a national dialogue to deal with the problems of group relations (Question 5.12 and Table 74) and also to have international human rights at the centre of a new constitution for Syria (Question 5.13 and Table 75). All of which is a very positive result for the reform of Syrian institutions and constitution post conflict.

Pilot 2

Both the Alawites and Kurd refugees support the establishment of Truth Committees (Table 71B) but like the Sunni (72.4 per cent 'no') the Alawites are also opposed to amnesty (72 per cent 'no', Table 72B). Like the Kurds in the first pilot the Alawites appear to be split on the idea of holding public hearings for victims (Table 73B) but the Kurd refugees (post ISIS) are now in favour of such hearings. Finally a majority (68 per cent) of the Alawites sampled support a national dialogue to deal with the problems of group relations (Table 74B) while, most significantly all the Alawites sampled (100 per cent) support a new constitution for Syria based on human rights.

Conclusion

Although the Alawites and Sunni Opposition have different views regarding who is most responsible for the war and its continuation all sides place some blame with all the parties to the conflict and, critically, the Alawites want reform of Syrian institutions as much as the Sunni, Kurds and most probably other minorities as well. So, by putting the often fruitless ‘blame game’ to one side and by focusing on substantive matters of institutional reform progress and even a significant degree of consensus should not be difficult to achieve between Sunni, Alawite and all the communities in Syria, at least at a ‘people to people’ level. What the political elites want may be more problematic. But this is often the case and is particularly true for radical groups whose constituencies are nearly always very much smaller than the claims their leaders make. In this context the views of the ‘silent majority’, who want little more than an end to violence and an opportunity to rebuild their lives in a political environment not subject to the failings of the past, can be a very constructive dynamic. Syria would appear to be no exception to this rule. In practice can this be done? This pilot clearly demonstrates that it can but much more needs to be done.

Firstly a very much better and comprehensive questionnaire needs to be developed that covers all the major priorities and possibilities for institutional reform in Syria with input from as many Syrian voices as is possible. The NGOs that I worked with on such projects in Northern Ireland, Israel, Palestine and Sri Lanka were all very experienced in such matters as they had been in the ‘business’ of peace making for a generation. As a consequence the Northern Ireland Belfast Agreement became known as ‘Sunnigdale for slow learners’ as the agreement was not very different to one proposed a decade earlier at Sunnigdale. Similarly if we ever get a settlement in the Middle East it will likely be ‘The Clinton Parameters/Taba proposals/Geneva Accords for slow learners’ and most recently the change of government in Sri Lanka may yet herald in an agreement there which history might characterise as ‘The full implementation of the 13th Amendment for slow learners’. However, by comparison the conflict in Syria is relatively ‘young’ and the NGOs there do not have this wealth of experience to build on. But this should not be an impediment to them making progress. Peace processes have to start somewhere and this is a very good place to start.

Secondly this questionnaire needs to be tested across all the communities in Syria as well as those presently exiled to refugee camps. The samples collected for the pilots reviewed here can be improved on and extended to other areas. I am sure the NGOs operating in the region, with the right guidance and support, can do very much better in terms of both coverage and quality control. But governments are also commissioning polls across Syria with some results coming into the public domain, notably the work of ORB International (ORB, 2014).⁵ Their samples are excellent given the hostile environment but understandably expensive. Having said that these costs are as nothing when compared to the costs of caring for millions of refugees and waging war.

Thirdly this exercise must be tied into a political process, preferably formally but if necessary informally, so that the effort is not just another academic exercise.

⁵ A pdf file of the sample breakdown is available from the ORB International website available here: <http://www.orb-international.com/perch/resources/syriadatatablesjuly2014.pdf>

Dissemination, discussion and opportunities for decision-making must be a planned part of the exercise. Having said that the sponsors of such research should not simply wait for a 'ripe moment' as such research can also help to create a ripe moment or, at the very least, be there with a result to be used when a ripe moment presents itself on the international stage. The pilot studies reviewed here were started before the rise of ISIS and recent 'talks' in Cairo and Moscow. A comprehensive study of all the possibilities for a peaceful solution to the war in Syria could have been completed before these events and probably before Geneva II. It should now be done in preparation for Geneva III.

References

DPKO/NUPI (2013) Workshop, Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in the Work of Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping Operations, Kampala – Uganda, February 26-28.

Irwin, C. J., (2012) *The People's Peace: 'Pax Populi, Pax Dei' - How Peace Polls are Democratizing the Peace Making Process*, CreateSpace, Scotts Valley, CA.

----- (2002) *The People's Peace Process in Northern Ireland*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke and New York.

Lordos, A., Kaymak E., and N. Tocci, (2009) *A People's Peace in Cyprus: Testing Public Opinion on the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.

ORB International (2014), Three in Five Syrians Support International Military Involvement. Available at: <http://www.orb-international.com/article.php?s=three-in-five-syrians-support-international-military-involvement>

Shamir, J. and Shikaki, K., (2010) *Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.

SOC/LACU (2014), *Peace Polls Workshop*, Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Local Administration Councils Unit (LACU), Gaziantep, Feb 22-24.

UN (2013) *Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping*. United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support Policy, Evaluation and Training Division Policy and Best Practices Services, New York.

UN (2011) Letter from the Chair to the Secretary General---Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747 S/2011/85 February.

UN (2009) *Report of the Secretary General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304 June.

Appendix

Questions and Tables of Results

Demographic	n interview	Pilot sample per cent interview	n domicile	Pilot sample per cent domicile	Pre-war Syria per cent
Damascus	-	-	30	2.0	7.3 (1,552,000)
Aleppo	261	17.4	377	25.1	23.0 (4,868,000)
Homs	2	0.1	49	3.3	8.5 (1,803,000)
Hama	27	1.8	64	4.3	7.7 (1,628,000)
Idlib	181	12.1	216	14.4	7.1 (1,501,000)
Deir Ezzor	345	23.0	352	23.5	5.9 (1,239,000)
Raqqa	-	-	6	0.4	4.5 (944,000)
Hassakah	67	4.5	64	4.3	7.1 (1,512,000)
Daraa	-	-	189	12.6	4.9 (1,027,000)
Swaida	-	-	2	0.1	1.7 (370,000)
Qunaitera	-	-	-	-	0.4 (90,000)
Latakia	-	-	8	0.5	4.8 (1,008,000)
Tartus	-	-	-	-	3.8 (797,000)
Damascus countryside	136	9.1	140	9.3	13.4 (2,836,000)
Zaatary Camp (Mokhayam)	264	17.6	0	0	0
Turkish Camp (Mokhayyamat)	215	14.3	0	0	0
Male	1,090	72.7			52
Female	405	27.0			48
Muslim	365	24.3			90
Christian	9	0.6			10
Muslim Sunni	1,074	71.6			74
Muslim Alawite	2	0.1			13
Muslim Shi'a	-	-			<3
Muslim Druze	2	0.1			<3
Muslim Ismaeli	12	0.8			<3
Arab	1,400	93.4			90
Kurd	59	3.9			9
Circassian	1	0.1			<1
Armenian	1	0.1			<1
Assyrian	8	0.5			<1
Other	15	1.0			-

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the first pilot sample and pre-war Syria where 'n interview' is the number of persons interviewed and 'n domicile' indicates where those interviewed were from prior to the war. These numbers are also expressed as percentages of the sample along with available demographics of pre-war Syria.

Demographic	n interview	Pilot sample per cent interview	n domicile	Pilot sample per cent domicile	Pre-war Syria per cent
Latakia	33	2.1	33	2.1	4.8 (1,008,000)
Tartus	15	0.9	15	0.9	3.8 (797,000)
Turkish Camp (Mokhayyamat) Kurd Refugees	52	2.4	Aleppo 52	2.4	0

Table 1B. Demographic characteristics of the second pilot samples of Alawites, Kurd refugees and pre-war Syria where 'n interview' is the number of persons interviewed and 'n domicile' indicates where those interviewed were from prior to the war. These numbers are also expressed as percentages of the sample along with available demographics of pre-war Syria.

Region	M	F	18-25	26-45	46-55	56-65	65+ n=12	Illit.	Ele.	Sec.	Uni.	MA PhD	Sunni	Kurd	Christian
Aleppo	81.6	18.0	13.6	61.9	17.5	6.2	0.8	7.7	23.4	28.0	38.3	0.8	8.9	8.5	0
Hama	63.0	29.6	11.5	46.2	26.9	7.7	7.7	0	18.5	29.6	44.4	3.7	0.5	0	0
Idlib	64.6	35.4	28.2	56.5	12.4	2.8	0	9.9	35.4	26.5	27.6	0.6	16.9	0	0
Deir Ezzor	55.9	44.1	12.9	73.2	9.7	2.4	1.8	1.7	13.9	28.1	54.5	1.7	30.3	1.7	0
Hassakah	82.1	17.9	7.5	85.1	7.5	0	0	0	13.4	25.4	56.7	4.5	0.3	84.7	n=9
Damascus countryside	88.2	11.0	35.6	60.7	3.7	0	0	6.6	39.7	27.9	25.0	0	12.5	1.7	0
Zaatary Camp	81.1	18.9	12.9	66.2	15.2	5.3	0	12.1	52.3	25.0	10.2	0.4	13.1	3.4	0
Turkish Camps	74.4	25.6	16.4	62.4	14.6	5.6	0.9	10.2	30.7	31.6	25.6	0.5	17.5	0	0
Total	72.7	27.0	17.2	65.3	12.9	3.8	0.8	7.3	29.7	27.8	33.6	1.0	100	100	n=9

Table 2. Demographic characteristics of first pilot sample by region with percentage breakdowns of gender (male and female), age (18-25, 26-45, 46-55, 56-65, 65+), education (illiterate, elementary, secondary, university, MA/PhD), religion and ethnicity (Sunni, Kurd and Christian where Christians are expressed as a number 'n' because this sample is so small).

Region	M	F	Illiterate	Elementary	Secondary	University	MA PhD	Sunni	Alawite	Kurd	Christian
Latakia	69.7	30.3	0	21.2	24.2	51.5	3.0	0	63.5	0	0
Tartus	60.0	40.0	0	26.7	26.7	46.7	0	0	28.8	0	0
Turkish Camp (Mokhayyat) Kurd Refugees	55.8	36.0	0	31.3	52.0	56.7	0	100	0	100	0

Table 2B. Demographic characteristics of the second pilot sample by region with percentage breakdowns of gender (male and female), education (illiterate, elementary, secondary, university, MA/PhD), religion and ethnicity (Sunni, Alawite, Kurd and Christian where Christians are expressed as a number 'n' because this sample is so small).

