

The APRC Proposals and 'Winning the Peace'

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About the poll

The research for this poll was carried out by the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo, on behalf of Dr. Colin Irwin from the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method as part of the successful Northern Ireland peace process. The survey work for the first poll in this series was completed between March and May 2008 and included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. Using the same methods the survey work for this second poll was completed a year later in March 2009. All interviews were face-to-face and the margin of error is +/- 2.27%. A copy of the questionnaire is given in the Appendix with and full results.

Introduction

With the end of the ground campaign, the death of the Tamil Tiger leadership and the unification of the island of Sri Lanka under one authority, the Sinhala majority can truly say their war has been won. But now the people of Sri Lanka are faced with the daunting task of rebuilding their country, making up for all the lost years and taking their rightful place as a prosperous, vibrant island nation in a region of the world where economic success can only be held back by instability or despotism. Sri Lanka now has to win the peace. To this end the President of Sri Lanka established the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to draft a set of constitutional reforms that would enhance the democratic rights and freedoms of all it's citizens so as to ensure long-term stability and growth. But if this exercise in nation building is to be a success these proposals must be acceptable to a significant majority in both the Sinhala and Tamil communities. Ideally such proposals should enjoy what is sometimes referred to as a ‘Southern Consensus’ amongst the Sinhala. While, at the same time, addressing the needs and past grievances of the Tamils living in the East and North, so that they might never again consider violence as a justified course of action. Critically then do the APRC proposals enjoy the support of the Sinhala majority and will the Tamil minority accept them as a settlement of their political claims?

To answer these two questions a summary of the major elements of the APRC proposals was drafted as they existed in February of this year and then tested against public opinion in March. This summary is listed in Table 1 as a series of 14 ‘show cards’. Those being interviewed were asked what they thought of each item on a given card. Was it ‘essential’, ‘desirable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘tolerable’ or ‘unacceptable’? Then they were asked what they thought of the ‘package’ as a whole, if they would support such a ‘package’ and under what circumstances and if they wanted the government to take such reforms forward.

Table 1. The APRC proposals in summary form, as they existed in February 2009.

1. **The Structure of the State** – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state.
2. **The Powers of the Centre and Provinces** – These powers will be clearly defined in two lists.
3. **The Parliament** - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators.
4. **Amending the Constitution** – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.
5. **The Powers of the President** – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent's term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives.
6. **The Powers of Local Authorities** – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
7. **Language Rights** – The Tamil and Sinhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Sinhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Sinhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education.
8. **Religious Rights** – Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.
9. **Fundamental Rights** – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
10. **Electoral System** – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
11. **The Judiciary** – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
12. **Public Service** – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
13. **Safeguards against secession** – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to succeed from the State.
14. **Law and Order** - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.

Sinhala response

The results for the Sinhala community are listed in Table 2 with a rank ordering of those items they consider 'essential or desirable' in Table 3.

The key percentages to look at in Table 2 are the levels of 'unacceptable'. First of all it should be pointed out that these results are very good when compared to places like Northern Ireland and the Middle East where levels of 'unacceptable' of 50 per cent plus had to or have yet to be negotiated. Having said that of course Sri Lanka is not Northern Ireland or Israel and Palestine. The political context in Sri Lanka is very different. The highest per cent 'unacceptable' in Sri Lanka is for 'The Powers of the President' at 23% and a closely related item 'The Parliament' at 15%. Clearly these items need close scrutiny and perhaps some adjustment if they are not to become a cause for political decent.

In this version of the APRC proposals 'The Powers of the President' are described as follows: 'The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent's term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives.' The problem with this formulation becomes quite obvious when viewed in the context of another question run in the same poll that dealt with the popularity of some key political figures (Table 4 and see the Appendix for full results). The President enjoys unparalleled popularity amongst the Sinhala people at 93% 'trust very much or trust quite a bit' and they clearly do not want to see him step down from office. Given this fact a number of options come to mind for amending this part of the APRC proposals.

- The President could give his support to this particular reform.
- The President could remain in office for a second term.
- The President could become Prime Minister in the new Parliament.
- The powers of the President could simply be reduced.
- The President could become a Non-Executive President.
- Or some other option and/or a suitable combination of the above.

This seems to be the major problem with the APRC proposals for the Sinhala and will most probably require attention. It seems very probable that if such a change is made then the overall acceptability of the 'package' will rise. On this point it should be noted that the level of 'unacceptable' for the package as a whole is only 9% down from 23% for 'The Powers of the President'. This is normal. In both Northern Ireland and the Middle East 'the whole is greater than the sum of the parts'. That is to say people will accept items that they may not want for the benefits of other items.

As to the benefits these are prioritised for the Sinhala in Table 3. Interestingly the top three items are Religious, Fundamental and Language Rights at 76%, 71% and 68% 'essential or desirable' followed fourth by 'The Structure of the State' at 55%. As the top priority for the Tamil community is 'Language Rights' this result is most encouraging for the prospects of long term peace.

Table 2. Sinhala response to the APRC proposals

Sinhala per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	20	35	16	5	9	16
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	13	28	23	5	11	21
3. The Parliament	9	21	19	6	15	29
4. Amending the Constitution	14	23	19	5	8	31
5. The Powers of the President	12	26	14	5	23	19
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	11	22	27	7	11	23
7. Language Rights	33	35	12	3	9	8
8. Religious Rights	46	30	10	3	5	6
9. Fundamental Rights	35	36	16	2	3	7
10. Electoral System	18	25	18	4	13	24
11. The Judiciary	18	28	16	4	10	24
12. Public Service	13	28	21	6	6	25
13. Safeguards against secession	18	25	19	4	8	26
14. Law and Order	21	25	16	7	14	17
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	13	21	25	11	9	22

Table 3. Sinhala priorities for the APRC proposals

Sinhala per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Religious Rights	76
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	71
3rd.	Language Rights	68
4th.	The Structure of the State	55
5th.	The Judiciary	46
6th.	Law and Order	46
7th.	Electoral System	43
8th.	Safeguards against secession	43
9th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	41
10th.	Public Service	41
11th.	The Powers of the President	38
12th.	Amending the Constitution	37
13th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	34
14th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	33
15th.	The Parliament	30

Finally, with regards to Sinhala support for the APRC proposals it should be noted that a political analysis of the same set of questions produces very similar results for the Presidents party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP: Table 5), with ‘Powers of the President’ at 23% ‘unacceptable’ [17% for the People’s Liberation Front (JVP: Table 7) and 13% for the United National Party (UNP: Table 6)]. The major concern for the UNP is ‘Religious Rights’ at 20% ‘unacceptable’ and for the JVP it is the ‘Powers of Local Authorities’ at 27% ‘unacceptable’. Critically the level of ‘unacceptable’ for the ‘package’ as a whole is only 8% for the SLFP, 3% for the UNP and 4% for the JVP.