Question 1.1 Every part of Syria is different so first of all can you please tell me what you think is the most serious problem that has to be dealt with in your country today? Write in.....

Syria Opposition Sample		n	Kurd Sample		n
1	Syrian regime	396	The war		18
2	The war	245	Syrian regime		6
3	The shelling	129	Terrorism from both sides		3
4	Topple the regime	92	The fighting, killing, violence		3
5	Bashar al-Assad	73	Displacement		2
6	The killing	72	Ending the conflict and foreign armed groups		2
7	Lack of Opposition unity	29	Fighting ISIS and electricity supply		1
8	Lack of security	21	Syrian regime and shelling		1
9	Displacement	20	Robbery		1
10	ISIS	13	The conflict between the opposition and the regime		1

Table 3. Top ten problems for the Syrian Opposition sample as a whole and Kurd sample in the Opposition controlled areas expressed as the number of citations 'n'.

Alawite Sample		n
1	The war	18
2	ISIS	11
3	Islamism	3
4	Islamic radicalism	1
5	Radical groups	1
6	Armed groups	1
7	The killing	1
8	Using heavy weapons	1

Table 3B1. Top problems for the Alawite sample expressed as the number of citations 'n'.

Kurd Refugee Sample		n
1	The war	13
2	The conflict between the regime and the opposition	8
3	Releasing all the detainees from ISIS and the regime	8
4	Continuous shelling	8
5	The lack of service	5
6	Syrian regime	4
7	Supporting the FSA and stopping radicals from entering Syria	2
8	Stopping the regime from torturing women and children	1
9	The violence against women	1
10	Stopping all the armed conflict	1
11	Building a Civil Society	1

Table 3B2. Top problems for the Kurd Refugee sample expressed as the number of citations 'n'.

Question 1.2 People from different communities often hold very different views about the problems at the centre of a conflict. Here is a list of some of the problems often mentioned as a cause of conflict. Which problems do you consider to be ‘Very significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of some significance’, ‘Of little significance’ or ‘Of no significance at all’ in Syria today.

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Significant	Significant	Of Some Significance	Of Little Significance	Of No Significance At All	Can't Say
1	So many killed and displaced by violence	87.1	7.2	4.6	0.4	0.6	0.1
2	The actions of the army	77.7	10.2	4.9	1.8	1.9	3.5
3	The government's foreign military engagements	72.9	13.5	7.2	2.3	3.3	0.7
4	Corrupt Government	68.9	16.5	9.9	2.7	1.7	0.2
5	No political solution to end conflict	66.4	20.5	7.7	1.9	3.5	0.1
6	Corruption and criminality in general	60.1	22.5	9.8	5.5	2.0	0.1
7	No effective negotiations to end conflict	59.1	21.1	13.1	3.0	3.5	0.1
8	Poor economy and unemployment	56.7	17.6	11.9	7.0	6.9	0
9	Poor political leadership	56.4	29.0	9.1	3.7	1.6	0.2
10	Discrimination and sectarianism	51.9	21.2	13.0	4.7	9.1	0.1
11	No justice and reconciliation	51.8	23.7	16.9	4.1	2.1	1.4
12	Elections not free and fair	50.1	33.5	9.5	3.4	3.0	0.5
13	Prejudice and personal safety	47.9	25.7	13.9	10.5	1.9	0.1
14	UN resolutions and human rights violations	46.7	19.9	15.3	12.2	5.4	0.5
15	Lack of food and clean water	46.1	23.0	10.9	8.2	11.8	0
16	The military actions of foreign forces	45.1	22.0	11.8	7.6	13.2	0.3
17	The actions of terrorists and militants	44.3	20.0	11.9	9.3	14.6	0.7
18	Lack of democratic accountability	43.3	32.4	14.5	2.3	7.2	0.3
19	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	38.1	23.8	17.5	12.1	8.5	0
20	Lack of free press and media	37.5	40.0	14.8	6.4	1.3	0.1
21	Low standards of education	36.8	28.4	15.1	9.5	10.1	0.1
22	The actions of the police	34.7	21.7	12.8	7.3	22.9	0.5
23	Media that incites hatred	32.9	28.1	20.4	11.2	7.3	0.1
24	Lack of language and cultural rights	20.4	21.3	29.3	22.7	6.2	0.1
25	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	19.7	18.9	19.4	19.7	21.5	0.7

Table 4. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	Syria Opposition sample	Very Significant		Kurd sample	Very Significant
1	So many killed and displaced by violence	87.1		Poor economy and unemployment	93.2
2	The actions of the army	77.7		Corrupt Government	91.5
3	The government's foreign military engagements	72.9		No political solution to end conflict	91.5
4	Corrupt Government	68.9		Lack of language and cultural rights	88.1
5	No political solution to end conflict	66.4		No effective negotiations to end conflict	88.1
6	Corruption and criminality in general	60.1		UN resolutions and human rights violations	83.1
7	No effective negotiations to end conflict	59.1		Discrimination and sectarianism	81.4
8	Poor economy and unemployment	56.7		The actions of the police	81.4
9	Poor political leadership	56.4		Media that incites hatred	79.7
10	Discrimination and sectarianism	51.9		Lack of democratic accountability	79.7
11	No justice and reconciliation	51.8		No justice and reconciliation	79.7
12	Elections not free and fair	50.1		The government's foreign military engagements	78.0
13	Prejudice and personal safety	47.9		Poor political leadership	74.6
14	UN resolutions and human rights violations	46.7		Lack of free press and media	71.2
15	Lack of food and clean water	46.1		Elections not free and fair	69.5
16	The military actions of foreign forces	45.1		The military actions of foreign forces	69.5
17	The actions of terrorists and militants	44.3		So many killed and displaced by violence	67.8
18	Lack of democratic accountability	43.3		Corruption and criminality in general	62.7
19	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	38.1		The actions of the army	59.3
20	Lack of free press and media	37.5		Low standards of education	57.6
21	Low standards of education	36.8		The actions of terrorists and militants	57.6
22	The actions of the police	34.7		Prejudice and personal safety	55.9
23	Media that incites hatred	32.9		Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	54.2
24	Lack of language and cultural rights	20.4		The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	49.2
25	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	19.7		Lack of food and clean water	42.4

Table 5. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for Syria and Kurd samples.

	Syria Opposition sample	Very Significant	Sunni sample	Very Significant
1	So many killed and displaced by violence	87.1	So many killed and displaced by violence	94.1
2	The actions of the army	77.7	The actions of the army	89.6
3	The government's foreign military engagements	72.9	The government's foreign military engagements	77.4
4	Corrupt Government	68.9	Corruption and criminality in general	69.1
5	No political solution to end conflict	66.4	No political solution to end conflict	69.1
6	Corruption and criminality in general	60.1	Corrupt Government	68.2
7	No effective negotiations to end conflict	59.1	Poor economy and unemployment	63.7
8	Poor economy and unemployment	56.7	No effective negotiations to end conflict	58.0
9	Poor political leadership	56.4	Poor political leadership	55.6
10	Discrimination and sectarianism	51.9	Lack of food and clean water	54.7
11	No justice and reconciliation	51.8	Prejudice and personal safety	52.7
12	Elections not free and fair	50.1	No justice and reconciliation	52.0
13	Prejudice and personal safety	47.9	Discrimination and sectarianism	51.2
14	UN resolutions and human rights violations	46.7	The military actions of foreign forces	51.1
15	Lack of food and clean water	46.1	UN resolutions and human rights violations	49.6
16	The military actions of foreign forces	45.1	The actions of terrorists and militants	49.4
17	The actions of terrorists and militants	44.3	Elections not free and fair	48.6
18	Lack of democratic accountability	43.3	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	44.8
19	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	38.1	Low standards of education	42.8
20	Lack of free press and media	37.5	Lack of democratic accountability	41.3
21	Low standards of education	36.8	The actions of the police	39.0
22	The actions of the police	34.7	Lack of free press and media	33.1
23	Media that incites hatred	32.9	Media that incites hatred	32.9
24	Lack of language and cultural rights	20.4	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	20.9
25	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	19.7	Lack of language and cultural rights	14.7

Table 6. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for the Syria and Sunni samples.

	Aleppo sample	Very Significant	Hama sample	Very Significant
1	Corrupt Government	92.3	So many killed and displaced by violence	85.2
2	So many killed and displaced by violence	92.3	Corrupt Government	81.5
3	The government's foreign military engagements	80.1	Lack of free press and media	74.1
4	The actions of the army	74.3	Lack of democratic accountability	74.1
5	Elections not free and fair	65.5	Poor political leadership	74.1
6	Lack of democratic accountability	57.1	Elections not free and fair	70.4
7	Poor political leadership	54.0	Corruption and criminality in general	63.0
8	Corruption and criminality in general	48.7	No political solution to end conflict	63.0
9	Discrimination and sectarianism	48.3	No justice and reconciliation	63.0
10	No political solution to end conflict	47.9	The actions of the army	63.0
11	Lack of free press and media	46.0	The government's foreign military engagements	63.0
12	No effective negotiations to end conflict	45.2	No effective negotiations to end conflict	59.3
13	No justice and reconciliation	39.1	Media that incites hatred	55.6
14	The actions of the police	35.6	UN resolutions and human rights violations	55.6
15	Poor economy and unemployment	31.0	Discrimination and sectarianism	51.9
16	The military actions of foreign forces	21.5	Poor economy and unemployment	48.1
17	Prejudice and personal safety	17.6	Prejudice and personal safety	48.1
18	UN resolutions and human rights violations	14.9	The actions of terrorists and militants	44.4
19	Lack of language and cultural rights	7.7	The military actions of foreign forces	44.4
20	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	6.1	Low standards of education	37.0
21	Low standards of education	5.7	Lack of food and clean water	37.0
22	Media that incites hatred	4.6	Lack of language and cultural rights	37.0
23	Lack of food and clean water	2.7	The actions of the police	33.3
24	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	1.9	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	29.6
25	The actions of terrorists and militants	0.8	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	25.9

Table 7. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for Aleppo and Hama samples.

	Idlib sample	Very Significant	Hassakah sample	Very Significant
1	So many killed and displaced by violence	95.0	No political solution to end conflict	98.5
2	The actions of the army	93.9	No effective negotiations to end conflict	97.0
3	Poor economy and unemployment	86.7	Poor economy and unemployment	95.5
4	The government's foreign military engagements	81.8	Media that incites hatred	92.5
5	Corruption and criminality in general	74.0	No justice and reconciliation	91.0
6	Low standards of education	69.1	Corrupt Government	89.6
7	The actions of terrorists and militants	66.3	UN resolutions and human rights violations	89.6
8	Corrupt Government	60.8	Lack of democratic accountability	86.6
9	Lack of food and clean water	60.2	Discrimination and sectarianism	85.1
10	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	58.6	Lack of language and cultural rights	85.1
11	Poor political leadership	58.6	The actions of the police	79.1
12	The military actions of foreign forces	55.8	The military actions of foreign forces	79.1
13	Discrimination and sectarianism	53.6	Poor political leadership	77.6
14	No political solution to end conflict	53.6	Lack of free press and media	76.1
15	Prejudice and personal safety	48.6	The government's foreign military engagements	74.6
16	No justice and reconciliation	48.6	So many killed and displaced by violence	70.1
17	UN resolutions and human rights violations	46.4	The actions of terrorists and militants	68.7
18	Lack of democratic accountability	39.2	Low standards of education	59.7
19	No effective negotiations to end conflict	38.1	Corruption and criminality in general	59.7
20	Elections not free and fair	35.9	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	59.7
21	Lack of free press and media	35.4	Prejudice and personal safety	56.7
22	The actions of the police	33.7	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	55.2
23	Media that incites hatred	26.5	The actions of the army	55.2
24	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	21.5	Lack of food and clean water	44.8
25	Lack of language and cultural rights	13.8	Elections not free and fair	13.4

Table 8. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for Idlib and Al Hassakah samples.

	Deir Ezzor sample	Very Significant	Damascus countryside sample	Very Significant
1	So many killed and displaced by violence	97.4	The actions of the army	83.1
2	The actions of the army	86.7	So many killed and displaced by violence	78.7
3	Corrupt Government	84.9	The government's foreign military engagements	70.6
4	No political solution to end conflict	82.9	Poor economy and unemployment	68.4
5	Lack of food and clean water	78.6	No political solution to end conflict	66.9
6	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	77.7	Lack of food and clean water	63.2
7	Prejudice and personal safety	75.4	Corrupt Government	62.5
8	Poor economy and unemployment	72.5	Poor political leadership	60.3
9	Poor political leadership	68.1	Corruption and criminality in general	58.8
10	The actions of terrorists and militants	68.1	No effective negotiations to end conflict	54.4
11	No effective negotiations to end conflict	67.2	Discrimination and sectarianism	46.3
12	Discrimination and sectarianism	63.2	Elections not free and fair	41.9
13	The government's foreign military engagements	63.2	Low standards of education	40.4
14	Corruption and criminality in general	59.7	The military actions of foreign forces	39.7
15	UN resolutions and human rights violations	57.7	Prejudice and personal safety	30.9
16	Low standards of education	55.4	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	30.1
17	Media that incites hatred	44.9	Lack of democratic accountability	22.8
18	No justice and reconciliation	44.9	The actions of the police	22.8
19	Elections not free and fair	44.3	No justice and reconciliation	22.1
20	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	42.6	The actions of terrorists and militants	21.3
21	Lack of democratic accountability	36.2	Lack of free press and media	19.9
22	The actions of the police	35.9	Media that incites hatred	19.1
23	The military actions of foreign forces	33.3	UN resolutions and human rights violations	17.6
24	Lack of free press and media	29.3	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	12.5
25	Lack of language and cultural rights	12.2	Lack of language and cultural rights	6.6

Table 9. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for Deir Ezzor and Damascus countryside samples.

	Zaatary Camp sample	Very Significant	Turkish Camp sample	Very Significant
1	So many killed and displaced by violence	69.3	So many killed and displaced by violence	90.2
2	The government's foreign military engagements	69.3	The actions of the army	80.9
3	No justice and reconciliation	68.6	Corrupt Government	80.0
4	The military actions of foreign forces	68.6	The government's foreign military engagements	79.1
5	No effective negotiations to end conflict	62.9	Discrimination and sectarianism	75.3
6	No political solution to end conflict	61.7	Elections not free and fair	74.4
7	The actions of the army	60.6	Poor economy and unemployment	71.2
8	UN resolutions and human rights violations	58.0	Corruption and criminality in general	69.3
9	Prejudice and personal safety	44.3	No political solution to end conflict	69.3
10	The actions of terrorists and militants	34.8	Poor political leadership	67.4
11	Media that incites hatred	31.1	No effective negotiations to end conflict	66.0
12	Lack of free press and media	30.3	No justice and reconciliation	64.7
13	Corruption and criminality in general	28.0	Lack of democratic accountability	64.2
14	Lack of language and cultural rights	25.0	The actions of the police	60.9
15	Poor political leadership	24.2	The actions of terrorists and militants	59.1
16	Lack of food and clean water	23.5	UN resolutions and human rights violations	57.2
17	Lack of democratic accountability	20.5	Low standards of education	53.0
18	Elections not free and fair	18.6	Lack of food and clean water	52.6
19	Corrupt Government	17.8	Prejudice and personal safety	52.6
20	Discrimination and sectarianism	14.8	The military actions of foreign forces	47.9
21	The actions of the police	6.8	Lack of free press and media	45.1
22	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	3.4	Media that incites hatred	43.7
23	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	0.8	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	39.5
24	Poor economy and unemployment	0.4	Lack of language and cultural rights	34.4
25	Low standards of education	0.4	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	18.1

Table 10. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for Jordanian Camp and Turkish Camp samples.

	Alawite sample	Very Significant	Kurd Refugee sample	Very Significant
1	The military actions of foreign forces	96.0	No justice and reconciliation	98.1
2	The government's foreign military engagements	96.0	No effective negotiations to end conflict	96.2
3	So many killed and displaced by violence	88.0	Poor economy and unemployment	92.3
4	No effective negotiations to end conflict	86.0	Corruption and criminality in general	90.4
5	Corrupt Government	84.0	Discrimination and sectarianism	90.4
6	No justice and reconciliation	84.0	Lack of language and cultural rights	88.5
7	The actions of terrorists and militants	74.0	UN resolutions and human rights violations	88.5
8	Poor economy and unemployment	70.0	Lack of food and clean water	84.6
9	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	68.0	Corrupt Government	82.7
10	Media that incites hatred	64.0	Prejudice and personal safety	82.7
11	Discrimination and sectarianism	60.0	The actions of terrorists and militants	80.8
12	Lack of democratic accountability	58.0	Low standards of education	78.8
13	Prejudice and personal safety	56.0	The actions of the police	78.8
14	Low standards of education	54.0	The actions of the army	76.9
15	Corruption and criminality in general	54.0	So many killed and displaced by violence	73.1
16	Elections not free and fair	50.0	Poor political leadership	71.2
17	Lack of language and cultural rights	48.0	Lack of free press and media	67.3
18	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	46.0	Elections not free and fair	67.3
19	Lack of food and clean water	46.0	Poor health care, roads and electrical supply	65.4
20	Lack of free press and media	44.0	The actions of rebels and the opposition fighters	63.5
21	UN resolutions and human rights violations	44.0	Lack of democratic accountability	61.5
22	No political solution to end conflict	44.0	No political solution to end conflict	61.5
23	Poor political leadership	42.0	Media that incites hatred	46.2
24	The actions of the police	20.0	The government's foreign military engagements	11.5
25	The actions of the army	20.0	The military actions of foreign forces	1.9

Table 10B. Rank order of 25 general conflict problems for Alawite and Kurd Refugee samples.

Question 2.1 Who do you think is most responsible for starting the armed conflict in Syria?

Write in.....

	Syria Opposition Sample	n	Kurd Sample	n	Christian Sample	n
1	Syrian Regime	1172	Syrian Regime	46	The Regime and Opposition	4
2	Bashar al-Assad	52	Regime and Opposition	8	The Regime	2
3	Regime and international community	22	The Regime and Shabiha	2	The Opposition	2
4	Regime and Opposition	15	Syrian regime and ISIS	1	The Opposition and other counties supporting terrorism	1
5	Syrian army	13	Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Regime	1		

Table 11. Top five responsible for starting the conflict for the Syrian Opposition sample as a whole, Kurd and Christian samples all expressed as the number of responses ‘n’.

	Alawite Sample	n
1	Islamic Opposition and Muslim Brotherhood	19
2	Syrian Regime	8
3	The Regime, Opposition and Regional Forces	7
4	Gulf States, US and Turkey	6
5	The Opposition	5

Table 11B1. Top five responsible for starting the conflict for the Alawite sample expressed as the number of responses ‘n’.

	Kurd Refugee Sample	n
1	Syrian Regime	23
2	Syrian Regime and FSA	9
3	The Regime and Opposition	9
4	The Regime, Opposition armed groups and ISIS	7
5	Syrian Army	4

Table 11B2. Top five responsible for starting the conflict for the Kurd Refugee sample expressed as the number of responses ‘n’.

Question 2.2 Please say who you think is 'Very Responsible', 'Responsible', 'Somewhat Responsible', 'A little Responsible' or 'Not Responsible at all'.

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Responsible	Responsible	Some What Responsible	A Little Responsible	Nor Responsible At All	Can't Say
1	The Regime	96.3	2.6	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.1
2	The Opposition	8.1	15.7	17.9	18.6	39.7	0.1
3	The Regional Forces	50.0	32.0	13.6	2.9	1.4	0.1
4	The International Forces	46.9	32.3	13.0	3.9	3.5	0.4

Table 12. Per cent responsibility for starting the conflict for the Syrian Opposition sample.

	Very Responsible	Sunni	Kurd	Christian (n)
1	The Regime	97.0	98.3	5
2	The Opposition	7.7	23.7	7
3	The Regional Forces	54.3	66.1	8
4	The International Forces	50.7	35.6	6

Table 13. Per cent 'very responsible' for starting the conflict for Sunni and Kurd samples and number 'n' for the small Christian sample.