Table 4. The popularity of key political figures

Sinhala per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all
President Rajapaksa	69	24	3	3	0
Minister Tissa Vitharana	8	27	39	18	8
Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe	3	10	12	30	46
Mr. R. Sambandan	0	4	14	35	46
Mr. Rauffhakeem	0	8	24	36	31
Mr. Soma Wansa Amarasinghe	2	10	28	28	33
Mr. Champika Ranawake	2	29	37	17	15
Mr. V. Muralitharan (Karuna)	1	8	18	26	47
Mr. Douglas Devananda	3	15	22	28	32
Mr. Arumugam Thondaman	1	4	17	34	44
Mr. S. Chandrakanthan (Pillayam)	0	6	14	26	53

Table 5. The SLFP response to the APRC proposals

SLFP per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	24	37	15	4	8	13
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	16	32	22	4	9	17
3. The Parliament	11	23	22	5	12	27
4. Amending the Constitution	18	25	18	3	6	28
5. The Powers of the President	15	25	15	5	23	18
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	15	24	27	5	8	20
7. Language Rights	37	33	13	4	8	6
8. Religious Rights	45	30	11	3	7	3
9. Fundamental Rights	38	36	16	2	3	5
10. Electoral System	19	26	16	6	13	21
11. The Judiciary	20	31	14	5	8	23
12. Public Service	17	30	22	5	6	20
13. Safeguards against secession	20	28	18	5	7	23
14. Law and Order	25	26	16	7	12	14
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	19	26	25	9	8	13

Table 6. The UNP response to the APRC proposals

UNP per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	29	29	18	7	7	10
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	23	26	22	12	4	13
3. The Parliament	24	24	18	10	11	13
4. Amending the Constitution	34	26	16	7	7	10
5. The Powers of the President	28	28	13	10	13	7
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	27	22	21	13	4	13
7. Language Rights	53	29	9	2	2	5
8. Religious Rights	43	20	7	5	20	5
9. Fundamental Rights	59	20	12	3	0	5
10. Electoral System	29	25	21	11	5	8
11. The Judiciary	40	24	17	5	4	10
12. Public Service	31	26	23	7	1	12
13. Safeguards against secession	38	19	13	10	5	15
14. Law and Order	43	24	12	7	4	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	39	29	16	6	3	6

Table 7. The JVP response to the APRC proposals

JVP per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	39	22	13	9	13	4
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	17	35	22	4	17	4
3. The Parliament	30	35	4	9	17	4
4. Amending the Constitution	36	36	14	5	5	5
5. The Powers of the President	30	26	17	4	17	4
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	14	23	23	9	27	5
7. Language Rights	57	22	4	0	13	4
8. Religious Rights	65	17	4	0	13	0
9. Fundamental Rights	52	35	4	0	9	0
10. Electoral System	35	35	4	0	13	13
11. The Judiciary	43	22	9	0	22	4
12. Public Service	26	52	0	9	4	9
13. Safeguards against secession	39	22	9	0	22	9
14. Law and Order	39	35	0	9	13	4
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	30	26	9	26	4	4

Tamil response

The results for the Tamil community are listed in Table 8 with a rank ordering of those items they consider 'essential or desirable' in Table 9.

Again the key percentages to look at in Table 8 are the levels of 'unacceptable' and again the results are very good. The one serious potential difficulty here is 'Religious Rights' at 28% 'unacceptable'. But on the same issue 44% of Tamils consider this feature of the APRC proposals to be 'essential'. They are clearly 'split' on this item. Why?

Perhaps the answer is to be found in the way the question was asked? In the summary proposals 'Religious Rights' was drafted as, 'Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.' It seems very likely that those Tamils who considered this proposal to be 'unacceptable' were focusing on the suggestion that 'Buddhism shall have 'pride of place'' while those who considered this proposal to be 'essential' were focused on 'with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.' The problem here seems to be a matter of education, understanding and or some sort of good or bad previous experience in this regard. Clearly this item requires some explanation or clarification to make sure there are no misunderstandings in the Tamil community and that their religious freedom will be effectively guaranteed by a new Sri Lanka constitution.

With regards to the benefits of the APRC proposals the top item for the Tamils is 'Language Rights' at 85% 'essential or desirable' followed by 'Fundamental Rights' at 76% and 'The Judiciary' at 73% (Table 9). Fortunately the Sinhala also welcome these reforms so there should be no political difficulty with each community's top priorities. In other conflicts around the world such a result is most unusual. Top priorities generally require a degree of 'horse trading'. It is perhaps a mark of the understanding of each community's needs by the other community that has produced this unusual but most welcome result and/or the careful drafting of the All Party Representative Committee.

Table 8. The Tamil response to the APRC proposals

Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	33	19	16	11	15	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	31	22	21	15	4	7
3. The Parliament	37	24	17	13	1	8
4. Amending the Constitution	39	26	15	7	2	11
5. The Powers of the President	37	29	12	6	6	9
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	34	21	15	15	6	9
7. Language Rights	72	13	8	2	1	4
8. Religious Rights	44	10	6	6	28	6
9. Fundamental Rights	69	7	11	4	2	7
10. Electoral System	31	21	15	12	7	13
11. The Judiciary	49	24	12	7	1	6
12. Public Service	38	28	17	8	3	7
13. Safeguards against secession	33	17	17	16	7	11
14. Law and Order	55	17	11	7	2	8
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	41	27	14	6	2	11

Table 9. Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals

Tamil per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	85
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	76
3rd.	The Judiciary	73
4th.	Law and Order	72
5th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	68
6th.	The Powers of the President	66
7th.	Public Service	66
8th.	Amending the Constitution	65
9th.	The Parliament	61
10th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	55
11th.	Religious Rights	54
12th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	53
13th.	The Structure of the State	52
14th.	Electoral System	52
15th.	Safeguards against secession	50

Unfortunately it was not possible to sample the Northern Province in March when the fieldwork for this public opinion poll was undertaken. But two sets of data do provide a useful insight into the views of Tamils in these areas. Firstly, the response of TNA supporters and secondly the results from the Eastern Province.