	Very Responsible	Alawite	Kurd Refugees
1	The Regime	40.0	98.1
2	The Opposition	68.0	40.4
3	The Regional Forces	60.0	13.5
4	The International Forces	34.0	0

Table 13B. Per cent 'very responsible' for starting the conflict for Alawite and Kurd Refugee samples.

Question 2.3 Who do you think is most responsible for keeping the armed conflict in Syria going now? Please say who you think is 'Very Responsible', 'Responsible', 'Somewhat Responsible', 'A little Responsible' or 'Not Responsible at all'.

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Responsible	Responsible	Some What Responsible	A Little Responsible	Nor Responsible At All	Can't Say
1	The Regime	94.4	4.0	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.1
2	The Opposition	15.7	20.2	22.2	18.7	22.9	0.2
3	The Regional Forces	73.1	20.7	4.3	1.3	0.6	0.1
4	The International Forces	71.6	19.5	7.1	0.8	0.5	0.5

Table 14. Per cent responsibility for keeping the conflict going for the Syria Opposition sample.

	Very Responsible	Sunni	Kurd	Christian (n)	Aleppo	Hama	Idlib	Deir Ezzor	Hassakah	Damascus countryside	Zaatary Camp	Turkish Camp
1	The Regime	95.6	96.6	5	92.7	88.9	98.3	94.5	89.6	93.4	100	89.3
2	The Opposition	15.2	44.1	8	8.4	14.8	10.5	36.5	52.2	11.0	1.9	4.2
3	The Regional Forces	71.6	89.8	9	76.2	74.1	54.1	85.5	92.5	69.1	67.4	68.8
4	The International Forces	68.7	74.6	9	78.2	77.8	62.4	66.1	79.1	70.6	77.3	70.7

Table 15. Per cent 'very responsible' for keeping the conflict going for Sunni, Kurd, Christian (n) and Regions.

	Very Responsible	Syria Opposition Sample	18-25	24-45	46-55	56-65	65+ n=12	M	F	Illiterate	Elementary	Secondary	University	MA PhD
1	The Regime	94.4	90.9	94.9	95.8	94.7	100	94.1	95.1	97.2	94.8	95.2	92.7	100
2	The Opposition	15.7	15.0	16.6	11.0	10.5	41.7	14.5	19.0	7.3	9.0	14.7	23.8	40.0
3	The Regional Forces	73.1	75.2	72.4	74.9	73.7	91.7	74.0	70.4	79.8	69.7	69.0	78.2	80.0
4	The International Forces	71.6	76.4	70.2	71.2	71.9	91.7	74.3	64.2	79.8	74.8	70.9	67.5	60.0

Table 16. Per cent 'very responsible' for keeping the conflict going for Age, Gender and Education.

	Very Responsible	Alawite	Kurd Refugees
1	The Regime	36.0	100
2	The Opposition	80.0	30.8
3	The Regional Forces	82.0	34.6
4	The International Forces	76.0	0

Table 16B. Per cent 'very responsible' for keeping the conflict going for the Alawite and Kurd Refugee samples.

	Syria Opposition Sample	n
1	Radical groups	10
2	Hezbollah	5
3	Armed groups working for the Syrian Regime	2
4	Al-Qaeda	2
5	USA – EU – Arab Countries	2

Table 17. Top five ‘others’ responsible for keeping the conflict going for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

Question 2.4 Who do you think is most responsible for war crimes and human rights abuses? Please say who you think is ‘Very Responsible’, ‘Responsible’, ‘Somewhat Responsible’, ‘A little Responsible’ or ‘Not Responsible at all’.

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Responsible	Responsible	Some What Responsible	A Little Responsible	Nor Responsible At All	Can't Say
1	The Regime	98.1	1.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1
2	The Opposition	12.6	10.4	22.2	24.9	29.5	0.3
3	The Regional Forces	61.1	26.5	9.7	1.7	0.7	0.2
4	The International Forces	55.5	27.5	12.3	3.3	0.8	0.6

Table 18. Per cent responsibility for war crimes and human rights abuses for the Syrian Opposition sample.

	Very Responsible	Sunni	Kurd	Christian (n)
1	The Regime	99.1	98.3	3
2	The Opposition	13.7	42.4	8
3	The Regional Forces	60.3	62.7	8
4	The International Forces	55.6	30.5	5

Table 19. Per cent ‘very responsible’ for war crimes and human rights abuses for Sunni and Kurd samples and number (n) for the small Christian sample.

	Very Responsible	Alawite	Kurd Refugees
1	The Regime	46.0	90.4
2	The Opposition	90.0	25.0
3	The Regional Forces	54.0	19.2
4	The International Forces	40.0	0

Table 19B. Per cent ‘very responsible’ for war crimes and human rights abuses for Alawite and Kurd Refugee samples.

	Syria Opposition Sample	n
1	Radical groups	11
2	Failure of some Human Rights NGOs	7
3	Armed groups	3
4	Foreign arms dealers	2
5	ISIS	2

Table 20. Top five ‘others’ responsible for war crimes and human rights abuses for the Syrian sample as a whole.

Question 2.5 Which Regional and International forces they are referring to?

	Syria Opposition Sample	n
1	IRN, LBN, RUS	70
2	IRN, RUS	68
3	IRN, LBN, RUS, CHN	26
4	IRN, RUS, USA	25
5	IRN, RUS, USA	24
6	IRN, RUS, LBN	23
7	IRN, RUS, CHN	22
8	IRN, LBN, IRQ, RUS, CHN	20
9	IRN, LBN, RUS, USA, CHN	19
10	IRN, LBN, IRQ, RUS	19

Table 21. Syrian Opposition sample top ten groups of states responsible for the continued conflict in Syria.

	Alawite Sample	n
1	QTR, SAU, TUR	5
2	GS, TUR, USA	4
3	QTR, SAU, TUR, IRN, USA	4
4	TUR, QTR, USA	4
5	GS, IRN, USA	3
6	QTR, SAU, USA	3
7	QTR, TUR	3
8	IRN, TUR, GS	2
9	QTR, SAU, TUR, IRN	2
10	QTR, SAU, TUR, IRN, Hezbollah, USA, ISR	2

Table 21B1. Alawite top ten groups of states responsible for the continued conflict in Syria.

	Kurd Refugee Sample	n
1	IRN, RUS, TUR	5
2	IRN, RUS, TUR, ISR	5
3	IRN, RUS, Hezbollah	4
4	TUR, IRN, ISR	4
5	RUS, IRN TUR	3
6	Hezbollah, RUS, IRN, TUR, CHN	2
7	IRN, RUS, Hezbollah, TUR	2
8	IRN, RUS, TUR, CHN	2
9	RUS, TUR, IRN, Hezbollah, SAU, QTR	2
10	TUR, IRN, RUS	2

Table 21B2. Kurd Refugee top ten groups of states responsible for the continued conflict in Syria.

*Question 3.1 Justice can make an important contribution to the end of war. Can you please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very important', 'Important', 'Of some importance', 'Of little importance' or 'Of no importance at all'?*⁶

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Important	Important	Of Some Importance	Of Little Importance	Of No Importance At All	Can't Say
1	Fair trials of most responsible persons	84.3	11.3	3.3	0.7	0.3	0.1
2	Free and fair elections	70.2	20.4	7.4	0.9	1.0	0.1
3	Promote human rights	68.4	21.5	8.9	2.3	2.1	0.4
4	Avoid impunity	68.2	15.9	6.5	2.8	6.3	0.1
5	Promote stability	66.1	24.5	6.7	1.9	0.6	0.1
6	Participation in the institutions of the state	65.6	22.3	8.6	2.3	0.6	0.6
7	Promote the rule of law	64.0	25.2	8.8	1.3	0.7	0
8	Build trust	62.2	15.9	6.5	2.8	6.3	0.1
9	Free media	62.2	25.9	8.3	2.8	0.7	0
10	Promote peace	58.6	26.8	9.3	3.9	1.1	0.2
11	Democracy	57.6	25.2	11.5	3.1	2.4	0.2
12	Freedom of information	46.5	30.0	17.0	5.0	1.5	0.1
13	Islamic government	44.7	24.2	18.3	6.7	6.0	0.1
14	Promote reconciliation	42.2	21.9	18.0	7.5	10.1	0.2

Table 22. Justice priorities for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	Sunni sample	Very Important	Kurd sample	Very Important
1	Fair trials of most responsible persons	86.0	Promote human rights	88.1
2	Avoid impunity	67.1	Fair trials of most responsible persons	86.4
3	Free and fair elections	66.8	Free and fair elections	86.4
4	Participation in the institutions of the state	64.7	Promote the rule of law	83.1
5	Promote stability	64.2	Promote stability	81.4
6	Build trust	61.0	Build trust	81.4
7	Free media	60.3	Democracy	81.4
8	Promote human rights	60.1	Participation in the institutions of the state	81.4
9	Promote the rule of law	59.9	Free media	81.4
10	Promote peace	58.8	Promote reconciliation	79.7
11	Democracy	53.1	Promote peace	79.7
12	Islamic government	44.1	Avoid impunity	78.0
13	Freedom of information	43.8	Freedom of information	74.6
14	Promote reconciliation	38.6	Islamic government	5.1

Table 23. Justice priorities for the Sunni and Kurd samples.

⁶ 'Establish the truth' was included in the original draft of this question but was replaced with 'Islamic government'.

	Aleppo sample	Very Important	Hama sample	Very Important
1	Free and fair elections	76.6	Promote the rule of law	92.6
2	Free media	71.6	Democracy	92.6
3	Fair trials of most responsible persons	57.5	Free media	92.6
4	Participation in the institutions of the state	52.9	Participation in the institutions of the state	88.9
5	Promote Human Rights	51.3	Fair trials of most responsible persons	85.2
6	Promote the rule of law	51.0	Free and fair elections	81.5
7	Democracy	46.7	Promote Human Rights	77.8
8	Promote stability	44.4	Avoid impunity	66.7
9	Avoid impunity	41.0	Promote stability	63.0
10	Build trust	37.5	Freedom of information	59.3
11	Freedom of information	37.5	Build trust	55.6
12	Islamic Government	32.6	Promote peace	48.1
13	Promote peace	27.2	Promote reconciliation	25.9
14	Promote reconciliation	23.4	Islamic Government	3.7

Table 24. Justice priorities for the Aleppo and Hama samples.