The TNA results (Table 10) are very similar to those for the Tamil community as a whole except perhaps they are characterised by stronger views. For example, for Tamils as a whole (in this sample that excludes the Northern Province) 'Language Rights' comes in at 72% 'essential' but for TNA supporters this rises to 90% 'essential'. Similarly those opposed to the 'Religious Rights' provision rises to 47% 'unacceptable' for TNA supporters from 28% for Tamils in general. However, as with other Tamils, TNA supporters are split on this issue with 43% saying this aspect of the APRC proposals is 'essential'. Twenty two per cent of TNA supporters also find 'The Structure of the State' 'unacceptable'. This is not a surprising result but 54% of TNA supporters also consider 'The Structure of the State' as drafted here to be 'essential or desirable'.

The results for the Eastern Province seem to clearly reflect the ethnic mix of that part of Sri Lanka (Table 11). Twelve per cent consider 'The Powers of the President' 'unacceptable' (a mostly Sinhala concern) while 27% find the 'Religious Rights' 'unacceptable' (a significantly Tamil concern but also an Up-Country Tamil and Muslim concern according to the results of this poll).

Most importantly only 3% of TNA supporters oppose the 'package' as a whole as 'unacceptable' with only 1% 'Don't Know' (DK) which here includes those who did not answer.

Table 10. The TNA response to the APRC proposals

TNA per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	31	24	14	8	22	0
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	28	23	30	13	6	0
3. The Parliament	42	28	16	13	1	0
4. Amending the Constitution	44	35	15	1	0	5
5. The Powers of the President	39	33	13	4	7	4
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	39	19	19	15	9	0
7. Language Rights	90	7	2	0	0	0
8. Religious Rights	43	4	4	2	47	0
9. Fundamental Rights	88	4	5	1	1	1
10. Electoral System	31	28	18	10	9	5
11. The Judiciary	51	39	8	1	1	0
12. Public Service	40	35	17	5	2	0
13. Safeguards against secession	35	20	20	19	5	1
14. Law and Order	71	17	8	2	1	0
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	40	34	20	3	3	1

Table 11. The Eastern Province response to the APRC proposals

Eastern Province per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	28	32	18	7	11	3
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	24	34	25	9	2	6
3. The Parliament	27	36	18	8	6	4
4. Amending the Constitution	27	40	21	4	1	7
5. The Powers of the President	29	33	13	5	12	7
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	27	29	24	9	5	6
7. Language Rights	60	28	9	1	1	1
8. Religious Rights	34	23	9	5	27	2
9. Fundamental Rights	57	23	13	2	1	3
10. Electoral System	23	33	18	7	10	9
11. The Judiciary	39	40	13	3	1	4
12. Public Service	28	39	21	5	2	5
13. Safeguards against secession	25	30	19	14	5	7
14. Law and Order	44	35	11	4	2	3
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	30	39	20	2	2	7

Up-Country Tamil response

Although the recent war has largely been viewed as a conflict between the Sinhala and Tamil communities the APRC proposals have been drafted for the benefit of all the communities in Sri Lanka. Like other Tamils the Up-Country Tamils share the concern and/or misunderstanding about the 'Religious Rights' (46% 'unacceptable' and 42% 'essential': Table 12). Their top priority is also 'Language Rights' at 91% 'essential or desirable' (Table 13). But unlike other Tamils they also have some misgivings about 'The Powers of the President' as drafted in the APRC proposals at 11% 'unacceptable'.

Table 12. The Up-Country Tamil response to the APRC proposals

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	44	23	12	2	11	9
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	38	23	17	1	8	13
3. The Parliament	37	16	15	5	13	13
4. Amending the Constitution	58	21	2	3	4	13
5. The Powers of the President	34	13	8	24	11	10
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	49	20	11	3	1	17
7. Language Rights	79	12	2	1	2	5
8. Religious Rights	42	4	2	0	46	6
9. Fundamental Rights	79	8	4	2	0	7
10. Electoral System	35	17	14	12	5	17
11. The Judiciary	52	20	7	6	3	13
12. Public Service	37	23	18	6	1	15
13. Safeguards against secession	63	10	6	4	6	12
14. Law and Order	67	12	8	1	3	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	71	15	4	0	0	9

Table 13. Up-Country Tamil priorities for the APRC proposals

Up-Country Tamil per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	91
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	87
3rd.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	86
4th.	Amending the Constitution	79
5th.	Law and Order	79
6th.	Safeguards against secession	73
7th.	The Judiciary	72
8th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	69
9th.	The Structure of the State	67
10th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	61
11th.	Public Service	60
12th.	The Parliament	53
13th.	Electoral System	52
14th.	The Powers of the President	47
15th.	Religious Rights	46

Muslim response

Similarly 11% of the Muslim community also have reservations about ‘The Powers of the President’ and they are also split on ‘Religious Rights’ at 30% ‘essential’ and 17% ‘unacceptable’ (Table 14). As Tamil speakers their top priority is similarly ‘Language Rights’ at 85% ‘essential or desirable’ (Table 15).

The sample size for this poll was not large enough to generate reliable results for the smaller political parties in Sri Lanka. However, it was possible to get a result for the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC: Table 16). The percentages follow a similar pattern to those of the Muslim community as a whole but unlike the results for the TNA, which were stronger than the Tamil results in general the SLMC results seem to be slightly more moderate than they are for other Muslims.

Table 14. The Muslim response to the APRC proposals

Muslim per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	29	39	17	3	4	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	25	36	17	10	2	10
3. The Parliament	22	42	17	4	5	10
4. Amending the Constitution	28	43	13	4	3	9
5. The Powers of the President	28	30	16	4	11	11
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	25	33	20	8	2	13
7. Language Rights	49	36	8	2	1	4
8. Religious Rights	30	32	9	9	17	3
9. Fundamental Rights	47	35	10	2	3	4
10. Electoral System	28	36	16	9	3	9
11. The Judiciary	33	42	10	4	1	9
12. Public Service	34	40	9	7	1	9
13. Safeguards against secession	24	37	11	11	4	13
14. Law and Order	35	38	11	4	3	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’	27	45	13	4	0	10

Table 15. Muslim priorities for the APRC proposals

Muslim per cent 'essential or desirable'		
1st.	Language Rights	85
2nd.	Fundamental Rights	82
3rd.	The Judiciary	75
4th.	Public Service	74
5th.	Law and Order	73
6th.	All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	72
7th.	Amending the Constitution	71
8th.	The Structure of the State	68
9th.	The Parliament	64
10th.	Electoral System	64
11th.	Religious Rights	62
12th.	The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	61
13th.	Safeguards against secession	61
14th.	The Powers of the President	58
15th.	The Powers of Local Authorities	58

Table 16. The SLMC response to the APRC proposals

SLMC per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	34	37	24	0	2	2
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	27	46	22	2	0	2
3. The Parliament	19	57	14	2	5	2
4. Amending the Constitution	19	50	19	7	2	2
5. The Powers of the President	25	38	23	3	5	8
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	27	39	22	2	0	10
7. Language Rights	46	34	10	2	5	2
8. Religious Rights	26	31	12	12	17	2
9. Fundamental Rights	33	36	19	2	5	5
10. Electoral System	26	45	17	0	5	7
11. The Judiciary	36	40	12	5	0	7
12. Public Service	30	43	10	13	3	3
13. Safeguards against secession	24	46	15	7	0	7
14. Law and Order	36	43	10	2	2	7
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	28	38	26	3	0	5

Support for reform

All these results are very good but if, for example, the people of Sri Lanka were asked to vote for them in a referendum would the results be different? With this point in mind each person being interviewed was asked if they would support this set of proposals (Table 17a), would they change their opinion if the party they supported did or did not support the proposals (Tables 17b and 17c) and finally should the government undertake such a programme of reform anyway (Table 18).

The results for this series of questions are, as with the other results of this poll, most reassuring. Eighty six per cent of the Tamil community said they would support the APRC proposals rising to 90% for Muslims and 92% for Up-Country Tamils. In the Eastern Province 91% said 'yes'. As for the political parties the strongest support came from the TNA at 90% 'yes' followed by the SLMC at 88%, UNP at 85% and JVP at 83%. Similarly the people of Sri Lanka want the government to go ahead with these reforms rather than have 'no change' (Table 18).

The weakest support for the proposals was from the SLFP at 68% 'yes' but only 10% of them said 'no' with 22% undecided. However, if 'The Powers of the President' were revised in a way that met the concerns of the SLFP and if the President were to give his support to the APRC reforms then this 67% 'yes' will most probably be improved. Finally given the overall consistency of these results it seems unlikely that a few minor changes or revisions will significantly alter the outcome of these results and that the people of Sri Lanka will support the APRC proposals. Providing, of course, the political leaders of Sri Lanka do not pervert the will of the people as they sometimes have done in the past. 'Winning the peace', is clearly in their grasp.

Table 17a. Question: 'Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here?'

Per cent	Yes	No	DK
Sinhala	67	12	21
Tamil	86	4	10
Eastern Province	91	2	7
Up Country Tamil	92	0	8
Muslim	90	1	9

Per cent	Yes	No	DK
SLFP	68	10	22
UNP	85	3	12
JVP	83	4	13
TNA	90	2	7
SLMC	88	5	7

Table 17b. Question: ‘If you answered ‘Yes’ would you still support these reforms even if the political party you support, was against them?’

Per cent	Yes	No	Not affiliated to any Party	DK
Sinhala	72	20	4	4
Tamil	40	44	12	4
Eastern Province	48	35	13	4
Up Country Tamil	66	32	1	1
Muslim	59	32	4	5

Per cent	Yes	No	Not affiliated to any Party	DK
SLFP	69	23	4	5
UNP	64	32	1	3
JVP	68	26	5	0
TNA	34	51	11	4
SLMC	62	38	0	0

Table 17c. Question: ‘If you answered ‘No’ would you support these reforms if the political party you support, was for them?’

Per cent	Yes	No	Not affiliated to any Party	DK
Sinhala	22	66	0	12
Tamil	11	67	0	22
Eastern Province	17	83	0	0
Up Country Tamil	0	0	0	0
Muslim	0	33	33	33

Per cent	Yes	No	Not affiliated to any Party	DK
SLFP	23	64	13	23
UNP	25	75	0	25
JVP	0	0	0	0
TNA	0	0	0	0
SLMC	0	0	0	0

Table 18. Question: ‘Finally with regards to the programme of reforms outline here do you want the Government of Sri Lanka to press ahead with these reforms or make no changes to the present system of government?’

Per cent	Reform	No Change	DK
Sinhala	61	16	23
Tamil	92	0	8
Eastern Province	86	5	9
Up Country Tamil	94	0	6
Muslim	89	3	8

Per cent	Reform	No Change	DK
SLFP	62	16	22
UNP	82	4	14
JVP	83	0	17
TNA	94	0	6
SLMC	88	7	5

Appendix

Copy of questionnaire and results for each community

Peace in Sri Lanka

Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is _____ from _____. At this critical time we are conducting a survey of public opinion to find out what the people of Sri Lanka believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the island.

The Research is being carried out by the staff of Social Indicator in Colombo.

The Survey involves interviewing two thousand people from all parts of Sri Lanka to complete a representative sample in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and geographical area.

Topics covered include:

- The range of problems faced by the people
- What you think will happen if reforms are not put in place to consolidate the peace
- The major elements of possible reforms for achieving a lasting peace
- Who you think can best help Sri Lanka achieve a lasting peace
- And finally some questions that tell us where you fit into our sample

All your answers will be kept completely confidential.