	Idlib sample	Very Important	Hassakah sample	Very Important
1	Fair trials of most responsible persons	90.6	Promote human rights	94.0
2	Avoid impunity	77.9	Fair trials of most responsible persons	91.0
3	Islamic government	76.8	Promote the rule of law	89.6
4	Promote the rule of law	71.8	Promote peace	86.6
5	Build trust	66.3	Promote stability	86.6
6	Promote stability	65.2	Promote reconciliation	85.1
7	Promote human rights	63.0	Build trust	85.1
8	Free and fair elections	62.4	Democracy	85.1
9	Promote peace	59.1	Free and fair elections	85.1
10	Promote reconciliation	54.7	Avoid impunity	82.1
11	Participation in the institutions of the state	54.1	Participation in the institutions of the state	82.1
12	Democracy	47.0	Free media	80.6
13	Free media	43.6	Freedom of information	77.6
14	Freedom of information	20.4	Islamic government	9.0

Table 25. Justice priorities for the Idlib and Hasakah samples.

	Deir Ezzor sample	Very Important	Damascus countryside sample	Very Important
1	Fair trials of most responsible persons	97.4	Fair trials of most responsible persons	85.3
2	Promote stability	86.4	Islamic Government	68.4
3	Participation in the institutions of the state	77.1	Participation in the institutions of the state	58.1
4	Promote peace	74.2	Free media	56.6
5	Promote Human Rights	71.6	Build trust	54.4
6	Promote the rule of law	64.6	Free and fair elections	49.3
7	Avoid impunity	64.3	Avoid impunity	47.1
8	Freedom of information	58.3	Promote the rule of law	41.9
9	Build trust	57.4	Promote stability	40.4
10	Free and fair elections	55.9	Promote peace	30.9
11	Democracy	52.8	Freedom of information	28.7
12	Free media	48.1	Promote Human Rights	23.5
13	Islamic Government	34.8	Democracy	22.8
14	Promote reconciliation	24.1	Promote reconciliation	15.4

Table 26. Justice priorities for the Deir Ezzor and Damascus countryside samples.

	Zaatary Camp sample	Very Important	Turkish Camp sample	Very Important
1	Avoid impunity	90.9	Fair trials of most responsible persons	89.3
2	Promote Human Rights	90.2	Free and fair elections	81.4
3	Build trust	88.6	Avoid impunity	80.9
4	Democracy	87.5	Participation in the institutions of the state	63.3
5	Promote peace	87.1	Free media	63.3
6	Promote stability	86.4	Build trust	61.9
7	Promote the rule of law	84.8	Democracy	59.5
8	Promote reconciliation	84.8	Promote Human Rights	55.3
9	Free and fair elections	84.1	Promote the rule of law	48.8
10	Fair trials of most responsible persons	82.6	Islamic Government	47.9
11	Free media	78.8	Democracy	47.0
12	Participation in the institutions of the state	70.5	Promote peace	46.5
13	Freedom of information	58.0	Promote stability	45.6
14	Islamic Government	45.8	Promote reconciliation	37.7

Table 27. Justice priorities for the Jordanian Camp and Turkish Camp samples.

	Alawite sample	Very Important	Kurd Refugee	Very Important
1	Democracy	100.0	Free media	98.1
2	Promote human rights	100.0	Promote human rights	96.2
3	Fair trials of most responsible persons	98.0	Fair trials of most responsible persons	90.4
4	Free and fair elections	86.0	Promote stability	90.4
5	Free media	86.0	Promote the rule of law	88.5
6	Promote the rule of law	82.0	Democracy	88.5
7	Freedom of information	82.0	Free and fair elections	80.8
8	Build trust	74.0	Build trust	78.8
9	Promote peace	72.0	Freedom of information	75.0
10	Promote stability	72.0	Promote peace	71.2
11	Avoid impunity	64.0	Promote reconciliation	53.8
12	Participation in the institutions of the state	48.0	Participation in the institutions of the state	36.5
13	Promote reconciliation	26.0	Islamic Government	7.7
14	Islamic Government	0	Avoid impunity	0

Table 27B. Justice priorities for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 3.2 Justice can be achieved in many different ways to help secure a lasting peace. Here is a list of different ways to implement justice that have been used successfully in different parts of the world to help end conflict. Can you please indicate which ones you consider to be ‘Very important’, ‘Important’, ‘Of some importance’, ‘Of little importance’ or ‘Of no importance at all’?

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Important	Important	Of Some Importance	Of Little Importance	Of No Importance At All	Can't Say
1	Reform of government institutions	74.4	19.2	4.9	0.9	0.5	0.1
2	Support civil society organisations	74.4	16.5	6.0	1.7	1.1	0.2
3	National tribunals	67.4	17.0	7.5	1.3	6.7	0
4	Monitor justice solutions	66.8	24.6	5.4	2.1	1.1	0.1
5	Restitution	61.0	22.9	6.1	2.9	7.0	0.1
6	National dialogue with all groups	54.2	23.6	12.7	5.2	4.2	0.1
7	Reintegration of banned individuals	50.2	28.6	10.1	3.3	7.5	0.3
8	Human rights commission/council	49.3	15.3	18.1	9.5	7.5	0.2
9	Truth commissions	44.7	24.0	17.9	6.2	7.0	0.2
10	Special international tribunals	27.7	15.2	18.1	14.5	24.3	0.2
11	Permanent international tribunals	26.5	16.7	19.9	12.3	24.1	0.5
12	Memorials	21.4	20.7	22.0	11.8	23.7	0.3
13	Apologies	19.6	19.0	11.5	16.4	33.4	0.1
14	Hybrid courts	18.6	26.0	24.3	16.2	14.7	0.2
15	Traditional courts	16.1	24.9	28.3	13.1	17.5	0.1

Table 28. Justice procedures for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	Sunni sample	Very Important	Kurd sample	Very Important
1	Reform of government institutions	77.9	Restitution	94.9
2	Support civil society organisations	75.4	Reform of government institutions	86.4
3	National tribunals	66.6	National dialogue with all groups	84.7
4	Monitor justice solutions	65.3	Truth commissions	81.4
5	Restitution	61.6	Apologies	81.4
6	National dialogue with all groups	53.7	Reintegration of banned individuals	81.4
7	Reintegration of banned individuals	52.1	Monitor justice solutions	81.4
8	Human rights commission/council	46.1	Human rights commission/council	79.7
9	Truth commissions	45.4	Support civil society organisations	79.7
10	Special international tribunals	30.4	Memorials	67.8
11	Permanent international tribunals	28.4	Special international tribunals	62.7
12	Traditional courts	20.2	Permanent international tribunals	57.6
13	Apologies	20.0	National tribunals	52.5
14	Hybrid courts	19.3	Hybrid courts	39.0
15	Memorials	19.3	Traditional courts	0

Table 29. Justice procedures for the Sunni and Kurd samples.

Alawite sample		Very Important	Kurd Refugee		Very Important
1	National tribunals	100	Permanent international tribunals	86.5	
2	Reintegration of banned individuals	98.0	Truth commissions	82.7	
3	Restitution	94.0	Reintegration of banned individuals	78.8	
4	Reform of government institutions	92.0	Monitor justice solutions	75.0	
5	Monitor justice solutions	92.0	Support civil society organisations	75.0	
6	National dialogue with all groups	70.0	Human rights commission/council	71.2	
7	Apologies	66.0	Special international tribunals	67.3	
8	Truth commissions	62.0	Reform of government institutions	63.5	
9	Traditional courts	60.0	National dialogue with all groups	51.9	
10	Human rights commission/council	50.0	Restitution	44.2	
11	Support civil society organisations	50.0	Hybrid courts	13.5	
12	Special international tribunals	44.0	Traditional courts	3.8	
13	Memorials	42.0	Apologies	1.9	
14	Hybrid courts	28.0	National tribunals	0	
15	Permanent international tribunals	24.0	Memorials	0	

Table 29B. Justice procedures for the Alawite and Kurd Refugee samples.

3.3 Here is a list of losses suffered by victims in Syria. Please indicate which forms of restitution you think the victim should receive?

Syria Opposition Sample		Financial Compensation ⁷	Justice through Prosecutions	Justice through Truth Commission ⁸	Justice through truth seeking ⁹	Restore property and livelihood	Peace and Amnesty	Can't Say
1	Loss of head of household	42.0	51.6	1.7	0.6	0.8	3.0	0.2
2	Loss of husband or wife	38.3	60.9	1.9	1.4	0.4	4.2	0.5
3	Loss of son or daughter	18.9	70.6	2.1	1.7	0.3	5.2	1.3
4	Loss of business/ means of livelihood	57.6	5.1	1.7	1.1	34.1	0.5	0.3
5	Loss of house	76.1	3.2	1.0	0.7	18.8	0.2	0.1
6	Loss of limb	68.5	20.0	5.2	2.5	0.6	2.7	0.5
7	Loss of freedom through false imprisonment	17.4	47.8	13.2	11.9	0.5	8.7	0.5
8	Suffering due to torture	17.3	56.5	9.1	10.8	0.7	5.2	0.4

Table 30. Loss and restitution priorities for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

⁷ The original draft of this question separated 'Financial Compensation' into both compensation for individuals and compensation for groups as a whole.

⁸ The original draft for this item was 'Justice through truth and accountability'.

⁹ The original draft for this item was 'Justice through apology and amnesty'.

3.4 Here is a list of crimes that have been committed in Syria. If the person(s) who committed the crime, confessed their guilt and expressed remorse which punishment would you be willing to accept to help achieve peace and reconciliation?