1. The Problems

People from different communities often hold very different views about the problems at the centre of a conflict. Here is a list of some of the problems given to our research team from the different regions of Sri Lanka. Which problems do you consider to be 'Very significant', 'Significant', 'Of some significance', 'Of little significance' or 'Of no significance at all'.

NOTE: The results for this question are presented in rank order of 'very significant' so that comparisons can be made with a very similar question run a year ago in 2008 available at www.peacepolls.org

Sinhala per cent		Very Significant
1st	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	63
2nd	The continued violence of the LTTE	61
3rd	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	45
4th	Violence over the past 30 years	42
5th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	41
6th	The ongoing war	37
7th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	32
8th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	32
9th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	31
10th	Corrupt politicians	25
11th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	25
12th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	20
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	20
14th	The decline of the economy	19
15th	The British Colonialism	19
16th	Polarisation of civil society	18
17th	Failure to implement language rights	18
18th	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	18
19th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	18
20th	Inflation	17
21st	Unemployment	15
22nd	State aided colonization and change of demographics	15
23rd	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	15
24th	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	15
25th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	15
26th	Politicisation of the public service	15
27th	Discrimination after independence	15
28th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	14
29th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	14
30th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	14
31st	Lack of basic health care	12
32nd	The Police do not provide service for the public	11
33rd	Politicians frequently changing party	11
34th	State control over media	11
35th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	11
36th	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	11
37th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	10
38th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	10
39th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	10
40th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	10
41st	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	9
42nd	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	8
43rd	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	8
44th	Increasing number of IDPs	8
45th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	7
46th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	6
47th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	6
48th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	3
49th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	2

Tamil per cent		Very Significant
1st	Discrimination after independence	66
2nd	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	63
3rd	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	62
4th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	60
5th	Failure to implement language rights	60
6th	The ongoing war	59
7th	Violence over the past 30 years	54
8th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	53
9th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	53
10th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	52
11th	State control over media	51
12th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	50
13th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	50
14th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	49
15th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	46
16th	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	46
17th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	44
18th	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	43
19th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	42
20th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	41
21st	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	40
22nd	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	39
23rd	Increasing number of IDPs	38
24th	Politicisation of the public service	38
25th	Unemployment	37
26th	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	37
27th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	36
28th	The Police do not provide service for the public	36
29th	The continued violence of the LTTE	35
30th	The British Colonialism	34
31st	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	33
32nd	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	32
33rd	Inflation	31
34th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	30
35th	The decline of the economy	29
36th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	28
37th	Corrupt politicians	28
38th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	28
39th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	25
40th	Politicians frequently changing party	25
41st	Polarisation of civil society	24
42nd	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	22
43rd	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	22
44th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	21
45th	Lack of basic health care	20
46th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	20
47th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	20
48th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	17
49th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	14

Up-Country Tamil per cent		Very Significant
1st	Violence over the past 30 years	80
2nd	The ongoing war	79
3rd	State control over media	73
4th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	72
5th	Failure to implement language rights	71
6th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	65
7th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	64
8th	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	62
9th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	62
10th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	62
11th	Discrimination after independence	61
12th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	60
13th	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	59
14th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	59
15th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	58
16th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	56
17th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	52
18th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	50
19th	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	47
20th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	47
21st	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	47
22nd	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	42
23rd	Corrupt politicians	41
24th	The continued violence of the LTTE	40
25th	The Police do not provide service for the public	39
26th	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	38
27th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	38
28th	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	37
29th	Inflation	35
30th	The decline of the economy	31
31st	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	31
32nd	Polarisation of civil society	31
33rd	Politicisation of the public service	31
34th	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	31
35th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	30
36th	Politicians frequently changing party	30
37th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	26
38th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	22
39th	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	22
40th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	22
41st	Increasing number of IDPs	21
42nd	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	19
43rd	The British Colonialism	19
44th	Unemployment	16
45th	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	16
46th	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	13
47th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	13
48th	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	10
49th	Lack of basic health care	5

Muslim per cent		Very Significant
1st	The continued violence of the LTTE	57
2nd	Abuse of Human Rights by the LTTE	55
3rd	Failure to implement 17th Amendment	54
4th	It is not possible to kill the last Tiger	53
5th	Failure to implement 13th Amendment	52
6th	Violence over the past 30 years	51
7th	All Tamils being treated like terrorists by the security forces	51
8th	State aided colonization and change of demographics	50
9th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Armed forces	49
10th	The ongoing war	48
11th	Failure to bring perpetrators of human rights violations to justice	48
12th	Abuse of Human Rights by the Police	46
13th	Abuse of Human Rights by Paramilitary groups associated with government forces	45
14th	Proliferation of armed paramilitary forces	44
15th	Failure to provide Sri Lankan Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	44
16th	Failure to implement language rights	43
17th	The failure of successive governments to find a political solution	43
18th	A defeated LTTE will give rise to new armed groups	42
19th	The Police do not provide service for the public	40
20th	The Armed forces are predominately Sinhalese	40
21st	Failure to provide Muslims with a constitutional solution to their problems	40
22nd	Politicisation of the public service	39
23rd	The Police are predominately Sinhalese	37
24th	Heightened ethnic polarisation in politics and life	37
25th	Vested interests in ongoing conflict	37
26th	Devolution of power to North and East will lead to the break up of Sri Lanka	37
27th	Discrimination after independence	37
28th	The LTTE can only be weakened by war	35
29th	Government leadership dependent on JVP and JHU	34
30th	Disproportionate power exercised by JVP and JHU	33
31st	Corrupt politicians	33
32nd	State control over media	33
33rd	Unemployment	32
34th	Failure to protect historic Hindu sites	31
35th	Dominance of Sinhalese in public sector employment	31
36th	Lack of free and fair elections including manipulation	31
37th	Non-productive Peace Secretariat	28
38th	Inflation	27
39th	The decline of the economy	25
40th	Public Institutions corrupted for political purposes	25
41st	Increasing number of IDPs	23
42nd	Upcountry Tamils do not own their own homes	23
43rd	Increasing number of refugees leaving Sri Lanka	22
44th	Politicians frequently changing party	20
45th	Failure to provide Upcountry Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problems	19
46th	Failure to protect historic Buddhist sites in the North and East	17
47th	Polarisation of civil society	17
48th	The British Colonialism	17
49th	Lack of basic health care	9

2. If there is no Reform

From the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if there is no reform of the constitution to deal with the problems of the past. Please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Possible', 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.