Syria Opposition Sample		Kill without trial	Trial and punishment by law	Confess crime and reduced punishment	Confess crime and amnesty	Amnesty	Can't Say
1	Ordering genocide	52.8	46.6	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
2	Ordering mass killings of civilians	52.8	46.8	0.1	0.3	0.1	0
3	Ordering extra-judicial executions	45.6	53.6	0.6	0.1	0.1	0
4	Ordering torture	19.6	74.7	4.6	0.7	0.3	0.1
5	Ordering crimes against women	51.8	47.9	0	0.2	0.1	0.1
6	Ordering imprisonment without trial	11.5	69.8	14.1	4.1	0.3	0.2
7	Ordering destruction of essential buildings	11.7	29.6	16.2	2.3	0.1	0
8	Killing civilians	49.6	49.7	0	0.2	0.1	0.4
9	Torturing	25.2	66.3	6.0	1.7	0.6	0.2
10	Committing crimes against women	56.9	42.9	0.1	0	0.1	0
11	Destroying essential buildings	15.3	61.3	19.9	2.4	1.1	0
12	Imprisoning persons without trial	13.2	63.5	15.3	7.4	0.5	0.1
13	Looting	7.7	60.2	13.3	16.1	2.7	0

Table 31. Crime and punishment priorities for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

Alawite Sample		Kill without trial	Trial and punishment by law	Confess crime and reduced punishment	Confess crime and amnesty	Amnesty	Can't Say
1	Ordering crimes against women	44.0	56.0	0	0	0	0
2	Ordering genocide	42.0	58.0	0	0	0	0
3	Ordering mass killings of civilians	42.0	58.0	0	0	0	0
4	Killing civilians	42.0	58.0	0	0	0	0
5	Committing crimes against women	40.0	60.0	0	0	0	0
6	Ordering extra-judicial executions	16.0	84.0	0	0	0	0
7	Ordering torture	2.0	92.0	6.0	0	0	0
8	Ordering destruction of essential buildings	0	100	0	0	0	0
9	Torturing	0	100	0	0	0	0
10	Destroying essential buildings	0	100	0	0	0	0
11	Ordering imprisonment without trial	0	96.0	4.0	0	0	0
12	Imprisoning persons without trial	0	94.0	6.0	0	0	0
13	Looting	0	90.0	6.0	4.0	0	0

Table 31B. Crime and punishment priorities for the Alawite sample.

Question 4.1 With regards to documenting what is happening in Syria can you please indicate which records you consider to be 'Very important', 'Important', 'Of some importance', 'Of little importance' or 'Of no importance at all'?

Syria Opposition Sample		Very Important	Important	Of Some Importance	Of Little Importance	Of No Importance At All	Can't Say
1	Crimes	95.3	4.1	0.5	0.1	0	0.1
2	Disappeared persons	91.9	6.7	1.1	0.1	0	0.1
3	Prisoners	86.5	10.7	2.3	0.4	0	0.1
4	Loss of life	84.5	13.1	1.9	0.2	0	0.3
5	Property held/owned	80.2	16.1	2.5	0.5	0.3	0.3
6	Civil papers	79.1	16.7	3.5	0.5	0.1	0.1
7	Court proceedings	74.3	17.2	6.3	1.7	0.3	0.3
8	Damage to property	58.2	26.1	13.1	2.3	0.3	0.1

Table 32. Priorities for documentation for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole

Sunni sample		Very Important	Kurd sample		Very Important
1	Crimes	96.8	Crimes	98.3	
2	Disappeared persons	94.8	Disappeared persons	98.3	
3	Prisoners	89.6	Prisoners	93.2	
4	Loss of life	87.6	Loss of life	86.4	
5	Property held/owned	80.9	Property held/owned	54.2	
6	Civil papers	80.1	Civil papers	49.2	
7	Court proceedings	77.2	Court proceedings	49.2	
8	Damage to property	57.6	Damage to property	47.5	

Table 33. Priorities for documentation for the Sunni and Kurd samples.

Alawite sample		Very Important	Kurd Refugee sample		Very Important
1	Crimes	88.0	Crimes	51.9	
2	Loss of life	88.0	Loss of life	42.3	
3	Disappeared persons	88.0	Damage to property	36.5	
4	Prisoners	88.0	Disappeared persons	34.6	
5	Damage to property	60.0	Court proceedings	26.9	
6	Civil papers	54.0	Prisoners	15.4	
7	Property held/owned	54.0	Property held/owned	15.4	
8	Court proceedings	50.0	Civil papers	7.7	

Table 33B. Priorities for documentation for the Alawite and Kurd Refugee samples.

Question 4.2 And, if any, which documentation centres have you used or corresponded with?

	Documentation Centres – Syria Opposition sample	Yes	No	None
1	Interim Government Ministry	9.7	59.5	30.8
2	Interim Government Local Council	19.3	54.2	26.6
3	Civil society organisations (NGOs)	29.4	46.2	24.4
4	International organisations (for example ICRC)	10.8	56.6	32.6
5	None	48.5	22.0	29.5
6	Others	3.9	36.0	62.2

Table 34. Documentation centres used for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	Documentation Centres – Alawite sample	Yes	No	None
1	Interim Government Ministry	0	100	0
2	Interim Government Local Council	0	100	0
3	Civil society organisations (NGOs)	0	100	0
4	International organisations (for example ICRC)	0	100	0
5	None	100	0	0
6	Others	0	100	0

Table 34B1. Documentation centres used for the Alawite sample.

	Documentation Centres – Kurd Refugee sample	Yes	No	None
1	Interim Government Ministry	0	100	0
2	Interim Government Local Council	0	100	0
3	Civil society organisations (NGOs)	0	100	0
4	International organisations (for example ICRC)	0	100	0
5	None	100	0	0
6	Others	80.8	19.2	0

Table 34B2. Documentation centres used for the Kurd Refugee sample.

Other....

	Syria Opposition sample	n
1	Shia court	9
2	Documentation centres	4
3	Humanitarian assistance NGO	4
4	Rebel police and Shia court	3
5	Human rights NGO	2
6	Human Rights Watch	2
7	Red Crescent	2
8	Medical assistance NGO	2
9	Civilian lawyers group	2
10	Doctors Without Borders	2

Table 35. Top ten ‘Other’ documentation centres used for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	Kurd Refugee Sample	n
1	Azadi Kurdish Party in Syria	8
2	Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria	1
3	Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria	1

Table 35B. Top ten ‘Other’ documentation centres used for the Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 4.3 Have you heard of the following organisations?

	NGOs – Syria Opposition sample	Yes	No	DK
1	Syrian Network for Human Rights.	80.8	16.2	3.0
2	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights	78.1	19.4	2.5
3	Violations Documenting Center.	47.3	46.6	6.1
4	Raqeeb Organization	23.2	67.4	9.3
5	The Day After Organization	23.2	67.7	9.1
6	Others	4.6	33.2	62.2

Table 36. Most identified NGOs for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	NGOs – Alawite sample	Yes	No	DK
1	Syrian Network for Human Rights.	44.0	56.0	0
2	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights	70.0	30.0	0
3	Violations Documenting Center.	16.0	84.0	0
4	Raqeeb Organization	100	0	0
5	The Day After Organization	6.0	94.0	0
6	Others	18.0	82.0	0

Table 36B1. Most identified NGOs for the Alawite sample.

	NGOs – Kurd Refugee sample	Yes	No	DK
1	Syrian Network for Human Rights.	0	100	0
2	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights	80.8	19.2	0
3	Violations Documenting Center.	100	0	0
4	Raqeeb Organization	100	0	0
5	The Day After Organization	100	0	0
6	Others	100	0	0

Table 36B2. Most identified NGOs for the Kurd Refugee sample.

Other....

	Syria Opposition Sample	n
1	Red Cross and Red Crescent	15
2	Amnesty	7
3	GOAL	7
4	Human Rights Watch	7
5	UNICEF and UNESCO	4
6	Omega Human Rights	3
7	FSL	3
8	Documentation centre for detainees	3
9	Arab research centre	2
10	Security NGO	2

Table 37. Top ten 'Other' NGOs from the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

Question 4.4 With regards to implementing justice through the courts in Syria can you please tell me which legal system is ‘Most Acceptable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Somewhat Acceptable’, ‘A little Acceptable’ or ‘Not Acceptable at all’?

Syria Opposition Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	30.3	37.0	13.9	4.9	13.4	0.5
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	25.6	30.2	14.3	11.6	17.9	0.5
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	15.8	33.8	23.7	9.1	17.1	0.5
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	18.9	31.8	15.2	11.3	22.3	0.5
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	5.0	18.5	14.1	17.5	44.3	0.7
6	Sharia law and courts	34.2	21.8	16.0	21.9	5.6	0.3

Table 38. Syria Opposition sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Sunni Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	33.2	33.1	13.0	5.3	14.8	0.6
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	26.2	33.0	13.9	8.9	17.6	0.5
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	18.2	33.1	23.2	8.2	16.9	0.5
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	20.6	33.3	13.5	11.2	20.9	0.5
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	3.1	20.7	12.5	21.4	41.6	0.7
6	Sharia law and courts	35.8	21.1	16.7	22.9	3.2	0.3

Table 39. Sunni sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Kurd Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	18.6	55.9	10.2	6.8	8.5	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	71.2	11.9	5.1	3.4	8.5	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	5.1	23.7	35.6	15.3	20.3	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	39.0	32.2	8.5	13.6	6.8	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	37.7	30.5	11.9	5.1	15.3	0
6	Sharia law and courts	6.8	6.8	13.6	54.2	18.6	0

Table 40. Kurd sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Christian Sample (n)		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	2	3	4	0	0	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	8	1	0	0	0	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	0	4	5	0	0	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	2	1	2	3	1	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	3	1	2	2	1	0
6	Sharia law and courts	0	0	2	2	5	0

Table 41. Christian sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Aleppo Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	16.5	41.4	21.8	13.4	6.9	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	8.4	10.0	17.6	23.8	40.2	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	13.0	38.7	35.6	10.0	2.7	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	8.8	14.9	22.2	26.8	27.2	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	1.5	1.9	5.0	4.6	87.0	0
6	Sharia law and courts	37.2	18.0	9.6	35.2	0	0

Table 42. Aleppo sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Hama Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	11.1	37.0	18.5	7.4	22.2	3.7
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	25.9	40.7	11.1	14.8	3.7	3.7
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	3.7	11.1	14.8	14.8	51.9	3.7
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	7.4	40.7	25.9	7.4	14.8	0.6
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	51.9	18.5	3.7	3.7	18.5	3.7
6	Sharia law and courts	3.7	7.4	0	0	7.4	81.5

Table 43. Hama sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Idlib Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	21.5	33.1	2.8	0.6	41.4	0.6
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	16.0	29.8	13.8	0	39.8	0.6
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	28.2	24.9	5.0	0	41.4	0.6
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	16.0	40.3	2.8	0	40.3	0.6
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	5.0	29.3	7.2	11.0	47.0	0.6
6	Sharia law and courts	55.8	12.7	19.9	9.9	1.1	0.6

Table 44. Idlib sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Hassakh Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	22.4	50.7	16.4	4.5	6.0	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	85.1	11.9	1.5	1.5	0	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	7.5	23.9	41.8	13.4	13.4	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	38.8	31.3	9.0	11.9	9.0	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	38.8	29.9	10.4	9.0	11.9	0
6	Sharia law and courts	10.4	4.5	11.9	46.3	26.9	0

Table 45. Hassakah sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Der Ezzor Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	14.2	37.4	26.1	3.2	18.8	0.3
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	45.8	38.8	12.2	0.3	2.9	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	20.3	23.8	37.4	13.6	4.9	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	45.2	35.7	13.9	1.2	4.1	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	3.2	47.0	12.8	11.3	25.5	0.3
6	Sharia law and courts	33.3	12.5	16.5	31.0	6.7	0

Table 46. Der Ezzor sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Damascus countryside Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	25.7	43.4	18.4	6.6	3.7	2.2
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	3.7	11.8	18.4	38.2	25.7	2.2
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	4.4	5.1	14.7	25.0	48.5	2.2
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	1.5	8.8	14.7	33.1	39.7	2.2
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	2.2	1.5	15.4	26.5	52.2	2.2
6	Sharia law and courts	69.9	19.1	7.4	1.5	0	2.2

Table 47. Damascus countryside sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Zaatary Camp Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	58.3	36.7	0	0	4.9	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	23.5	42.4	14.4	13.6	6.1	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	10.2	58.0	13.6	0.8	17.4	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	7.2	49.6	15.9	3.4	23.9	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	10.2	58.0	13.6	0.8	17.4	0
6	Sharia law and courts	23.5	42.4	14.4	13.6	6.1	0

Table 48. Jordanian Camp sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Turkish Camp Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	53.0	26.5	7.0	5.6	7.0	0.9
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	20.0	41.9	16.3	8.4	12.6	0.9
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	20.0	45.1	16.7	7.0	10.2	0.9
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	11.6	30.7	19.1	14.9	22.8	0.9
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	20.0	45.1	16.7	7.0	10.2	0.9
6	Sharia law and courts	20.0	41.9	16.3	8.4	12.6	0.9

Table 49. Turkish Camp sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Illiterate Education Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	36.7	33.9	11.0	2.8	15.6	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	15.5	20.2	14.7	19.3	30.3	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	14.7	32.1	15.6	9.2	28.4	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	13.8	24.8	10.1	10.1	41.3	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	5.5	6.4	12.8	12.8	62.4	0
6	Sharia law and courts	44.0	28.4	7.3	16.5	3.7	0

Table 50. Illiterate sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

University Education Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	24.0	42.7	16.1	6.3	10.5	0.4
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	31.7	30.6	14.9	9.3	13.1	0.4
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	6.7	33.3	40.0	6.7	13.3	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	23.0	34.9	15.9	13.5	12.3	0.4
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	6.7	32.1	8.9	14.1	37.1	1.0
6	Sharia law and courts	31.3	15.7	16.1	29.2	7.3	0.4

Table 51. University Education sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Age 18-25 Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	30.7	26.8	15.4	3.9	21.7	1.6
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	19.3	23.6	16.5	9.4	29.5	1.6
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	10.6	30.7	20.9	8.7	27.6	1.6
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	15.4	24.8	16.5	9.4	32.3	1.6
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	3.9	9.4	12.2	18.9	53.5	2.0
6	Sharia law and courts	53.1	18.9	9.4	14.2	3.1	1.2

Table 52. Age 18-25 sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Age 46-55 Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	35.5	41.9	9.4	4.2	11.0	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	24.6	29.8	11.5	13.6	20.4	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	16.8	36.6	22.0	7.9	16.8	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	19.4	34.6	14.7	8.9	22.5	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	4.2	22.0	13.1	12.0	48.7	0
6	Sharia law and courts	29.3	24.6	12.0	26.2	7.9	0

Table 53. Age 46-55 sample priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Male Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	31.2	34.3	13.5	5.9	14.5	0.6
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	22.6	27.4	16.1	12.2	21.1	0.6
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	15.0	35.1	22.0	8.8	18.4	0.6
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	15.5	29.6	17.1	13.3	23.9	0.6
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	4.4	13.2	14.4	20.7	46.4	0.8
6	Sharia law and courts	37.7	21.1	14.6	21.4	4.8	0.4

Table 54. Male priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Female Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	27.9	44.4	14.8	2.2	10.6	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	33.8	37.3	9.6	9.9	9.4	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	18.0	30.4	28.6	9.9	13.1	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	28.4	37.5	10.1	6.2	17.8	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	6.7	32.8	13.3	8.9	38.3	0
6	Sharia law and courts	24.7	24.0	20.0	23.7	7.7	0

Table 55. Female priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Alawite Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	28.0	58.0	6.0	8.0	0	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	34.0	64.0	2.0	0	0	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	20.0	48.0	28.0	4.0	0	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	28.0	28.0	40.0	4.0	0	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	24.0	68.0	8.0	0	0	0
6	Sharia law and courts	0	6.0	0	0	94.0	0

Table 55B1. Alawite priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Kurd Refugee Sample		Most Acceptable	Acceptable	Some What Acceptable	A Little Acceptable	Not Acceptable At All	Can't Say
1	Syrian courts established under Syrian law in 1948 before Assad came to power	0	0	19.2	13.5	67.3	0
2	Syrian law and courts operating to UN international standards with international monitors	75.0	5.8	5.8	5.8	7.7	0
3	Syrian law and courts operating to standards set under the United Arabic Law	1.9	0	38.5	19.2	40.4	0
4	Combined Syrian and International courts using both Syrian and International judges	86.5	9.6	3.8	0	0	0
5	International courts with international law that excludes execution of criminals	57.7	0	7.7	1.9	32.7	0
6	Sharia law and courts	8.8	2.9	3.9	1.0	83.3	0

Table 55B2. Kurd Refugee priorities for implementing justice through the courts.

Question 5.1. Have you personally or anyone close to you faced a violation in the field of human rights in Syria?

	Yes self	Yes relative	Yes Both	No
Syria Opposition sample	25.6	50.1	14.1	9.1
Sunni	27.6	47.5	17.8	6.1
Kurd	13.6	45.8	0	37.3
Christian (n)	2	3	0	4

Table 56. Rates of human rights violations for the Syria Opposition sample, Sunni and Kurd samples as per cent and Christian sample as number (n).

	Yes self	Yes relative	Yes Both	No
Alawite sample	8.0	64.0	4.0	22.0
Kurd Refugee	0	98.1	0	1.9

Table 56B. Rates of human rights violations for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.2. Who committed violations against you or your relatives?

	Regime forces	Armed brigades	Both	Others	None
Syria Opposition sample	81.3	2.3	5.5	0.7	10.3
Sunni	83.1	1.4	7.4	0.9	7.2
Kurd	44.1	13.6	0	0	39.0
Christian (n)	3	2	0	0	4
Aleppo	80.8	1.5	3.4	0	14.2
Hama	81.5	3.7	3.7	0	11.1
Idlib	72.9	1.1	23.2	0.6	2.2
Hassakah	34.3	17.9	3.0	1.5	43.3
Der Ezzor	83.2	4.3	6.7	0.9	4.9
Damascus countryside	72.1	0	0.7	0	27.2
Zaatary Camp	95.5	0	0	0.8	3.8
Turkish Camp	88.8	0	1.9	1.4	7.9

Table 57. Groups responsible for human rights violations for the Syria Opposition sample, Sunni and Kurd samples as per cent and Christian sample as number (n) with an additional break down by region.

	Regime forces	Armed brigades	Both	Others	None
Alawite sample	20.0	54.0	2.0	0	24.0
Kurd Refugee	0	98.1	0	0	1.9

Table 57B. Groups responsible for human rights violations for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee samples as per cent.

Note which regime forces and armed brigades they are referring to.....

	Syria Opposition Sample	n
1	Syrian Army	245
2	Military security	157
3	Air Force intelligence	98
4	The intelligence	70
5	Shabiha	57
6	State security	57
7	Political security	41
8	State security and Army	40
9	The intelligence and Shabiha	17
10	ISIS	9

Table 58. Top ten groups responsible for human rights violations for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

	Alawite Sample	n
1	Al-Nusra Front	13
2	Military Security	5
3	State Security	5
4	Islamic Group	4
5	Terrorist Group	4
6	Armed Groups	2
7	FSA	2
8	Muslim Brotherhood	1
9	State Security and FSA	1

Table 58B1. Groups responsible for human rights violations for the Alawite sample.

	Kurd Refugee Sample	n
1	ISIS	51

Table 58B2. Group responsible for human rights violations for the Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.3 What is the type of violation that you or your relatives suffered from?

	Arrest	Tortured	Loss of property	Threat	Displacement	Loss of relative	Other
Syria Opposition sample	87.9	87.4	80.9	80.9	84.4	82.8	41.8
Sunni	91.7	91.1	86.8	89.7	89.7	89.4	52.7
Kurd	52.0	36.8	20.0	27.3	27.3	22.6	11.1
Christian (n)	3	2	0	0	0	0	2

Table 59. Type of human right violations for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Arrest	Tortured	Loss of property	Threat	Displacement	Loss of relative	Other
Alawite sample	62.5	66.7	60.0	63.6	55.6	42.9	36.8
Kurd Refugee	98.1	98.1	98.1	96.4	96.7	97.3	0

Table 59B. Type of human right violations for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Other.....

	Syria Opposition Sample	n
1	Electrocuting	17
2	Kidnap	8
3	Physical disability	7
4	Losing job	6
5	Rape	5
6	Solitary confinement	5
7	Beating	4
8	Beating and kidnapping	3
9	Losing hearing	2
10	Robbery	2

Table 60. Top ten ‘Other’ human right violations.

	Alawite Sample	n
1	Kidnap	3
2	Killing	3
3	Killing by Shabiha	1

Table 60B. ‘Other’ human right violations for the Alawite sample

Question 5.4 When discussing any matters relating to human rights violations, which options do you prefer?

1. *Investigating violations that occurred during the Syrian Revolution since March 2011 until now*
2. *Investigating violations that have occurred before March 2011*

	After March 2011	Before March 2011
Syria Opposition sample	68.8	30.7
Sunni	67.5	32.1
Kurd	22.0	78.0
Christian (n)	6	3

Table 61. Options for the investigation of human rights for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	After March 2011	Before March 2011
Alawite sample	82.0	18.0
Kurd Refugee	57.7	42.3

Table 61B. Options for the investigation of human rights for Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.5 In your opinion, which of the following are the most important for the investigation and prosecution of those who committed human rights violations?