Results with DKs included:

Sinhala per cent	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	7	18	19	25	13	18
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	7	18	22	23	15	15
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	7	20	23	16	9	25
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	8	21	21	14	11	25
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	11	16	19	18	13	24

Tamil per cent	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	44	26	19	3	3	4
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	55	21	17	3	1	3
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	34	28	24	8	1	4
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	41	22	19	3	1	14
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	52	22	14	2	1	8

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	35	21	18	12	10	5
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	63	10	9	10	4	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	51	18	13	7	4	6
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	58	15	4	7	6	9
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	67	12	6	4	6	5

Muslim per cent	Very probable	Probable	Possible	Improbable	Very improbable	DK
The international community will not invest in Sri Lanka	45	32	11	4	0	7
The Sri Lankan economy will not develop	49	31	10	5	1	4
India will continue to be involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka	24	38	23	4	1	11
The LTTE or new militant groups will start terrorist actions again	44	27	13	1	2	13
The present opportunity to make peace will be lost for a generation	36	38	12	3	1	10

3. A Program for Reform

With regards to the future peace and stability of Sri Lanka I am now going to present you with a number of reforms on a series of cards. For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable' and for the purposes of this poll 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' mean:

'Essential' – You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better future for the island and should be fully implemented.

'Desirable' – This option is not what you would consider to be 'Essential', but you think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice.

'Acceptable' – This option is not what you would consider to be 'Desirable', if you were given a choice, but you could certainly 'live with it'.

'Tolerable' – This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it.

'Unacceptable' – This option is totally unacceptable under any circumstances. You would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the island.

You may use each of the terms 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' and 'Unacceptable' as many times as you wish in each question.

SHOW CARDS 1 to 14

15. **The Structure of the State** – Powers will be divided between the centre and the provinces under a unitary state.
16. **The Powers of the Centre and Provinces** – These powers will be clearly defined in two lists.
17. **The Parliament** - Will consist of two houses. The House of Representatives directly elected by the people and the Senate elected by the Provincial Legislators with each Province having the same number of Senators.
18. **Amending the Constitution** – Amendments affecting the powers of the Provinces can only be made if a majority of Senators from each of the Provinces votes in favour together with not less than two thirds of a joint session of both houses. Amending certain specific articles will also require approval by the people at a referendum.
19. **The Powers of the President** – The Executive Presidency will cease to exist at the end of the incumbent's term and be replaced by the Westminster system with a Prime Minister enjoying majority support in the House of Representatives.
20. **The Powers of Local Authorities** – The Local Authorities will have powers to make by-laws in respect of subjects listed separately in the Constitution.
21. **Language Rights** – The Tamil and Sinhala languages will have parity of status as national and official languages and as languages of the courts. English can also be used for official purposes where it is expedient to do so. Sinhala and Tamil shall be the medium of instruction at the school level as well as English if facilities are available. Sinhala, Tamil and English shall be used at institutes of higher education.
22. **Religious Rights** – Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed.
23. **Fundamental Rights** – Individual and Group Rights will be recognized including the equality of all citizens and the protection of all persons before the law.
24. **Electoral System** – The House of Representatives and Provincial Legislators will be elected on a mixed system of first past the post and proportional representation.
25. **The Judiciary** – Will be independent of the Executive. The Court of Appeal will function with Divisions in the Provinces along with the Provincial High Courts.
26. **Public Service** – There will be separate services for the Centre and the Provinces with certain categories of officers classified as all island services. The Village, Divisional and District levels of administration will all come under the Provinces. As far as is practical the Public Service will reflect the composition of the population and it will be independent.
27. **Safeguards against secession** – The Constitution will provide for adequate safeguards against attempts by any Province to succeed from the State.
28. **Law and Order** - There will be a Sri Lanka police officers service consisting of senior officers from all ethnic groups. Policing will be devolved to the Provinces with certain powers retained by the centre. National security will be the responsibility of the centre.

Sinhala per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	20	35	16	5	9	16
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	13	28	23	5	11	21
3. The Parliament	9	21	19	6	15	29
4. Amending the Constitution	14	23	19	5	8	31
5. The Powers of the President	12	26	14	5	23	19
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	11	22	27	7	11	23
7. Language Rights	33	35	12	3	9	8
8. Religious Rights	46	30	10	3	5	6
9. Fundamental Rights	35	36	16	2	3	7
10. Electoral System	18	25	18	4	13	24
11. The Judiciary	18	28	16	4	10	24
12. Public Service	13	28	21	6	6	25
13. Safeguards against secession	18	25	19	4	8	26
14. Law and Order	21	25	16	7	14	17
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	13	21	25	11	9	22

Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	33	19	16	11	15	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	31	22	21	15	4	7
3. The Parliament	37	24	17	13	1	8
4. Amending the Constitution	39	26	15	7	2	11
5. The Powers of the President	37	29	12	6	6	9
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	34	21	15	15	6	9
7. Language Rights	72	13	8	2	1	4
8. Religious Rights	44	10	6	6	28	6
9. Fundamental Rights	69	7	11	4	2	7
10. Electoral System	31	21	15	12	7	13
11. The Judiciary	49	24	12	7	1	6
12. Public Service	38	28	17	8	3	7
13. Safeguards against secession	33	17	17	16	7	11
14. Law and Order	55	17	11	7	2	8
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	41	27	14	6	2	11

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	44	23	12	2	11	9
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	38	23	17	1	8	13
3. The Parliament	37	16	15	5	13	13
4. Amending the Constitution	58	21	2	3	4	13
5. The Powers of the President	34	13	8	24	11	10
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	49	20	11	3	1	17
7. Language Rights	79	12	2	1	2	5
8. Religious Rights	42	4	2	0	46	6
9. Fundamental Rights	79	8	4	2	0	7
10. Electoral System	35	17	14	12	5	17
11. The Judiciary	52	20	7	6	3	13
12. Public Service	37	23	18	6	1	15
13. Safeguards against secession	63	10	6	4	6	12
14. Law and Order	67	12	8	1	3	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	71	15	4	0	0	9

Muslim per cent	Essential	Desirable	Acceptable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	DK
1. The Structure of the State	29	39	17	3	4	7
2. The Powers of the Centre and Provinces	25	36	17	10	2	10
3. The Parliament	22	42	17	4	5	10
4. Amending the Constitution	28	43	13	4	3	9
5. The Powers of the President	28	30	16	4	11	11
6. The Powers of Local Authorities	25	33	20	8	2	13
7. Language Rights	49	36	8	2	1	4
8. Religious Rights	30	32	9	9	17	3
9. Fundamental Rights	47	35	10	2	3	4
10. Electoral System	28	36	16	9	3	9
11. The Judiciary	33	42	10	4	1	9
12. Public Service	34	40	9	7	1	9
13. Safeguards against secession	24	37	11	11	4	13
14. Law and Order	35	38	11	4	3	10
15. All of the reform proposals taken together as a 'package'	27	45	13	4	0	10

16. Would you support a package of constitutional reforms for Sri Lanka as outlined here? **Yes/No/DK**

Per cent	Yes	No	DK
Sinhala	67	12	21
Tamil	86	4	10
Up Country Tamil	92	0	8
Muslim	90	1	9

17. If you answered 'Yes' would you still support these reforms even if the political party you support, was against them? **Yes/No/Not affiliated to any Party/DK**

Per cent	Yes	No	Not affiliated to any Party	DK
Sinhala	72	20	4	4
Tamil	40	44	12	4
Up Country Tamil	66	32	1	1
Muslim	59	32	4	5

18. If you answered 'No' would you support these reforms if the political party you support, was for them? **Yes/No/Not affiliated to any Party/DK**

Per cent	Yes	No	Not affiliated to any Party	DK
Sinhala	22	66	0	12
Tamil	11	67	0	22
Up Country Tamil	0	0	0	0
Muslim	0	33	33	33

Reform or Not?

Finally with regards to the programme of reforms outline here do you want the Government of Sri Lanka to press ahead with these reforms or make no changes to the present system of government?

Per cent	Reform	No Change	DK
Sinhala	61	16	23
Tamil	92	0	8
Up Country Tamil	94	0	6
Muslim	89	3	8

Trust and Confidence

With regards to who you would like to see involved with insuring peace and stability in Sri Lanka please indicate which politicians you trust ‘very much’, ‘quite a bit’, ‘nether trust or distrust’, ‘do not trust’ or ‘do not trust at all’.

Sinhala per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Rajapaksa	69	24	3	3	0	1
Minister Tissa Vitharana	5	18	26	12	5	33
Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe	3	10	11	29	44	3
Mr. R. Sambandan	-	3	10	24	32	31
Mr. Rauffhakeem	0	7	20	31	27	15
Mr. Soma Wansa Amarasinghe	2	9	26	26	30	7
Mr. Champika Ranawake	2	24	31	15	13	15
Mr. V. Muralitharan (Karuna)	1	7	16	23	41	12
Mr. Douglas Devananda	2	12	17	21	25	23
Mr. Arumugam Thondaman	1	3	14	28	35	19
Mr. S. Chandrakanthan (Pillayam)	0	5	12	22	45	15

Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Rajapaksa	8	26	11	12	40	2
Minister Tissa Vitharana	1	8	16	16	29	30
Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe	13	41	17	11	15	2
Mr. R. Sambandan	11	22	22	11	17	17
Mr. Rauffhakeem	1	12	23	22	26	16
Mr. Soma Wansa Amarasinghe	0	0	10	19	43	28
Mr. Champika Ranawake	0	0	9	18	43	29
Mr. V. Muralitharan (Karuna)	3	7	16	16	42	16
Mr. Douglas Devananda	3	6	14	24	36	17
Mr. Arumugam Thondaman	1	17	15	25	35	7
Mr. S. Chandrakanthan (Pillayam)	3	14	15	14	38	15

Up-Country Tamil per cent

	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Rajapaksa	4	28	12	21	33	2
Minister Tissa Vitharana	4	9	22	14	16	35
Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe	36	35	4	7	13	5
Mr. R. Sambandan	4	18	21	15	10	32
Mr. Rauffhakeem	4	20	9	30	18	20
Mr. Soma Wansa Amarasinghe	1	4	2	11	63	20
Mr. Champika Ranawake	-	3	5	10	46	36
Mr. V. Muralitharan (Karuna)	-	4	4	13	58	21
Mr. Douglas Devananda	2	7	4	12	55	21
Mr. Arumugam Thondaman	4	9	4	18	57	8
Mr. S. Chandrakanthan (Pillayam)	3	11	6	14	41	25

Muslim per cent

	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Rajapaksa	35	36	17	6	2	4
Minister Tissa Vitharana	8	23	26	9	3	31
Mr. Ranil Wickremasinghe	14	33	24	15	8	6
Mr. R. Sambandan	5	12	26	17	15	26
Mr. Rauffhakeem	19	30	30	7	5	9
Mr. Soma Wansa Amarasinghe	5	8	18	22	27	21
Mr. Champika Ranawake	4	7	17	17	25	29
Mr. V. Muralitharan (Karuna)	8	8	20	17	26	21
Mr. Douglas Devananda	9	12	22	15	20	22
Mr. Arumugam Thondaman	6	10	28	16	21	19
Mr. S. Chandrakanthan (Pillayam)	9	9	22	14	26	20

And which persons of reputation do you trust 'very much', 'quite a bit', 'nether trust or distrust', 'do not trust' or 'do not trust at all'.