	Idlib sample	Per cent first choice
1	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	49.2
2	State officials with high rank	33.1
3	Security section officers with high rank	10.5
4	Army officers of high rank	6.1
5	Security section officers with medium to low rank	0
6	Army officers of middle rank	0
7	State officials with medium or low rank	0
8	Army battalion soldiers	0

Table 62. Idlib sample priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Hassakah sample	Per cent first choice
1	State officials with high rank	86.6
2	Army battalion soldiers	10.4
3	Security section officers with high rank	3.0
4	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	0
5	Army officers of high rank	0
6	Security section officers with medium to low rank	0
7	State officials with medium or low rank	0
8	Army officers of middle rank	0

Table 63. Hassakah priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Der Ezzor sample	Per cent first choice
1	State officials with high rank	35.4
2	Security section officers with high rank	26.4
3	Security section officers with medium to low rank	9.6
4	State officials with medium rank	7.0
5	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	6.7
6	Army officers of high rank	5.8
7	Army battalion soldiers	1.2
8	Army officers of middle rank	0

Table 64. Der Ezzor priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Damascus countryside sample	Per cent first choice
1	Security section officers with high rank	65.2
2	State officials with high rank	25.7
3	Army officers of high rank	8.8
4	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	0.7
5	State officials with medium or low rank	0
6	Security section officers with medium to low rank	0
7	Army officers of middle rank	0
8	Army battalion soldiers	0

Table 65. Damascus countryside priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Zaatary Camp sample	Per cent first choice
1	State officials with high rank	95.8
2	Security section officers with high rank	4.2
3	State officials with medium or low rank	0
4	Security section officers with medium to low rank	0
5	Army officers of high rank	0
6	Army officers of middle rank	0
7	Army battalion soldiers	0
8	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	0

Table 66. Zaatary Camp priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Turkish Camp sample	Per cent first choice
1	State officials with high rank	62.8
2	Security section officers with high rank	15.3
3	Security section officers with medium to low rank	8.4
4	Army officers of high rank	5.1
5	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	4.7
6	Army officers of middle rank	4.2
7	State officials with medium or low rank	3.7
8	Army battalion soldiers	2.8

Table 67. Turkish Camp priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Alawite sample	Per cent first choice
1	Army battalion soldiers	62.0
2	Security section officers with high rank	30.0
3	State officials with high rank	8.0
4	Security section officers with medium to low	4.0
5	State officials with medium rank	2.0
6	Army officers of high rank	0
7	Army officers of middle rank	0
8	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	0

Table 67B1. Alawite sample priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

	Kurd Refugee sample	Per cent first choice
1	State officials with high rank	61.5
2	Elements of the security and intelligence branches	30.8
3	Army officers of high rank	3.8
4	Army officers of middle rank	3.8
5	State officials with medium rank	0
6	Security section officers with high rank	0
7	Security section officers with medium to low	0
8	Army battalion soldiers	0

Table 67B2. Kurd Refugee priorities for the investigation of human rights by the Regime.

Question 5.6 And should all other violators of human rights also be prosecuted in the same way? Yes/No

	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	87.8	11.3	0.9
Sunni	89.8	9.3	0.8
Kurd	94.9	5.1	0
Christian (n)	9	0	0

Table 68. Investigation of human rights violations by other parties for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	100	0	0
Kurd Refugee	98.1	1.9	0

Table 68B. Investigation of human rights violations by other parties for Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.7 Please indicate which of the following organisations could remain unchanged or be rehabilitated, restructured or should be disbanded?

Syria Opposition Sample		Disband	Restructure	Rehabilitation	No Change	Can't Say
1	Al-Bath party	91.3	7.3	0.9	0.4	0
2	Air Force Intelligence	78.7	17.8	1.8	0.4	1.2
3	Political Security	69.2	28.0	1.9	0.7	0.1
4	Military Security	66.1	30.8	2.5	0.5	0.1
5	State Security	61.9	33.9	3.5	0.5	0.1
6	Special forces	51.0	37.0	11.0	0.7	0.3
7	Syrian Army	35.9	51.9	11.2	0.9	0.1
8	Civil Order Police (Qwat Hefz Nezam)	25.2	44.1	29.0	1.4	0.2
9	Ministry of Defence	24.9	59.4	13.2	2.5	0
10	The internal security forces (police)	20.2	44.7	33.2	1.7	0.1
11	Free Syrian Army	18.9	38.7	38.9	3.5	0
12	Ministry of Interior	17.8	53.1	24.7	2.9	1.3
13	Ministry of Oil and Mineral Reserves	12.7	54.5	26.9	5.8	0.1
14	Ministry of Justice	11.7	59.7	25.1	3.4	0.1
15	Ministry of Local Administration	10.4	45.8	36.9	6.5	0.2
16	Ministry of Finance	7.1	51.6	34.3	6.7	0.3
17	Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology	6.3	47.4	33.6	12.1	0.5
18	Ministry of Higher Education	4.9	50.3	35.8	8.9	0.1
19	Ministry of Health	4.1	42.6	39.8	13.1	0.3

Table 69. Priority for the reform of government agencies and departments for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole.

Alawite Sample		Disband	Restructure	Rehabilitation	No Change	Can't Say
1	Free Syrian Army	80.0	20.0	0	0	0
2	Air Force Intelligence	64.0	2.0	14.0	20.0	0
3	Special forces	64.0	2.0	14.0	20.0	0
4	State Security	48.0	2.0	30.0	10.0	0
5	Political Security	42.0	10.0	28.0	20.0	0
6	Military Security	28.0	2.0	50.0	20.0	0
7	Al-Bath party	24.0	42.0	6.0	28.0	0
8	The internal security forces (police)	0	52.0	28.0	20.0	0
9	Ministry of Interior	0	20.0	44.0	36.0	0
10	Syrian Army	0	20.0	34.0	46.0	0
11	Civil Order Police (Qwat Hefz Nezam)	0	16.0	62.0	22.0	0
12	Ministry of Defence	0	10.0	54.0	36.0	0
13	Ministry of Local Administration	0	10.0	54.0	36.0	0
14	Ministry of Justice	0	6.0	56.0	38.0	0
15	Ministry of Health	0	4.0	60.0	36.0	0
16	Ministry of Finance	0	4.0	60.0	36.0	0
17	Ministry of Oil and Mineral Reserves	0	4.0	60.0	26.0	0
18	Ministry of Higher Education	0	4.0	58.0	38.0	0
19	Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology	0	4.0	58.0	38.0	0

Table 69B. Priority for the reform of government agencies and departments for the Alawite sample.

Question 5.8 Do you support posts being retained for government officials who haven't committed any violations? Yes/No

	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	46.7	53.1	0.2
Sunni	49.2	50.7	0.1
Kurd	79.7	20.3	0
Christian (n)	8	1	0

Table 70. Government officials, human rights violations and retaining their posts for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	96.0	4.0	0
Kurd Refugee	44.2	55.8	0

Table 70B. Government officials, human rights violations and retaining their posts for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.9 Do you agree to establish Truth Committees to accurately and transparently expose the history of conflict in Syria? Yes/No

	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	91.1	8.7	0.1
Sunni	91.9	8.0	0
Kurd	98.3	1.7	0
Christian (n)	8	1	0

Table 71. Support for Truth Committees for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	94.0	6.0	0
Kurd Refugee	100	0	0

Table 71B. Support for Truth Committees for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.10 Do you agree to grant amnesty and impunity to dangerous violation perpetrators in cases where they have honestly participated in Truth Committees? Yes/No

Demographic	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	27.6	72.3	0.1
Sunni	27.5	72.4	0.1
Kurd	23.7	76.3	0
Christian (n)	8	1	0
Aleppo	13.4	86.6	0
Hama	11.1	85.2	3.7
Idlib	51.4	48.6	0
Al-Hasakah	19.4	80.6	0
Der ez-Zor	2.6	97.1	0.3
Rif Dimashq	30.9	69.1	0
Jordanian Camp	73.1	26.9	0
Turkish Camp	10.7	89.3	0

Demographic	Yes	No	DK
Male	26.9	73.1	0
Female	29.6	70.1	0.2
Illiterate	37.6	62.4	0
Elementary	36.4	63.4	0.2
Secondary	27.4	72.6	0
University	18.5	81.5	0
MA/PhD	13.3	86.7	0
18-25	22.0	78.0	0
26-45	28.5	71.3	0.2
46-55	33.0	67.0	0
56-65	22.8	77.2	0
65+ (n=12)	0	100	0

Table 72. Support for Truth Committees and Amnesty for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

Demographic	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	28.0	72.0	0
Kurd Refugee	50.0	50.0	0

Table 72B. Support for Truth Committees and Amnesty for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.11 Do you agree to hold public listening sessions for victims? Yes/No

	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	86.3	13.3	0.3
Sunni	92.8	6.9	0.3
Kurd	52.5	47.5	0
Christian (n)	8	1	0

Table 73. Support for public listening sessions for victims for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	46.0	54.0	0
Kurd Refugee	98.1	1.9	0

Table 73B. Support for public listening sessions for victims for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.12 Do you agree to have a national discussion on the ethnic, religious, national and historic problems in Syria in order to have solutions? Yes/No

	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	84.8	14.2	1.0
Sunni	82.1	16.8	1.1
Kurd	96.6	3.4	0
Christian (n)	9	0	0

Table 74. Support for a national discussion of group relations in Syria for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	68.0	32.0	0
Kurd Refugee	100	0	0

Table 74B. Support for a national discussion of group relations in Syria for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.

Question 5.13 Do you agree to the commitment of international human rights in drafting the new rules and constitution for the country? Yes/No

	Yes	No	DK
Syria Opposition sample	96.1	3.2	0.7
Sunni	95.3	4.0	0.7
Kurd	98.3	1.7	0
Christian (n)	9	0	0

Table 75. Support for a new constitution based on human rights for the Syria Opposition sample as a whole, Sunni and Kurds as per cent and Christians as number (n).

	Yes	No	DK
Alawite sample	100	0	0
Kurd Refugee	100	0	0

Table 75B. Support for a new constitution based on human rights for the Alawite sample and Kurd Refugee sample.