Sinhala per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne	13	27	16	4	3	36
Prof. Nalin de Silva	3	19	19	4	3	52
Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekera	10	34	21	4	2	29
Ven. Bellanwila Wimalaratne Thero	33	40	14	1	1	10
Mahanayake – Malwatta Chapter	44	39	12	1	2	3
Mahanayake – Asgiriya Chapter	42	40	12	1	1	4
Catholic Archbishop of Colombo	16	26	24	6	3	25
Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe	0	5	15	9	12	59
Dr. Jehan Perera	0	3	14	7	8	68
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu	0	3	13	6	12	66

Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne	1	12	13	9	7	57
Prof. Nalin de Silva	0	7	17	9	10	57
Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekera	1	5	19	11	10	54
Ven. Bellanwila Wimalaratne Thero	0	4	17	12	17	50
Mahanayake – Malwatta Chapter	2	11	17	11	19	40
Mahanayake – Asgiriya Chapter	1	11	19	13	16	40
Catholic Archbishop of Colombo	8	28	17	6	8	33
Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe	3	18	17	6	12	43
Dr. Jehan Perera	1	10	22	6	12	49
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu	13	23	16	5	6	38

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne	3	12	28	4	2	53
Prof. Nalin de Silva	1	11	25	3	7	54
Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekera	0	10	21	5	7	57
Ven. Bellanwila Wimalaratne Thero	1	4	4	14	33	44
Mahanayake – Malwatta Chapter	3	11	4	13	32	37
Mahanayake – Asgiriya Chapter	4	11	4	14	30	36
Catholic Archbishop of Colombo	10	36	5	7	5	37
Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe	2	14	18	4	6	55
Dr. Jehan Perera	1	2	22	5	6	63
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu	4	26	19	2	5	45

Muslim per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne	2	13	17	8	0	60
Prof. Nalin de Silva	0	5	19	8	1	67
Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekera	0	4	18	8	2	67
Ven. Bellanwila Wimalaratne Thero	0	3	16	12	4	65
Mahanayake – Malwatta Chapter	0	4	19	9	10	57
Mahanayake – Asgiriya Chapter	0	5	20	7	10	58
Catholic Archbishop of Colombo	0	4	20	9	6	61
Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe	1	4	16	9	3	67
Dr. Jehan Perera	0	4	16	8	3	70
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu	0	5	17	8	2	67

And which International Statesmen do you trust 'very much', 'quite a bit', 'nether trust or distrust', 'do not trust' or 'do not trust at all'.

Sinhala per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Obama	12	37	23	8	5	15
Prime Minister of India	7	45	25	7	6	10
Secretary General of the UN	5	28	26	9	6	26
Nelson Mandela	5	19	22	9	7	38
Mr. Karunanidhi	0	5	10	21	39	25
Miss. Jayalalitha	1	16	18	19	23	23
Japanese Special Envoy Ambassador Akashi	1	21	20	15	15	27
The Pope	6	34	27	5	6	21

Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Obama	22	48	10	10	4	6
Prime Minister of India	8	37	18	16	15	5
Secretary General of the UN	30	39	11	4	4	12
Nelson Mandela	14	25	23	12	9	16
Mr. Karunanidhi	11	33	16	16	20	5
Miss. Jayalalitha	1	27	21	21	22	8
Japanese Special Envoy Ambassador Akashi	13	34	16	16	8	13
The Pope	24	32	18	7	5	14

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Obama	28	28	3	13	5	24
Prime Minister of India	35	38	4	11	5	7
Secretary General of the UN	40	29	3	2	5	21
Nelson Mandela	13	20	21	5	7	34
Mr. Karunanidhi	32	40	2	6	10	10
Miss. Jayalalitha	18	34	5	19	18	6
Japanese Special Envoy Ambassador Akashi	16	31	5	9	8	30
The Pope	35	28	7	4	4	22

Muslim per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
President Obama	19	38	22	4	2	14
Prime Minister of India	7	42	26	9	1	15
Secretary General of the UN	16	33	26	4	2	18
Nelson Mandela	10	20	26	13	4	26
Mr. Karunanidhi	5	20	20	23	14	17
Miss. Jayalalitha	9	19	22	19	14	16
Japanese Special Envoy Ambassador Akashi	18	32	23	6	2	18
The Pope	6	13	19	22	16	23

And which Countries and International Organisations do you trust ‘very much’, ‘quite a bit’, ‘nether trust or distrust’, ‘do not trust’ or ‘do not trust at all’.

Sinhala per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
India	9	52	20	12	5	3
UN	6	36	28	12	5	14
EU	2	20	26	18	8	27
SARRC	14	50	16	3	4	13
Norway	1	6	7	22	52	12
Japan	5	46	26	4	8	10
China	12	48	22	4	5	10
Pakistan	8	35	28	11	6	12
UK	1	24	33	16	12	15
World Bank	4	35	23	10	9	18
USA	3	31	22	10	6	28

Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
India	19	38	9	13	20	1
UN	36	34	12	8	1	8
EU	17	33	19	10	6	15
SARRC	9	22	26	19	12	13
Norway	30	37	13	13	1	6
Japan	10	30	20	18	10	12
China	3	19	21	23	19	15
Pakistan	1	9	18	27	32	13
UK	26	28	16	10	8	12
World Bank	24	25	17	11	7	17
USA	21	25	10	6	3	36

Up-Country Tamil per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
India	54	32	4	6	2	3
UN	46	21	6	5	0	21
EU	7	16	24	10	4	38
SARRC	18	34	6	11	4	27
Norway	32	39	4	6	2	16
Japan	6	21	19	16	10	28
China	3	15	21	17	19	26
Pakistan	0	5	4	22	42	26
UK	6	9	24	11	20	30
World Bank	12	19	19	5	7	38
USA	15	18	12	6	1	48

Muslim per cent	Trust very much	Trust quite a bit	Neither trust or distrust	Do not trust	Do not trust at all	DK
India	18	46	18	11	1	5
UN	20	41	17	8	2	12
EU	9	39	20	13	2	17
SARRC	17	42	21	4	2	14
Norway	14	30	18	15	8	14
Japan	15	40	23	7	1	14
China	9	34	27	11	3	15
Pakistan	14	43	21	12	2	9
UK	6	30	26	17	5	17
World Bank	18	37	20	5	4	17
USA	16	30	17	8	9	21